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authorMarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>2018-11-07 14:59:33 -0500
committerMarcoFalke <falke.marco@gmail.com>2018-11-07 14:59:35 -0500
commit11e1ac3ae08535cefbd8235a8deb6cd100bcb2b1 (patch)
treec9f0a8d3a2c862b8b2d1a86fa8244eedbd5da45d /src
parentd26d15c6c89ad02c0a951d5242bcdd3f29096a31 (diff)
parentb191c7dfb7ede3f74edb3a32b8ac6fa2f4d6b78a (diff)
downloadbitcoin-11e1ac3ae08535cefbd8235a8deb6cd100bcb2b1.tar.xz
Merge #14436: doc: add comment explaining recentRejects-DoS behavior
b191c7dfb7 doc: add comment explaining recentRejects-DoS behavior (James O'Beirne) Pull request description: When we receive invalid txs for the first time, we mark the sender as misbehaving. If we receive the same tx before a new block is seen, we *don't* punish the second sender (in the same way we do the original sender). It wasn't initially clear to me that this is intentional, so add a clarifying comment. Tree-SHA512: d12c674db137ed3ad83e0b941bffe6ddcd2982238048742afa574a4235881f0e58cfc0a4a576a0503e74c5c5240c270b9520fa30221e8b43a371fb3e0b37066b
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp17
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index f37312d155..f4ab3aa153 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -2357,6 +2357,23 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : lRemovedTxn)
AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx);
+ // If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached
+ // this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run
+ // the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS
+ // score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
+ //
+ // This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
+ // tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
+ // we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In
+ // other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
+ // submitted a DoSy tx.
+ //
+ // Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
+ // transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
+ // due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
+ // peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught,
+ // regardless of false positives.
+
int nDoS = 0;
if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS))
{