[validation] Remove useless ret parameter from Invalid()

ValidationState::Invalid() takes a parameter `ret` which is returned to
the caller. All call sites set this to false. Remove the `ret` parameter
and just return false always.

1 files changed, 56 insertions, 56 deletions

diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index f21e44d348..21f7f9c8db 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -506,11 +506,11 @@ private:
     {
         CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(package_size);
         if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
         }
 
         if (package_fee < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)) {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
         }
         return true;
     }
@@ -563,29 +563,29 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
 
     // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
     if (tx.IsCoinBase())
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "coinbase");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "coinbase");
 
     // Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
     std::string reason;
     if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason))
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, reason);
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason);
 
     // Do not work on transactions that are too small.
     // A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes.
     // Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842 by not relaying
     // 64-byte transactions.
     if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "tx-size-small");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "tx-size-small");
 
     // Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
     // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
     // be mined yet.
     if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS))
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-final");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-final");
 
     // is it already in the memory pool?
     if (m_pool.exists(hash)) {
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-in-mempool");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-in-mempool");
     }
 
     // Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
                     }
                 }
                 if (fReplacementOptOut) {
-                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "txn-mempool-conflict");
+                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
                 }
 
                 setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
             for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
                 // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
                 if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
-                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-known");
+                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-known");
                 }
             }
             // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
     // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
     // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
     if (!CheckSequenceLocks(m_pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-BIP68-final");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-BIP68-final");
 
     CAmount nFees = 0;
     if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, GetSpendHeight(m_view), nFees)) {
@@ -677,11 +677,11 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
 
     // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
     if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view))
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
 
     // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
     if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view))
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
 
     int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
 
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
     unsigned int nSize = entry->GetTxSize();
 
     if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
                 strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
 
     // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
     if (!bypass_limits && !CheckFeeRate(nSize, nModifiedFees, state)) return false;
 
     if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
-        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
+        return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD,
                 "absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
 
     const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
         // this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
         if (nSize >  EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT ||
                 !m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, 2, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants + 1, m_limit_descendant_size + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
         }
     }
 
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
         const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
         if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
         {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
                     strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
                         hash.ToString(),
                         hashAncestor.ToString()));
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
             CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
             if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
             {
-                return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
+                return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
                         strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
                             hash.ToString(),
                             newFeeRate.ToString(),
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
                 nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
             }
         } else {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too many potential replacements",
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too many potential replacements",
                     strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
                         hash.ToString(),
                         nConflictingCount,
@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
                 // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
                 // tx that's in the mempool.
                 if (m_pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
-                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
+                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
                             strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
                                 hash.ToString(), j));
                 }
@@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
         // transactions would not be paid for.
         if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
         {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
                     strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
                         hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
         }
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
         CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
         if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
         {
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
                     strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
                         hash.ToString(),
                         FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, Precompute
         if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
                 !CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
             // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
-            state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
+            state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED,
                     state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
         }
         return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
     if (!bypass_limits) {
         LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, std::chrono::hours{gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY)});
         if (!m_pool.exists(hash))
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool full");
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
     }
     return true;
 }
@@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV
                 CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i,
                         flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
                 if (check2())
-                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+                    return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
             }
             // MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
             // TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV
             // support, to avoid splitting the network (but this
             // depends on the details of how net_processing handles
             // such errors).
-            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
+            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
         }
     }
 
@@ -2058,7 +2058,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
             for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
                 if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
                     LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction\n");
-                    return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-BIP30");
+                    return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-BIP30");
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -2099,14 +2099,14 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
             TxValidationState tx_state;
             if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) {
                 // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
-                state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false,
+                state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
                             tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
                 return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
             }
             nFees += txfee;
             if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
                 LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.\n", __func__);
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
             }
 
             // Check that transaction is BIP68 final
@@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
 
             if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) {
                 LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction\n", __func__);
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
             }
         }
 
@@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
         nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
         if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) {
             LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): too many sigops\n");
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops");
         }
 
         txdata.emplace_back(tx);
@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
             TxValidationState tx_state;
             if (fScriptChecks && !CheckInputs(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) {
                 // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
-                state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false,
+                state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
                               tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
                 return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
                     tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@@ -2161,12 +2161,12 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
     CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus());
     if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) {
         LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)\n", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward);
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-amount");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-amount");
     }
 
     if (!control.Wait()) {
         LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: CheckQueue failed\n", __func__);
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "block-validation-failed");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "block-validation-failed");
     }
     int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
     LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, "    - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
@@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st
 {
     // Check proof of work matches claimed amount
     if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
 
     return true;
 }
@@ -3266,13 +3266,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
         bool mutated;
         uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
         if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
 
         // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
         // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
         // while still invalidating it.
         if (mutated)
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
     }
 
     // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@@ -3283,14 +3283,14 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
 
     // Size limits
     if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
 
     // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
     if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
     for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
         if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
 
     // Check transactions
     // Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
@@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
             // CheckBlock() does context-free validation checks. The only
             // possible failures are consensus failures.
             assert(tx_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS);
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
                                  strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()));
         }
     }
@@ -3310,7 +3310,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
         nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
     }
     if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
 
     if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
         block.fChecked = true;
@@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio
     // Check proof of work
     const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
     if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
 
     // Check against checkpoints
     if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
@@ -3421,24 +3421,24 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio
         CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints());
         if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) {
             LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)\n", __func__, nHeight);
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, false, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
         }
     }
 
     // Check timestamp against prev
     if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
 
     // Check timestamp
     if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
 
     // Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
     // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
     if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
        (block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
        (block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
                                  strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
 
     return true;
@@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
     // Check that all transactions are finalized
     for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
         if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
         }
     }
 
@@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
         CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
         if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
             !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
         }
     }
 
@@ -3500,11 +3500,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
             // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
             // witness tree.
             if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
             }
             CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin());
             if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
             }
             fHaveWitness = true;
         }
@@ -3514,7 +3514,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
     if (!fHaveWitness) {
       for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
             if (tx->HasWitness()) {
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
             }
         }
     }
@@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
     // the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
     // failed).
     if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
-        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
+        return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
     }
 
     return true;
@@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
                 *ppindex = pindex;
             if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
                 LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: block %s is marked invalid\n", __func__, hash.ToString());
-                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, false, "duplicate");
+                return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate");
             }
             return true;
         }
@@ -3560,12 +3560,12 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
         BlockMap::iterator mi = m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock);
         if (mi == m_block_index.end()) {
             LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block not found\n", __func__);
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, false, "prev-blk-not-found");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, "prev-blk-not-found");
         }
         pindexPrev = (*mi).second;
         if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
             LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__);
-            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk");
+            return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
         }
         if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime()))
             return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
@@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
                         invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
                     }
                     LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__);
-                    return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk");
+                    return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
                 }
             }
         }