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authorMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>2019-01-16 13:11:13 +1000
committerSuhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>2019-05-02 14:55:13 -0400
commit34477ccd39a8d4bfa8ad612f22d5a46291922185 (patch)
treecb10c04ca46dc532d59d8da2c5ca797e54093b9e /src
parent6a7f8777a0b193fae4f976196f3464ffac01bf1b (diff)
[refactor] Add useful-for-dos "reason" field to CValidationState
This is a first step towards cleaning up our DoS interface - make validation return *why* something is invalid, and let net_processing figure out what that implies in terms of banning/disconnection/etc. Behavior change: peers will now be banned for providing blocks with premature coinbase spends. Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au> Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/tx_check.cpp18
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp10
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/validation.h85
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp1
-rw-r--r--src/validation.cpp131
6 files changed, 171 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
index 638f6b808d..3aa6d3ae1f 100644
--- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
+++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
@@ -11,24 +11,24 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe
{
// Basic checks that don't depend on any context
if (tx.vin.empty())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
if (tx.vout.empty())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
// Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability)
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
// Check for negative or overflow output values
CAmount nValueOut = 0;
for (const auto& txout : tx.vout)
{
if (txout.nValue < 0)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative");
if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge");
nValueOut += txout.nValue;
if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut))
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge");
}
// Check for duplicate inputs - note that this check is slow so we skip it in CheckBlock
@@ -37,20 +37,20 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
{
if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
}
}
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
{
if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length");
}
else
{
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
if (txin.prevout.IsNull())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
}
return true;
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
index 24b5338503..62a1676e2b 100644
--- a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
+++ b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c
{
// are the actual inputs available?
if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx)) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", false,
strprintf("%s: inputs missing/spent", __func__));
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c
// If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured
if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", false,
strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight));
}
@@ -180,20 +180,20 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c
// Check for negative or overflow input values
nValueIn += coin.out.nValue;
if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn)) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange");
}
}
const CAmount value_out = tx.GetValueOut();
if (nValueIn < value_out) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false,
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false,
strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(value_out)));
}
// Tally transaction fees
const CAmount txfee_aux = nValueIn - value_out;
if (!MoneyRange(txfee_aux)) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
}
txfee = txfee_aux;
diff --git a/src/consensus/validation.h b/src/consensus/validation.h
index 163b17e629..787b171eea 100644
--- a/src/consensus/validation.h
+++ b/src/consensus/validation.h
@@ -22,6 +22,50 @@ static const unsigned char REJECT_NONSTANDARD = 0x40;
static const unsigned char REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE = 0x42;
static const unsigned char REJECT_CHECKPOINT = 0x43;
+/** A "reason" why something was invalid, suitable for determining whether the
+ * provider of the object should be banned/ignored/disconnected/etc.
+ * These are much more granular than the rejection codes, which may be more
+ * useful for some other use-cases.
+ */
+enum class ValidationInvalidReason {
+ // txn and blocks:
+ NONE, //!< not actually invalid
+ CONSENSUS, //!< invalid by consensus rules (excluding any below reasons)
+ /**
+ * Invalid by a change to consensus rules more recent than SegWit.
+ * Currently unused as there are no such consensus rule changes, and any download
+ * sources realistically need to support SegWit in order to provide useful data,
+ * so differentiating between always-invalid and invalid-by-pre-SegWit-soft-fork
+ * is uninteresting.
+ */
+ RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE,
+ // Only blocks (or headers):
+ CACHED_INVALID, //!< this object was cached as being invalid, but we don't know why
+ BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, //!< invalid proof of work or time too old
+ BLOCK_MUTATED, //!< the block's data didn't match the data committed to by the PoW
+ BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, //!< We don't have the previous block the checked one is built on
+ BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, //!< A block this one builds on is invalid
+ BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, //!< block timestamp was > 2 hours in the future (or our clock is bad)
+ BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, //!< the block failed to meet one of our checkpoints
+ // Only loose txn:
+ TX_NOT_STANDARD, //!< didn't meet our local policy rules
+ TX_MISSING_INPUTS, //!< a transaction was missing some of its inputs (or its inputs were spent at < coinbase maturity height)
+ /**
+ * Transaction might be missing a witness, have a witness prior to SegWit
+ * activation, or witness may have been malleated (which includes
+ * non-standard witnesses).
+ */
+ TX_WITNESS_MUTATED,
+ /**
+ * Tx already in mempool or conflicts with a tx in the chain
+ * (if it conflicts with another tx in mempool, we use MEMPOOL_POLICY as it failed to reach the RBF threshold)
+ * TODO: Currently this is only used if the transaction already exists in the mempool or on chain,
+ * TODO: ATMP's fMissingInputs and a valid CValidationState being used to indicate missing inputs
+ */
+ TX_CONFLICT,
+ TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, //!< violated mempool's fee/size/descendant/RBF/etc limits
+};
+
/** Capture information about block/transaction validation */
class CValidationState {
private:
@@ -30,31 +74,35 @@ private:
MODE_INVALID, //!< network rule violation (DoS value may be set)
MODE_ERROR, //!< run-time error
} mode;
+ ValidationInvalidReason m_reason;
int nDoS;
std::string strRejectReason;
unsigned int chRejectCode;
bool corruptionPossible;
std::string strDebugMessage;
public:
- CValidationState() : mode(MODE_VALID), nDoS(0), chRejectCode(0), corruptionPossible(false) {}
- bool DoS(int level, bool ret = false,
+ CValidationState() : mode(MODE_VALID), m_reason(ValidationInvalidReason::NONE), nDoS(0), chRejectCode(0), corruptionPossible(false) {}
+ bool DoS(int level, ValidationInvalidReason reasonIn, bool ret = false,
unsigned int chRejectCodeIn=0, const std::string &strRejectReasonIn="",
bool corruptionIn=false,
const std::string &strDebugMessageIn="") {
+ m_reason = reasonIn;
chRejectCode = chRejectCodeIn;
strRejectReason = strRejectReasonIn;
corruptionPossible = corruptionIn;
strDebugMessage = strDebugMessageIn;
+ nDoS += level;
+ assert(nDoS == GetDoSForReason());
+ assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED));
if (mode == MODE_ERROR)
return ret;
- nDoS += level;
mode = MODE_INVALID;
return ret;
}
- bool Invalid(bool ret = false,
+ bool Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason _reason, bool ret = false,
unsigned int _chRejectCode=0, const std::string &_strRejectReason="",
const std::string &_strDebugMessage="") {
- return DoS(0, ret, _chRejectCode, _strRejectReason, false, _strDebugMessage);
+ return DoS(0, _reason, ret, _chRejectCode, _strRejectReason, false, _strDebugMessage);
}
bool Error(const std::string& strRejectReasonIn) {
if (mode == MODE_VALID)
@@ -72,12 +120,39 @@ public:
return mode == MODE_ERROR;
}
bool CorruptionPossible() const {
+ assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED));
return corruptionPossible;
}
void SetCorruptionPossible() {
corruptionPossible = true;
+ assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED));
}
int GetDoS(void) const { return nDoS; }
+ int GetDoSForReason() const {
+ switch (m_reason) {
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE:
+ return 0;
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
+ return 100;
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV:
+ return 10;
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT:
+ case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ValidationInvalidReason GetReason() const { return m_reason; }
unsigned int GetRejectCode() const { return chRejectCode; }
std::string GetRejectReason() const { return strRejectReason; }
std::string GetDebugMessage() const { return strDebugMessage; }
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index a416093db1..489ffcdc66 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -961,6 +961,7 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV
static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state)
{
+ assert(state.GetDoS() == state.GetDoSForReason());
return (state.GetDoS() > 0);
}
@@ -975,6 +976,7 @@ static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state)
* txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152.
*/
static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") {
+ assert(state.GetDoS() == state.GetDoSForReason());
int nDoS = state.GetDoS();
if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) {
LOCK(cs_main);
diff --git a/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp b/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp
index 4876c44f10..aa30129361 100644
--- a/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp
+++ b/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_CASE(tx_mempool_reject_coinbase, TestChain100Setup)
// Check that the validation state reflects the unsuccessful attempt.
BOOST_CHECK(state.IsInvalid());
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state.GetRejectReason(), "coinbase");
+ BOOST_CHECK(state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS);
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 0951b3cf97..5f6d578c2b 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -579,28 +579,28 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase");
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
std::string reason;
if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason))
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason);
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason);
// Do not work on transactions that are too small.
// A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes.
// Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to reduce unnecessary malloc overhead.
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small");
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small");
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
// be mined yet.
if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS))
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final");
// is it already in the memory pool?
if (pool.exists(hash)) {
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool");
}
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
}
}
if (fReplacementOptOut) {
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict");
}
setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
if (pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known");
}
}
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
// CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
if (!CheckSequenceLocks(pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final");
CAmount nFees = 0;
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, GetSpendHeight(view), nFees)) {
@@ -694,11 +694,11 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view))
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
// Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, view))
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true);
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true);
int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
@@ -722,21 +722,21 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize();
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false,
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize);
if (!bypass_limits && mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) {
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee));
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee));
}
// No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected blocks
if (!bypass_limits && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) {
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)));
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)));
}
if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
- return state.Invalid(false,
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee",
strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
@@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
std::string errString;
if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) {
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString);
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString);
}
// A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
{
- return state.DoS(100, false,
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", false,
strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
hash.ToString(),
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
{
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
hash.ToString(),
@@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
}
} else {
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false,
REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements", false,
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
hash.ToString(),
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
// tx that's in the mempool.
if (pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false,
REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", false,
strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
hash.ToString(), j));
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
// transactions would not be paid for.
if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
{
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
{
- return state.DoS(0, false,
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false,
REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false,
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(),
@@ -898,7 +898,8 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
!CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
- state.SetCorruptionPossible();
+ state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
+ state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), true, state.GetDebugMessage());
}
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
}
@@ -956,7 +957,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
if (!bypass_limits) {
LimitMempoolSize(pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60);
if (!pool.exists(hash))
- return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
+ return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full");
}
}
@@ -1357,6 +1358,9 @@ void InitScriptExecutionCache() {
* which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache
* entry again.
*
+ * Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking
+ * callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases.
+ *
* Non-static (and re-declared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp
*/
bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
@@ -1418,7 +1422,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i,
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
if (check2())
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
}
// Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is
// invalid in new blocks, e.g. an invalid P2SH. We DoS ban
@@ -1427,7 +1431,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi
// as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue
// peering with non-upgraded nodes even after soft-fork
// super-majority signaling has occurred.
- return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
}
}
@@ -1922,7 +1926,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
- return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"),
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-BIP30");
}
}
@@ -1962,11 +1966,17 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
{
CAmount txfee = 0;
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) {
+ if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
+ // CheckTxInputs may return MISSING_INPUTS but we can't return that, as
+ // it's not defined for a block, so we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here.
+ state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
+ state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ }
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
nFees += txfee;
if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__),
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
}
@@ -1979,7 +1989,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
}
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) {
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__),
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
}
}
@@ -1990,7 +2000,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
// * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase)
nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"),
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops");
txdata.emplace_back(tx);
@@ -1999,9 +2009,16 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks;
bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */
if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) {
- // With parallel script checks, we always set DoS to 100; do
- // that here as well for simplicity (for now).
- state.DoS(100, false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD) {
+ // CheckInputs may return NOT_STANDARD for extra flags we passed,
+ // but we can't return that, as it's not defined for a block, so
+ // we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here.
+ // In the event of a future soft-fork, we may need to
+ // consider whether rewriting to CONSENSUS or
+ // RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE would be more appropriate.
+ state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false,
+ state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage());
+ }
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
}
@@ -2019,13 +2036,13 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl
CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus());
if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward)
- return state.DoS(100,
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS,
error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)",
block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward),
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-amount");
if (!control.Wait())
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed");
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
@@ -3051,7 +3068,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state,
{
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
return true;
}
@@ -3073,13 +3090,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
bool mutated;
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
// while still invalidating it.
if (mutated)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction");
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@@ -3090,19 +3107,19 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
// Size limits
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed");
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase");
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase");
// Check transactions
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx)
if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true))
- return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
+ return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(),
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage()));
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
@@ -3111,7 +3128,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
}
if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
block.fChecked = true;
@@ -3204,7 +3221,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// Check proof of work
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work");
// Check against checkpoints
if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
@@ -3213,23 +3230,23 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// MapBlockIndex.
CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = Checkpoints::GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints());
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight)
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
}
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", false, "block's timestamp is too early");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", false, "block's timestamp is too early");
// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
- return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
// check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), false,
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), false,
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
return true;
@@ -3259,7 +3276,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// Check that all transactions are finalized
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
}
}
@@ -3269,7 +3286,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase");
}
}
@@ -3291,11 +3308,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
// witness tree.
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
}
CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin());
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
}
fHaveWitness = true;
}
@@ -3305,7 +3322,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
if (!fHaveWitness) {
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
}
}
}
@@ -3317,7 +3334,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
// failed).
if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
- return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
}
return true;
@@ -3337,7 +3354,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
if (ppindex)
*ppindex = pindex;
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
- return state.Invalid(error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate");
+ return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate");
return true;
}
@@ -3348,10 +3365,10 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr;
BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(block.hashPrevBlock);
if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end())
- return state.DoS(10, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found");
+ return state.DoS(10, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found");
pindexPrev = (*mi).second;
if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK)
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime()))
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@@ -3388,7 +3405,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState&
setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(invalid_walk);
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
}
- return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
+ return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk");
}
}
}