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authorWladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>2018-07-09 20:23:46 +0200
committerWladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>2018-07-09 20:25:50 +0200
commit7e74c54fed364a2974b6033da12de65abc07df93 (patch)
tree7af8425faeb6467e2bc09d8db5dc56de163c5d66 /src
parent8cc048ee53e5ec8f6378c4e702083548706adcf0 (diff)
parentd280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 (diff)
Merge #13452: rpc: have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure
d280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 [qa] Add a test for merkle proof malleation (Suhas Daftuar) ed82f1700006830b6fe34572b66245c1487ccd29 have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure (Gregory Sanders) Pull request description: Recent publication of a weakness in Bitcoin's merkle tree construction demonstrates many SPV applications vulnerable to an expensive to pull off yet still plausible attack: https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design/ This change would at least allow `verifytxoutproof` to properly validate that the proof matches a known block, with known number of transactions any time after the full block is processed. This should neuter the attack entirely. The negative is that a header-only processed block/future syncing mode would cause this to fail until the node has imported the data required. related: #13451 `importprunedfunds` needs this check as well. Can expand it to cover this if people like the idea. Tree-SHA512: 0682ec2b622a38b29f3f635323e0a8b6fc071e8a6fd134c954579926ee7b516e642966bafa667016744ce49c16e19b24dbc8801f982a36ad0a6a4aff6d93f82b
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/merkleblock.h6
-rw-r--r--src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp13
2 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/merkleblock.h b/src/merkleblock.h
index 0976e21c3a..984e33a961 100644
--- a/src/merkleblock.h
+++ b/src/merkleblock.h
@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ public:
* returns the merkle root, or 0 in case of failure
*/
uint256 ExtractMatches(std::vector<uint256> &vMatch, std::vector<unsigned int> &vnIndex);
+
+ /** Get number of transactions the merkle proof is indicating for cross-reference with
+ * local blockchain knowledge.
+ */
+ unsigned int GetNumTransactions() const { return nTransactions; };
+
};
diff --git a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
index 63548bff05..3e06b05aca 100644
--- a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
+++ b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static UniValue verifytxoutproof(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
"\nArguments:\n"
"1. \"proof\" (string, required) The hex-encoded proof generated by gettxoutproof\n"
"\nResult:\n"
- "[\"txid\"] (array, strings) The txid(s) which the proof commits to, or empty array if the proof is invalid\n"
+ "[\"txid\"] (array, strings) The txid(s) which the proof commits to, or empty array if the proof can not be validated.\n"
);
CDataStream ssMB(ParseHexV(request.params[0], "proof"), SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS);
@@ -323,12 +323,17 @@ static UniValue verifytxoutproof(const JSONRPCRequest& request)
LOCK(cs_main);
const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(merkleBlock.header.GetHash());
- if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex)) {
+ if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex) || pindex->nTx == 0) {
throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_ADDRESS_OR_KEY, "Block not found in chain");
}
- for (const uint256& hash : vMatch)
- res.push_back(hash.GetHex());
+ // Check if proof is valid, only add results if so
+ if (pindex->nTx == merkleBlock.txn.GetNumTransactions()) {
+ for (const uint256& hash : vMatch) {
+ res.push_back(hash.GetHex());
+ }
+ }
+
return res;
}