Integrate util/system's CInit into RNGState

This guarantees that OpenSSL is initialized properly whenever randomness
is used, even when that randomness is invoked from global constructors.

Note that this patch uses Mutex directly, rather than CCriticalSection.
This is because the lock-detection code is not necessarily initialized
during global constructors.

1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/random.cpp b/src/random.cpp
index c78848d56e..6699318ee0 100644
--- a/src/random.cpp
+++ b/src/random.cpp
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
 
 [[noreturn]] static void RandFailure()
 {
@@ -294,15 +295,46 @@ void GetRandBytes(unsigned char* buf, int num)
     }
 }
 
+void LockingCallbackOpenSSL(int mode, int i, const char* file, int line);
+
 namespace {
+
 struct RNGState {
     Mutex m_mutex;
     unsigned char m_state[32] GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = {0};
     uint64_t m_counter GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = 0;
+    std::unique_ptr<Mutex[]> m_mutex_openssl;
 
     RNGState()
     {
         InitHardwareRand();
+
+        // Init OpenSSL library multithreading support
+        m_mutex_openssl.reset(new Mutex[CRYPTO_num_locks()]);
+        CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(LockingCallbackOpenSSL);
+
+        // OpenSSL can optionally load a config file which lists optional loadable modules and engines.
+        // We don't use them so we don't require the config. However some of our libs may call functions
+        // which attempt to load the config file, possibly resulting in an exit() or crash if it is missing
+        // or corrupt. Explicitly tell OpenSSL not to try to load the file. The result for our libs will be
+        // that the config appears to have been loaded and there are no modules/engines available.
+        OPENSSL_no_config();
+
+#ifdef WIN32
+        // Seed OpenSSL PRNG with current contents of the screen
+        RAND_screen();
+#endif
+
+        // Seed OpenSSL PRNG with performance counter
+        RandAddSeed();
+    }
+
+    ~RNGState()
+    {
+        // Securely erase the memory used by the OpenSSL PRNG
+        RAND_cleanup();
+        // Shutdown OpenSSL library multithreading support
+        CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(nullptr);
     }
 
     /** Extract up to 32 bytes of entropy from the RNG state, mixing in new entropy from hasher. */
@@ -343,6 +375,17 @@ RNGState& GetRNGState()
 }
 }
 
+void LockingCallbackOpenSSL(int mode, int i, const char* file, int line) NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS
+{
+    RNGState& rng = GetRNGState();
+
+    if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
+        rng.m_mutex_openssl[i].lock();
+    } else {
+        rng.m_mutex_openssl[i].unlock();
+    }
+}
+
 static void AddDataToRng(void* data, size_t len, RNGState& rng);
 
 void RandAddSeedSleep()