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| author | Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> | 2018-07-16 10:28:42 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> | 2018-07-16 10:37:02 -0700 |
| commit | f8d470e24606297dab95e30b1d39ff664fbda31d (patch) | |
| tree | e9dae171054bb1692c7ae097794e30245e4a3b4f /src/validation.h | |
| parent | 17943f77bda22d515e29662d31c8ac936b85f470 (diff) | |
| parent | d45b344ffd46b0226449cbd46cdaff9577402cf0 (diff) | |
| download | bitcoin-f8d470e24606297dab95e30b1d39ff664fbda31d.tar.xz | |
Merge #13298: Net: Bucketing INV delays (1 bucket) for incoming connections to hide tx time
d45b344ffd Bucket for inbound when scheduling invs to hide tx time (Gleb)
Pull request description:
It has been brought up to my attention that current random delays mechanism (originally intended to obfuscate transaction metadata) allows to easily estimate the time a transaction was received by a node.
It may be done by connecting multiple observer nodes to the same node. Each of those nodes will generate its own schedule of delays. Combined metadata regarding those events from different sources allows an observer to estimate transaction time.
After this patch a spy won't gain additional information by just creating multiple connections to a target.
Tree-SHA512: c71dae5ff350b614cb40a8e201fd0562d3e03e3e72a5099718cd451f0d84c66d5e52bbaf0d5b4b75137514c8efdedcc6ef4df90142b360153f04ad0721545ab1
Diffstat (limited to 'src/validation.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/validation.h | 14 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/src/validation.h b/src/validation.h index 07fe99c079..869f847cdb 100644 --- a/src/validation.h +++ b/src/validation.h @@ -104,20 +104,6 @@ static const unsigned int DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL = 60 * 60; static const unsigned int DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60; /** Maximum length of reject messages. */ static const unsigned int MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 111; -/** Average delay between local address broadcasts in seconds. */ -static const unsigned int AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60; -/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts in seconds. */ -static const unsigned int AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 30; -/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds. - * Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */ -static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5; -/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. - * Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods. */ -static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL; -/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */ -static const unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60; -/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */ -static const unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60; /** Block download timeout base, expressed in millionths of the block interval (i.e. 10 min) */ static const int64_t BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 1000000; /** Additional block download timeout per parallel downloading peer (i.e. 5 min) */ |