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| author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2019-05-04 11:58:48 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2019-05-04 11:58:57 +0200 |
| commit | d7d7d315060620446bd363ca50f95f79d3260db7 (patch) | |
| tree | f9b5ca3cb92d50524ffe614499bd12e726f0ea7d /src/validation.cpp | |
| parent | f19a3b2ded4b86d859c0a464f550e0743af78ae3 (diff) | |
| parent | 0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b (diff) | |
Merge #15141: Rewrite DoS interface between validation and net_processing
0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b Separate reason for premature spends (coinbase/locktime) (Suhas Daftuar)
54470e767bab37f9b7089782b1be73d5883bb244 Assert validation reasons are contextually correct (Suhas Daftuar)
2120c31521aa51aa1984ee33250b8320506d3a0f [refactor] Update some comments in validation.cpp as we arent doing DoS there (Matt Corallo)
12dbdd7a41bac73e51ed8f7b290b7671196bf9ea [refactor] Drop unused state.DoS(), state.GetDoS(), state.CorruptionPossible() (Matt Corallo)
aa502b88d10c2c3ac56d9163555849b96dc4df1e scripted-diff: Remove DoS calls to CValidationState (Matt Corallo)
7721ad64f40a0c67edefaaf7353264d78df8803e [refactor] Prep for scripted-diff by removing some \ns which annoy sed. (Matt Corallo)
5e78c5734bb0c9aae7b0a7019a745b2d7059b3d9 Allow use of state.Invalid() for all reasons (Matt Corallo)
6b34bc6b6f54f85537494cbea3846d5d195a06d9 Fix handling of invalid headers (Suhas Daftuar)
ef54b486d5333dfc85c56e6b933c81735196a25d [refactor] Use Reasons directly instead of DoS codes (Matt Corallo)
9ab2a0412e96e87956fe61257387683635213035 CorruptionPossible -> BLOCK_MUTATED (Matt Corallo)
6e55b292b0ea944897b6dc2f766446fd209af484 CorruptionPossible -> TX_WITNESS_MUTATED (Matt Corallo)
7df16e70e67c753c871797ce947ea09d7cb0e519 LookupBlockIndex -> CACHED_INVALID (Matt Corallo)
c8b0d22698385f91215ce8145631e3d5826dc977 [refactor] Drop redundant nDoS, corruptionPossible, SetCorruptionPossible (Matt Corallo)
34477ccd39a8d4bfa8ad612f22d5a46291922185 [refactor] Add useful-for-dos "reason" field to CValidationState (Matt Corallo)
6a7f8777a0b193fae4f976196f3464ffac01bf1b Ban all peers for all block script failures (Suhas Daftuar)
7b999103e21509e1c2dec10f68e48744ffe90f55 Clean up banning levels (Matt Corallo)
b8b4c80146780f9011abbd1be72343cc965c07b9 [refactor] drop IsInvalid(nDoSOut) (Matt Corallo)
8818729013e17c650a25f030b2b80e0997389155 [refactor] Refactor misbehavior ban decisions to MaybePunishNode() (Matt Corallo)
00e11e61c0211a62788611cd6a6714a393fdc26c [refactor] rename stateDummy -> orphan_state (Matt Corallo)
f34fa719cf33a51d11f1d2219cbe73ccff6fd697 Drop obsolete sigops comment (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
This is a rebase of #11639 with some fixes for the last few comments which were not yet addressed.
The original PR text, with some strikethroughs of text that is no longer correct:
> This cleans up an old main-carryover - it made sense that main could decide what DoS scores to assign things because the DoS scores were handled in a different part of main, but now validation is telling net_processing what DoS scores to assign to different things, which is utter nonsense. Instead, we replace CValidationState's nDoS and CorruptionPossible with a general ValidationInvalidReason, which net_processing can handle as it sees fit. I keep the behavior changes here to a minimum, but in the future we can utilize these changes for other smarter behavior, such as disconnecting/preferring to rotate outbound peers based on them providing things which are invalid due to SOFT_FORK because we shouldn't ban for such cases.
>
> This is somewhat complementary with, though obviously conflicts heavily with #11523, which added enums in place of DoS scores, as well as a few other cleanups (which are still relevant).
>
> Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made:
>
> Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS
> points to 100.
> Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban
> instead of 10 DoS points.
> ~~BIP68-violation no longer results in a ban as it is SOFT_FORK.~~
> ~~Non-SegWit SigOp violation no longer results in a ban as it
> considers P2SH sigops and is thus SOFT_FORK.~~
> ~~Any script violation in a block no longer results in a ban as
> it may be the result of a SOFT_FORK. This should likely be
> fixed in the future by differentiating between them.~~
> Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban.
> Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks
> too far in the future continue to not result in a ban.
> Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a
> ban instead of 10 DoS points.
Note: The change to ban all peers for consensus violations is actually NOT the change I'd like to make -- I'd prefer to only ban outbound peers in those situations. The current behavior is a bit of a mess, however, and so in the interests of advancing this PR I tried to keep the changes to a minimum. I plan to revisit the behavior in a followup PR.
EDIT: One reviewer suggested I add some additional context for this PR:
> The goal of this work was to make net_processing aware of the actual reasons for validation failures, rather than just deal with opaque numbers instructing it to do something.
>
> In the future, I'd like to make it so that we use more context to decide how to punish a peer. One example is to differentiate inbound and outbound peer misbehaviors. Another potential example is if we'd treat RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE failures differently (ie after the next consensus change is implemented), and perhaps again we'd want to treat some peers differently than others.
ACKs for commit 0ff1c2:
jnewbery:
utACK 0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b
ryanofsky:
utACK 0ff1c2a838da9e8dc7f77609adc89124bbea3e2b. Only change is dropping the first commit (f3883a321bf4ab289edcd9754b12cae3a648b175), and dropping the temporary `assert(level == GetDoS())` that was in 35ee77f2832eaffce30042e00785c310c5540cdc (now c8b0d22698385f91215ce8145631e3d5826dc977)
Tree-SHA512: e915a411100876398af5463d0a885920e44d473467bb6af991ef2e8f2681db6c1209bb60f848bd154be72d460f039b5653df20a6840352c5f7ea5486d9f777a3
Diffstat (limited to 'src/validation.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/validation.cpp | 178 |
1 files changed, 98 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp index 1da79e09f6..ba9d6184ee 100644 --- a/src/validation.cpp +++ b/src/validation.cpp @@ -585,28 +585,28 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction if (tx.IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase"); // Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest) std::string reason; if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason); // Do not work on transactions that are too small. // A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes. // Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to reduce unnecessary malloc overhead. if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small"); // Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't // be mined yet. if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final"); // is it already in the memory pool? if (pool.exists(hash)) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool"); } // Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions @@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool } } if (fReplacementOptOut) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict"); } setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash()); @@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) { // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs if (pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known"); } } // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own if (!CheckSequenceLocks(pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final"); CAmount nFees = 0; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, GetSpendHeight(view), nFees)) { @@ -704,11 +704,11 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view)) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, view)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard"); int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS); @@ -731,27 +731,22 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lp); unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize(); - // Check that the transaction doesn't have an excessive number of - // sigops, making it impossible to mine. Since the coinbase transaction - // itself can contain sigops MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS is less than - // MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS; we still consider this an invalid rather than - // merely non-standard transaction. if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost)); CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize); if (!bypass_limits && mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee)); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee)); } // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected blocks if (!bypass_limits && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))); } if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee) - return state.Invalid(false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee)); @@ -763,7 +758,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000; std::string errString; if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString); } // A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now @@ -775,8 +770,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash(); if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor)) { - return state.DoS(10, false, - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s", hash.ToString(), hashAncestor.ToString())); @@ -818,8 +812,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize()); if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate) { - return state.DoS(0, false, - REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s", hash.ToString(), newFeeRate.ToString(), @@ -847,8 +840,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize(); } } else { - return state.DoS(0, false, - REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n", hash.ToString(), nConflictingCount, @@ -867,8 +859,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a // tx that's in the mempool. if (pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, - REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d", hash.ToString(), j)); } @@ -880,8 +871,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // transactions would not be paid for. if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees) { - return state.DoS(0, false, - REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees))); } @@ -891,8 +881,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees; if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, - REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nDeltaFees), @@ -913,8 +902,10 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) && !CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) { // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine. - state.SetCorruptionPossible(); + state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage()); } + assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs } @@ -971,7 +962,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool if (!bypass_limits) { LimitMempoolSize(pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60); if (!pool.exists(hash)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full"); } } @@ -1309,7 +1300,7 @@ void static InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex* pindexNew) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(c } void CChainState::InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex *pindex, const CValidationState &state) { - if (!state.CorruptionPossible()) { + if (state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) { pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_failed_blocks.insert(pindex); setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex); @@ -1377,6 +1368,9 @@ void InitScriptExecutionCache() { * which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache * entry again. * + * Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking + * callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases. + * * Non-static (and re-declared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp */ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) @@ -1432,22 +1426,26 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi // Check whether the failure was caused by a // non-mandatory script verification check, such as // non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy - // arguments; if so, don't trigger DoS protection to - // avoid splitting the network between upgraded and - // non-upgraded nodes. + // arguments; if so, ensure we return NOT_STANDARD + // instead of CONSENSUS to avoid downstream users + // splitting the network between upgraded and + // non-upgraded nodes by banning CONSENSUS-failing + // data providers. CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i, flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata); if (check2()) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } - // Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is - // invalid in new blocks, e.g. an invalid P2SH. We DoS ban - // such nodes as they are not following the protocol. That - // said during an upgrade careful thought should be taken - // as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue - // peering with non-upgraded nodes even after soft-fork - // super-majority signaling has occurred. - return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + // MANDATORY flag failures correspond to + // ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS + // failures are the most serious case of validation + // failures, we may need to consider using + // RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE for any script failure that + // could be due to non-upgraded nodes which we may want to + // support, to avoid splitting the network (but this + // depends on the details of how net_processing handles + // such errors). + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } } @@ -1807,7 +1805,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl // re-enforce that rule here (at least until we make it impossible for // GetAdjustedTime() to go backward). if (!CheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck)) { - if (state.CorruptionPossible()) { + if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) { // We don't write down blocks to disk if they may have been // corrupted, so this should be impossible unless we're having hardware // problems. @@ -1942,7 +1940,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) { if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) { - return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"), + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-BIP30"); } } @@ -1982,11 +1980,19 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl { CAmount txfee = 0; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) { + if (!IsBlockReason(state.GetReason())) { + // CheckTxInputs may return MISSING_INPUTS or + // PREMATURE_SPEND but we can't return that, as it's not + // defined for a block, so we reset the reason flag to + // CONSENSUS here. + state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage()); + } return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } nFees += txfee; if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) { - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__), + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange"); } @@ -1999,7 +2005,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl } if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) { - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); } } @@ -2010,7 +2016,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl // * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase) nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"), + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops"); txdata.emplace_back(tx); @@ -2018,9 +2024,20 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl { std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks; bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */ - if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) + if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) { + if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD) { + // CheckInputs may return NOT_STANDARD for extra flags we passed, + // but we can't return that, as it's not defined for a block, so + // we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here. + // In the event of a future soft-fork, we may need to + // consider whether rewriting to CONSENSUS or + // RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE would be more appropriate. + state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage()); + } return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); + } control.Add(vChecks); } @@ -2035,13 +2052,13 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus()); if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) - return state.DoS(100, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-amount"); if (!control.Wait()) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed"); int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2; LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal); @@ -2569,7 +2586,7 @@ bool CChainState::ActivateBestChainStep(CValidationState& state, const CChainPar if (!ConnectTip(state, chainparams, pindexConnect, pindexConnect == pindexMostWork ? pblock : std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>(), connectTrace, disconnectpool)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { // The block violates a consensus rule. - if (!state.CorruptionPossible()) { + if (state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) { InvalidChainFound(vpindexToConnect.front()); } state = CValidationState(); @@ -3067,7 +3084,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state, { // Check proof of work matches claimed amount if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams)) - return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", "proof of work failed"); return true; } @@ -3089,13 +3106,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P bool mutated; uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, // while still invalidating it. if (mutated) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction"); } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any @@ -3106,19 +3123,19 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P // Size limits if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed"); // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase"); for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase"); // Check transactions for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true)) - return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), + return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage())); unsigned int nSigOps = 0; @@ -3127,7 +3144,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx); } if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; @@ -3236,7 +3253,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta // Check proof of work const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus(); if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work"); // Check against checkpoints if (fCheckpointsEnabled) { @@ -3245,23 +3262,23 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta // MapBlockIndex. CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints()); if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); } // Check timestamp against prev if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); // Check timestamp if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); // Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) || (block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) || (block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height)) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion)); return true; @@ -3291,7 +3308,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // Check that all transactions are finalized for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) { - return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction"); } } @@ -3301,7 +3318,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight; if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() || !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase"); } } @@ -3323,11 +3340,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the // witness tree. if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); } CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin()); if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); } fHaveWitness = true; } @@ -3337,7 +3354,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c if (!fHaveWitness) { for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (tx->HasWitness()) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); } } } @@ -3349,7 +3366,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently // failed). if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); } return true; @@ -3369,7 +3386,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& if (ppindex) *ppindex = pindex; if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) - return state.Invalid(error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate"); return true; } @@ -3380,10 +3397,10 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr; BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(block.hashPrevBlock); if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end()) - return state.DoS(10, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found"); pindexPrev = (*mi).second; if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime())) return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); @@ -3420,7 +3437,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(invalid_walk); invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev; } - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); } } } @@ -3524,7 +3541,8 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, CVali if (!CheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus()) || !ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), pindex->pprev)) { - if (state.IsInvalid() && !state.CorruptionPossible()) { + assert(IsBlockReason(state.GetReason())); + if (state.IsInvalid() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED) { pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex); } |