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authorR E Broadley <rebroad+github@gmail.com>2015-06-26 22:38:07 +0300
committerR E Broadley <rebroad+github@gmail.com>2016-03-08 08:49:42 +0000
commit9988554fc76250b1f695c616341c8dd3278c928b (patch)
treedf8b0e60e7d8066144c596fe75f21588bea557b6 /src
parent9f33dba05c01ecc5c56eb1284ab7d64d42f55171 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-9988554fc76250b1f695c616341c8dd3278c928b.tar.xz
No "Unknown command" for getaddr command.
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/main.cpp17
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp
index babdff54ef..378c454cd2 100644
--- a/src/main.cpp
+++ b/src/main.cpp
@@ -5064,13 +5064,18 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
}
- // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
- // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
- // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
- // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
- // the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
- else if ((strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR) && (pfrom->fInbound))
+ else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR)
{
+ // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
+ // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
+ // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
+ // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
+ // the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
+ if (!pfrom->fInbound) {
+ LogPrint("net", "Ignoring \"getaddr\" from outbound connection. peer=%d\n", pfrom->id);
+ return true;
+ }
+
pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
vector<CAddress> vAddr = addrman.GetAddr();
BOOST_FOREACH(const CAddress &addr, vAddr)