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authorW. J. van der Laan <laanwj@protonmail.com>2021-06-14 14:45:08 +0200
committerW. J. van der Laan <laanwj@protonmail.com>2021-06-14 15:04:32 +0200
commit5c4f0c4d46f030498c222a15a0399c6e0a7d28f1 (patch)
treed0d811e90e4d115f21ab5f77ebcb727e0eca8a97 /src/test
parentde5512e28df220990ad123b914167aadd6f50979 (diff)
parent1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-5c4f0c4d46f030498c222a15a0399c6e0a7d28f1.tar.xz
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#21261: p2p: update inbound eviction protection for multiple networks, add I2P peers
1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457 test: add combined I2P/onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack) 7c2284eda22a08dbf2a560894e496e245d026ee0 test: add tests for inbound eviction protection of I2P peers (Jon Atack) ce02dd1ef1f7f54f33780b32f195d31c1cc87318 p2p: extend inbound eviction protection by network to I2P peers (Jon Atack) 70bbc62711643ec57cce620f9f7a0e1fe5fb6346 test: add combined onion/localhost eviction protection coverage (Jon Atack) 045cb40192bf3dfa6c42916237e55f86bbc788d4 p2p: remove unused m_is_onion member from NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack) 310fab49282d507e5fa710afb20d036604bbf3a2 p2p: remove unused CompareLocalHostTimeConnected() (Jon Atack) 9e889e8a5c021b0ec7e4c4d17d418ab4a0accad4 p2p: remove unused CompareOnionTimeConnected() (Jon Atack) 787d46bb2a39fb39166882cc6e0afbc34424d88e p2p: update ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() doxygen docs (Jon Atack) 1e15acf478ae071234350c9b38dc823dfe2e3419 p2p: make ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() fully ratio-based (Jon Atack) 3f8105c4d251e0e81bdd31f0999004e36f8990b2 test: remove combined onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack) 38a81a8e20b0e5ad9fef0eae8abd914619f05b25 p2p: add CompareNodeNetworkTime() comparator struct (Jon Atack) 4ee7aec47ebf6b59b4d930e6e4025e91352c05b4 p2p: add m_network to NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack) 7321e6f2fe1641eb331f30e68646f5984d4bcbb3 p2p, refactor: rename vEvictionCandidates to eviction_candidates (Jon Atack) ec590f1d91325404383d74098a5b42a2cd67dad9 p2p, refactor: improve constness in ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() (Jon Atack) 4a19f501abac4adb476a6f2a30dfdf1a35892ccc test: add ALL_NETWORKS to test utilities (Jon Atack) 519e76bb64d03ecac175ec33c31e37d0e90f037f test: speed up and simplify peer_eviction_test (Jon Atack) 1cde8005233d163723d4d5bf1bacf22e6cb7a07e p2p, refactor: rm redundant erase_size calculation in SelectNodeToEvict() (Jon Atack) Pull request description: Continuing the work in #20197 and #20685, this pull updates and abstracts our inbound eviction protection to make it fully ratio-based and easily extensible to peers connected via high-latency privacy networks that we newly support, like I2P and perhaps others soon, as these peers are disadvantaged by the latency criteria of our eviction logic. It then adds eviction protection for peers connected over I2P. As described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20685#issuecomment-767486499, we've observed over the past few months that I2P peers have a min ping latency similar to or greater than that of onion peers. The algorithm is a basically a multi-pass knapsack: - Count the number of eviction candidates in each of the disadvantaged privacy networks. - Sort the networks from lower to higher candidate counts, so that a network with fewer candidates will have the first opportunity for any unused slots remaining from the previous iteration. In the case of a tie in candidate counts, priority is given by array member order from first to last, guesstimated to favor more unusual networks. - Iterate through the networks in this order. On each iteration, allocate each network an equal number of protected slots targeting a total number of candidates to protect, provided any slots remain in the knapsack. - Protect the candidates in that network having the longest uptime, if any in that network are present. - Continue iterating as long as we have non-allocated slots remaining and candidates available to protect. The goal of this logic is to favorise the diversity of our peer connections. The individual commit messages describe each change in more detail. Special thank you to Vasil Dimov for the excellent review feedback and the algorithm improvement that made this change much better than it would have been otherwise. Thanks also to Antoine Riard, whose review feedback nudged this change to protect disadvantaged networks having fewer, rather than more, eviction candidates. ACKs for top commit: laanwj: Code review re-ACK 1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457 vasild: ACK 1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457 Tree-SHA512: 722f790ff11f2969c79e45a5e0e938d94df78df8687e77002f32e3ef5c72a9ac10ebf8c7a9eb7f71882c97ab0e67b2778191effdb747d9ca54d7c23c2ed19a90
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test')
-rw-r--r--src/test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp2
-rw-r--r--src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp504
-rw-r--r--src/test/util/net.h12
3 files changed, 378 insertions, 140 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp b/src/test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp
index 70ffc6bf37..a3f71426fa 100644
--- a/src/test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp
+++ b/src/test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(node_eviction)
/* nKeyedNetGroup */ fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint64_t>(),
/* prefer_evict */ fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool(),
/* m_is_local */ fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool(),
- /* m_is_onion */ fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool(),
+ /* m_network */ fuzzed_data_provider.PickValueInArray(ALL_NETWORKS),
});
}
// Make a copy since eviction_candidates may be in some valid but otherwise
diff --git a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
index 31d391bf7d..4bfd487b86 100644
--- a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
+++ b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+#include <netaddress.h>
#include <net.h>
+#include <test/util/net.h>
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
@@ -15,11 +17,6 @@
BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(net_peer_eviction_tests, BasicTestingSetup)
-namespace {
-constexpr int NODE_EVICTION_TEST_ROUNDS{10};
-constexpr int NODE_EVICTION_TEST_UP_TO_N_NODES{200};
-} // namespace
-
std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(const int n_candidates, FastRandomContext& random_context)
{
std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> candidates;
@@ -36,7 +33,7 @@ std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(const int n_c
/* nKeyedNetGroup */ random_context.randrange(100),
/* prefer_evict */ random_context.randbool(),
/* m_is_local */ random_context.randbool(),
- /* m_is_onion */ random_context.randbool(),
+ /* m_network */ ALL_NETWORKS[random_context.randrange(ALL_NETWORKS.size())],
});
}
return candidates;
@@ -94,7 +91,8 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11},
@@ -104,129 +102,359 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [num_peers](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = num_peers - c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
random_context));
- // Test protection of onion and localhost peers...
+ // Test protection of onion, localhost, and I2P peers...
// Expect 1/4 onion peers to be protected from eviction,
- // independently of other characteristics.
+ // if no localhost or I2P peers.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 3 || c.id == 8 || c.id == 9);
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 3 || c.id == 8 || c.id == 9) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {3, 8, 9},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {},
random_context));
- // Expect 1/4 onion peers and 1/4 of the others to be protected
- // from eviction, sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected).
+ // Expect 1/4 onion peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected,
+ // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no localhost or I2P peers.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
c.m_is_local = false;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 3 || c.id > 7);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 3 || c.id > 7) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV6;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11},
random_context));
// Expect 1/4 localhost peers to be protected from eviction,
- // if no onion peers.
+ // if no onion or I2P peers.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
- c.m_is_onion = false;
c.m_is_local = (c.id == 1 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11);
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {1, 9, 11},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {},
random_context));
// Expect 1/4 localhost peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected,
- // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion peers.
+ // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion or I2P peers.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = false;
c.m_is_local = (c.id > 6);
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
},
/* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9},
/* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11},
random_context));
- // Combined test: expect 1/4 onion and 2 localhost peers to be protected
- // from eviction, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Expect 1/4 I2P peers to be protected from eviction,
+ // if no onion or localhost peers.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 2 || c.id == 7 || c.id == 10) ? NET_I2P : NET_IPV4;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {2, 7, 10},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Expect 1/4 I2P peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected,
+ // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion or localhost peers.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 0 || c.id == 5 || c.id == 10);
- c.m_is_local = (c.id == 1 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11);
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 4 || c.id > 8) ? NET_I2P : NET_IPV6;
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 4, 9, 10},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11},
random_context));
- // Combined test: expect having only 1 onion to allow allocating the
- // remaining 2 of the 1/4 to localhost peers, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Tests with 2 networks...
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost and 1 onion peer out of 4 to
+ // protect 1 localhost, 0 onion and 1 other peer, sorted by longest uptime;
+ // stable sort breaks tie with array order of localhost first.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
- num_peers + 4, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ 4, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 15);
- c.m_is_local = (c.id > 6 && c.id < 11);
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 4);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 3) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 15},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 4},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {1, 2},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost and 1 onion peer out of 7 to
+ // protect 1 localhost, 0 onion, and 2 other peers (3 total), sorted by
+ // uptime; stable sort breaks tie with array order of localhost first.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 7, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 5) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 6},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 4, 5},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost and 1 onion peer out of 8 to
+ // protect protect 1 localhost, 1 onion and 2 other peers (4 total), sorted
+ // by uptime; stable sort breaks tie with array order of localhost first.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 8, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 5) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 5, 6},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 4, 7},
random_context));
- // Combined test: expect 2 onions (< 1/4) to allow allocating the minimum 2
- // localhost peers, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Combined test: expect having 3 localhost and 3 onion peers out of 12 to
+ // protect 2 localhost and 1 onion, plus 3 other peers, sorted by longest
+ // uptime; stable sort breaks ties with the array order of localhost first.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 7 || c.id == 9);
- c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6 || c.id == 11);
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 7 || c.id == 8 || c.id == 10) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV6;
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 6, 7, 9, 11},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11},
random_context));
- // Combined test: when > 1/4, expect max 1/4 onion and 2 localhost peers
- // to be protected from eviction, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Combined test: expect having 4 localhost and 1 onion peer out of 12 to
+ // protect 2 localhost and 1 onion, plus 3 other peers, sorted by longest uptime.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id > 3 && c.id < 8);
- c.m_is_local = (c.id > 7);
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id > 4 && c.id < 9);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 10) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11},
random_context));
- // Combined test: idem > 1/4 with only 8 peers: expect 2 onion and 2
- // localhost peers (1/4 + 2) to be protected, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Combined test: expect having 4 localhost and 2 onion peers out of 16 to
+ // protect 2 localhost and 2 onions, plus 4 other peers, sorted by longest uptime.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
- 8, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ 16, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11 || c.id == 12);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 8 || c.id == 10) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV6;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 5 localhost and 1 onion peer out of 16 to
+ // protect 3 localhost (recovering the unused onion slot), 1 onion, and 4
+ // others, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 16, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id > 10);
+ c.m_network = (c.id == 10) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV4;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost and 4 onion peers out of 16 to
+ // protect 1 localhost and 3 onions (recovering the unused localhost slot),
+ // plus 4 others, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 16, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 15);
+ c.m_network = (c.id > 6 && c.id < 11) ? NET_ONION : NET_IPV6;
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 15},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 2 onion and 4 I2P out of 12 peers to protect
+ // 2 onion (prioritized for having fewer candidates) and 1 I2P, plus 3
+ // others, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id > 1 && c.id < 5);
- c.m_is_local = (c.id > 4);
+ c.m_is_local = false;
+ if (c.id == 8 || c.id == 10) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else if (c.id == 6 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11 || c.id == 12) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
+ }
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 5, 6},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 4, 7},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 6, 8, 10},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11},
random_context));
- // Combined test: idem > 1/4 with only 6 peers: expect 1 onion peer and no
- // localhost peers (1/4 + 0) to be protected, sorted by longest uptime.
+ // Tests with 3 networks...
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 1 I2P and 1 onion peer out of 4
+ // to protect 1 I2P, 0 localhost, 0 onion and 1 other peer (2 total), sorted
+ // by longest uptime; stable sort breaks tie with array order of I2P first.
BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
- 6, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ 4, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
- c.m_is_onion = (c.id == 4 || c.id == 5);
c.m_is_local = (c.id == 3);
+ if (c.id == 4) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 2) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
+ }
},
- /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 4},
- /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 5},
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 4},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {1, 2},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 1 I2P and 1 onion peer out of 7
+ // to protect 1 I2P, 0 localhost, 0 onion and 2 other peers (3 total) sorted
+ // by longest uptime; stable sort breaks tie with array order of I2P first.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 7, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 4);
+ if (c.id == 6) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 5) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 6},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 4, 5},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 1 I2P and 1 onion peer out of 8
+ // to protect 1 I2P, 1 localhost, 0 onion and 2 other peers (4 total) sorted
+ // by uptime; stable sort breaks tie with array order of I2P then localhost.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 8, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6);
+ if (c.id == 5) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 4) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 5, 6},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {2, 3, 4, 7},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 4 localhost, 2 I2P, and 2 onion peers out of
+ // 16 to protect 1 localhost, 2 I2P, and 1 onion (4/16 total), plus 4 others
+ // for 8 total, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 16, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 6 || c.id > 11);
+ if (c.id == 7 || c.id == 11) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 9 || c.id == 10) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 8 I2P and 1 onion peer out of
+ // 24 to protect 1, 4, and 1 (6 total), plus 6 others for 12/24 total,
+ // sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 24, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 12);
+ if (c.id > 14 && c.id < 23) { // 4 protected instead of usual 2
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 23) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 3 I2P and 6 onion peers out of
+ // 24 to protect 1, 3, and 2 (6 total, I2P has fewer candidates and so gets the
+ // unused localhost slot), plus 6 others for 12/24 total, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 24, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 15);
+ if (c.id == 12 || c.id == 14 || c.id == 17) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id > 17) { // 4 protected instead of usual 2
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 1 localhost, 7 I2P and 4 onion peers out of
+ // 24 to protect 1 localhost, 2 I2P, and 3 onions (6 total), plus 6 others
+ // for 12/24 total, sorted by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 24, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id == 13);
+ if (c.id > 16) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id == 12 || c.id == 14 || c.id == 15 || c.id == 16) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV6;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23},
+ random_context));
+
+ // Combined test: expect having 8 localhost, 4 I2P, and 3 onion peers out of
+ // 24 to protect 2 of each (6 total), plus 6 others for 12/24 total, sorted
+ // by longest uptime.
+ BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
+ 24, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
+ c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
+ c.m_is_local = (c.id > 15);
+ if (c.id > 10 && c.id < 15) {
+ c.m_network = NET_I2P;
+ } else if (c.id > 6 && c.id < 10) {
+ c.m_network = NET_ONION;
+ } else {
+ c.m_network = NET_IPV4;
+ }
+ },
+ /* protected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17},
+ /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23},
random_context));
}
@@ -257,91 +485,89 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_eviction_test)
{
FastRandomContext random_context{true};
- for (int i = 0; i < NODE_EVICTION_TEST_ROUNDS; ++i) {
- for (int number_of_nodes = 0; number_of_nodes < NODE_EVICTION_TEST_UP_TO_N_NODES; ++number_of_nodes) {
- // Four nodes with the highest keyed netgroup values should be
- // protected from eviction.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nKeyedNetGroup = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
-
- // Eight nodes with the lowest minimum ping time should be protected
- // from eviction.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.m_min_ping_time = std::chrono::microseconds{candidate.id};
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, random_context));
-
- // Four nodes that most recently sent us novel transactions accepted
- // into our mempool should be protected from eviction.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nLastTXTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
-
- // Up to eight non-tx-relay peers that most recently sent us novel
- // blocks should be protected from eviction.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
- if (candidate.id <= 7) {
- candidate.fRelayTxes = false;
- candidate.fRelevantServices = true;
- }
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, random_context));
-
- // Four peers that most recently sent us novel blocks should be
- // protected from eviction.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
-
- // Combination of the previous two tests.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
- if (candidate.id <= 7) {
- candidate.fRelayTxes = false;
- candidate.fRelevantServices = true;
- }
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}, random_context));
-
- // Combination of all tests above.
- BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
- number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
- candidate.nKeyedNetGroup = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
- candidate.m_min_ping_time = std::chrono::microseconds{candidate.id}; // 8 protected
- candidate.nLastTXTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
- candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
- },
- {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19}, random_context));
-
- // An eviction is expected given >= 29 random eviction candidates. The eviction logic protects at most
- // four peers by net group, eight by lowest ping time, four by last time of novel tx, up to eight non-tx-relay
- // peers by last novel block time, and four more peers by last novel block time.
- if (number_of_nodes >= 29) {
- BOOST_CHECK(SelectNodeToEvict(GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(number_of_nodes, random_context)));
- }
-
- // No eviction is expected given <= 20 random eviction candidates. The eviction logic protects at least
- // four peers by net group, eight by lowest ping time, four by last time of novel tx and four peers by last
- // novel block time.
- if (number_of_nodes <= 20) {
- BOOST_CHECK(!SelectNodeToEvict(GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(number_of_nodes, random_context)));
- }
+ for (int number_of_nodes = 0; number_of_nodes < 200; ++number_of_nodes) {
+ // Four nodes with the highest keyed netgroup values should be
+ // protected from eviction.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nKeyedNetGroup = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
+
+ // Eight nodes with the lowest minimum ping time should be protected
+ // from eviction.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.m_min_ping_time = std::chrono::microseconds{candidate.id};
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, random_context));
+
+ // Four nodes that most recently sent us novel transactions accepted
+ // into our mempool should be protected from eviction.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nLastTXTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
+
+ // Up to eight non-tx-relay peers that most recently sent us novel
+ // blocks should be protected from eviction.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
+ if (candidate.id <= 7) {
+ candidate.fRelayTxes = false;
+ candidate.fRelevantServices = true;
+ }
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, random_context));
+
+ // Four peers that most recently sent us novel blocks should be
+ // protected from eviction.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3}, random_context));
+
+ // Combination of the previous two tests.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id;
+ if (candidate.id <= 7) {
+ candidate.fRelayTxes = false;
+ candidate.fRelevantServices = true;
+ }
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}, random_context));
+
+ // Combination of all tests above.
+ BOOST_CHECK(!IsEvicted(
+ number_of_nodes, [number_of_nodes](NodeEvictionCandidate& candidate) {
+ candidate.nKeyedNetGroup = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
+ candidate.m_min_ping_time = std::chrono::microseconds{candidate.id}; // 8 protected
+ candidate.nLastTXTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
+ candidate.nLastBlockTime = number_of_nodes - candidate.id; // 4 protected
+ },
+ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19}, random_context));
+
+ // An eviction is expected given >= 29 random eviction candidates. The eviction logic protects at most
+ // four peers by net group, eight by lowest ping time, four by last time of novel tx, up to eight non-tx-relay
+ // peers by last novel block time, and four more peers by last novel block time.
+ if (number_of_nodes >= 29) {
+ BOOST_CHECK(SelectNodeToEvict(GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(number_of_nodes, random_context)));
+ }
- // Cases left to test:
- // * "If any remaining peers are preferred for eviction consider only them. [...]"
- // * "Identify the network group with the most connections and youngest member. [...]"
+ // No eviction is expected given <= 20 random eviction candidates. The eviction logic protects at least
+ // four peers by net group, eight by lowest ping time, four by last time of novel tx and four peers by last
+ // novel block time.
+ if (number_of_nodes <= 20) {
+ BOOST_CHECK(!SelectNodeToEvict(GetRandomNodeEvictionCandidates(number_of_nodes, random_context)));
}
+
+ // Cases left to test:
+ // * "If any remaining peers are preferred for eviction consider only them. [...]"
+ // * "Identify the network group with the most connections and youngest member. [...]"
}
}
diff --git a/src/test/util/net.h b/src/test/util/net.h
index 71685d437a..1b49a671bd 100644
--- a/src/test/util/net.h
+++ b/src/test/util/net.h
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@
#define BITCOIN_TEST_UTIL_NET_H
#include <compat.h>
+#include <netaddress.h>
#include <net.h>
#include <util/sock.h>
+#include <array>
#include <cassert>
#include <cstring>
#include <string>
@@ -67,6 +69,16 @@ constexpr ConnectionType ALL_CONNECTION_TYPES[]{
ConnectionType::ADDR_FETCH,
};
+constexpr auto ALL_NETWORKS = std::array{
+ Network::NET_UNROUTABLE,
+ Network::NET_IPV4,
+ Network::NET_IPV6,
+ Network::NET_ONION,
+ Network::NET_I2P,
+ Network::NET_CJDNS,
+ Network::NET_INTERNAL,
+};
+
/**
* A mocked Sock alternative that returns a statically contained data upon read and succeeds
* and ignores all writes. The data to be returned is given to the constructor and when it is