diff options
author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2018-07-09 20:23:46 +0200 |
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committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2018-07-09 20:25:50 +0200 |
commit | 7e74c54fed364a2974b6033da12de65abc07df93 (patch) | |
tree | 7af8425faeb6467e2bc09d8db5dc56de163c5d66 /src | |
parent | 8cc048ee53e5ec8f6378c4e702083548706adcf0 (diff) | |
parent | d280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 (diff) |
Merge #13452: rpc: have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure
d280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 [qa] Add a test for merkle proof malleation (Suhas Daftuar)
ed82f1700006830b6fe34572b66245c1487ccd29 have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure (Gregory Sanders)
Pull request description:
Recent publication of a weakness in Bitcoin's merkle tree construction demonstrates many SPV applications vulnerable to an expensive to pull off yet still plausible attack: https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design/
This change would at least allow `verifytxoutproof` to properly validate that the proof matches a known block, with known number of transactions any time after the full block is processed. This should neuter the attack entirely.
The negative is that a header-only processed block/future syncing mode would cause this to fail until the node has imported the data required.
related: #13451
`importprunedfunds` needs this check as well. Can expand it to cover this if people like the idea.
Tree-SHA512: 0682ec2b622a38b29f3f635323e0a8b6fc071e8a6fd134c954579926ee7b516e642966bafa667016744ce49c16e19b24dbc8801f982a36ad0a6a4aff6d93f82b
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/merkleblock.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp | 13 |
2 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/src/merkleblock.h b/src/merkleblock.h index 0976e21c3a..984e33a961 100644 --- a/src/merkleblock.h +++ b/src/merkleblock.h @@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ public: * returns the merkle root, or 0 in case of failure */ uint256 ExtractMatches(std::vector<uint256> &vMatch, std::vector<unsigned int> &vnIndex); + + /** Get number of transactions the merkle proof is indicating for cross-reference with + * local blockchain knowledge. + */ + unsigned int GetNumTransactions() const { return nTransactions; }; + }; diff --git a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp index 63548bff05..3e06b05aca 100644 --- a/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp +++ b/src/rpc/rawtransaction.cpp @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static UniValue verifytxoutproof(const JSONRPCRequest& request) "\nArguments:\n" "1. \"proof\" (string, required) The hex-encoded proof generated by gettxoutproof\n" "\nResult:\n" - "[\"txid\"] (array, strings) The txid(s) which the proof commits to, or empty array if the proof is invalid\n" + "[\"txid\"] (array, strings) The txid(s) which the proof commits to, or empty array if the proof can not be validated.\n" ); CDataStream ssMB(ParseHexV(request.params[0], "proof"), SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS); @@ -323,12 +323,17 @@ static UniValue verifytxoutproof(const JSONRPCRequest& request) LOCK(cs_main); const CBlockIndex* pindex = LookupBlockIndex(merkleBlock.header.GetHash()); - if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex)) { + if (!pindex || !chainActive.Contains(pindex) || pindex->nTx == 0) { throw JSONRPCError(RPC_INVALID_ADDRESS_OR_KEY, "Block not found in chain"); } - for (const uint256& hash : vMatch) - res.push_back(hash.GetHex()); + // Check if proof is valid, only add results if so + if (pindex->nTx == merkleBlock.txn.GetNumTransactions()) { + for (const uint256& hash : vMatch) { + res.push_back(hash.GetHex()); + } + } + return res; } |