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authorAndrew Chow <github@achow101.com>2023-04-13 18:14:12 -0400
committerAndrew Chow <github@achow101.com>2023-04-13 18:21:54 -0400
commit2bfe43db164de7382d01c06dbdebf250d35f9f2f (patch)
tree8ebafab18f7dc849520b9a1ffb7b9b3cf1d02c4b /src
parent19764dc143281376ea08e954018479ed10405b72 (diff)
parentb5585ba5f97a19d1b435d9ab69b5a55cfd45dd70 (diff)
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#27374: p2p: skip netgroup diversity of new connections for tor/i2p/cjdns
b5585ba5f97a19d1b435d9ab69b5a55cfd45dd70 p2p: skip netgroup diversity of new connections for tor/i2p/cjdns networks (stratospher) Pull request description: Follow up for #27264. In order to make sure that our persistent outbound slots belong to different netgroups, distinct net groups of our peers are added to `setConnected`. We’d only open a persistent outbound connection to peers which have a different netgroup compared to those netgroups present in `setConnected`. Current `GetGroup()` logic assumes route-based diversification behaviour for tor/i2p/cjdns addresses (addresses are public key based and not route-based). Distinct netgroups possible (according to the current `GetGroup()` logic) for: 1. tor => 030f, 031f, .. 03ff (16 possibilities) 2. i2p => 040f, 041f, .. 04ff (16 possibilities) 3. cjdns => 05fc0f, 05fc1f, ... 05fcff (16 possibilities) `setConnected` is used in `ThreadOpenConnections()` before making [outbound](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/84f4ac39fda7ffa5dc84e92d92dd1eeeb5e20f8c/src/net.cpp#L1846) and [anchor](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/84f4ac39fda7ffa5dc84e92d92dd1eeeb5e20f8c/src/net.cpp#L1805) connections to new peers so that they belong to distinct netgroups. **behaviour on master** - if we run a node only on tor/i2p/cjdns - we wouldn't be able to open more than 16 outbound connections(manual, block-relay-only anchor, outbound full relay, block-relay-only connections) because we run out of possible netgroups. - see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27264#issuecomment-1481322628 - tested by changing `MAX_OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY_CONNECTIONS` to 17 with `onlynet=onion` and observed how node wouldn't make more than 16 outbound connections. **behaviour on PR** - netgroup diversity checks are skipped for tor/i2p/cjdns addresses. - we don't insert tor/i2p/cjdns address in `setConnected` and `GetGroup` doesn't get called on tor/i2p/cjdns(see #27369) ACKs for top commit: achow101: ACK b5585ba5f97a19d1b435d9ab69b5a55cfd45dd70 mzumsande: ACK b5585ba5f97a19d1b435d9ab69b5a55cfd45dd70 vasild: ACK b5585ba5f97a19d1b435d9ab69b5a55cfd45dd70 Tree-SHA512: c120b3f9ca7f0be3f29ea665cd2f7dfb40cd1d7ec7058984252fb6e0295e414f736c5b4fba03c31188188a5ae4f543fb2654f6ee9776bad745c7ca72d23d5b9b
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/net.cpp28
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp
index 4f4c0a4079..903fedb2fb 100644
--- a/src/net.cpp
+++ b/src/net.cpp
@@ -1703,10 +1703,11 @@ void CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections(const std::vector<std::string> connect)
//
CAddress addrConnect;
- // Only connect out to one peer per network group (/16 for IPv4).
+ // Only connect out to one peer per ipv4/ipv6 network group (/16 for IPv4).
int nOutboundFullRelay = 0;
int nOutboundBlockRelay = 0;
- std::set<std::vector<unsigned char> > setConnected;
+ int outbound_privacy_network_peers = 0;
+ std::set<std::vector<unsigned char>> setConnected; // netgroups of our ipv4/ipv6 outbound peers
{
LOCK(m_nodes_mutex);
@@ -1714,7 +1715,7 @@ void CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections(const std::vector<std::string> connect)
if (pnode->IsFullOutboundConn()) nOutboundFullRelay++;
if (pnode->IsBlockOnlyConn()) nOutboundBlockRelay++;
- // Make sure our persistent outbound slots belong to different netgroups.
+ // Make sure our persistent outbound slots to ipv4/ipv6 peers belong to different netgroups.
switch (pnode->m_conn_type) {
// We currently don't take inbound connections into account. Since they are
// free to make, an attacker could make them to prevent us from connecting to
@@ -1728,7 +1729,19 @@ void CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections(const std::vector<std::string> connect)
case ConnectionType::MANUAL:
case ConnectionType::OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY:
case ConnectionType::BLOCK_RELAY:
- setConnected.insert(m_netgroupman.GetGroup(pnode->addr));
+ CAddress address{pnode->addr};
+ if (address.IsTor() || address.IsI2P() || address.IsCJDNS()) {
+ // Since our addrman-groups for these networks are
+ // random, without relation to the route we
+ // take to connect to these peers or to the
+ // difficulty in obtaining addresses with diverse
+ // groups, we don't worry about diversity with
+ // respect to our addrman groups when connecting to
+ // these networks.
+ ++outbound_privacy_network_peers;
+ } else {
+ setConnected.insert(m_netgroupman.GetGroup(address));
+ }
} // no default case, so the compiler can warn about missing cases
}
}
@@ -1886,8 +1899,11 @@ void CConnman::ThreadOpenConnections(const std::vector<std::string> connect)
}
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Making feeler connection to %s\n", addrConnect.ToStringAddrPort());
}
-
- OpenNetworkConnection(addrConnect, (int)setConnected.size() >= std::min(nMaxConnections - 1, 2), &grant, nullptr, conn_type);
+ // Record addrman failure attempts when node has at least 2 persistent outbound connections to peers with
+ // different netgroups in ipv4/ipv6 networks + all peers in Tor/I2P/CJDNS networks.
+ // Don't record addrman failure attempts when node is offline. This can be identified since all local
+ // network connections(if any) belong in the same netgroup and size of setConnected would only be 1.
+ OpenNetworkConnection(addrConnect, (int)setConnected.size() + outbound_privacy_network_peers >= std::min(nMaxConnections - 1, 2), &grant, nullptr, conn_type);
}
}
}