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author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2019-04-02 13:25:21 +0200 |
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committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2019-04-02 14:02:06 +0200 |
commit | 32ec900850446f60d13c8421c4a91f4fff912d13 (patch) | |
tree | 7a35f91f61d67cc9295daf467edb52071741552c /src/net_processing.cpp | |
parent | 7bcf90cb01aa964a54e3450ec5515e67db7088b7 (diff) | |
parent | 95faffed264cf54a3b3041db2471c10f5011aabe (diff) |
Merge #15691: 0.18: rc3 backportsv0.18.0rc3
95faffed264cf54a3b3041db2471c10f5011aabe qa: Check unconfirmed balance after loadwallet (João Barbosa)
59716ec395daaf914924fe5c1a4fbeb5d5031907 wallet: Update transactions with current mempool after load (João Barbosa)
ed0498af2827ccf033c9a7c4f46b82424e411083 interfaces: Add Chain::requestMempoolTransactions (João Barbosa)
ebf65666c26b7e2dff1b35b17d8fc466c3f347a6 wallet: Move CWallet::ReacceptWalletTransactions locks to callers (João Barbosa)
a90db2f175f86b78d8edc5c03b7bb351c8f43e5e [tests] Add test for wallet rebroadcasts (John Newbery)
50c56f2fcf00385dbe8f91588af3ee1a89a9d2d0 Interrupt orphan processing after every transaction (Pieter Wuille)
bb60121da1eb3484ecf20c5d1130d9e2f6f8f8c8 [MOVEONLY] Move processing of orphan queue to ProcessOrphanTx (Pieter Wuille)
6355214fd70ce7b44739acb8d546aaaf243f90b3 Simplify orphan processing in preparation for interruptibility (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Remaining backports for rc3
ACKs for commit 95faff:
promag:
ACK 95faffe, well done in ed0498af2827ccf033c9a7c4f46b82424e411083 - verified all cherry picks.
Tree-SHA512: 597ee45493ac04e8c3149628a357c3238169d4b4f78158f22a3531e5f66289c228ecd6582f99026698883216f1ee7934d6315d19c99fc5f4f33dd1bed4300186
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 140 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index a37451e39a..53ff6a52ac 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -1713,6 +1713,67 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve return true; } +void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set, std::list<CTransactionRef>& removed_txn) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, g_cs_orphans) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + AssertLockHeld(g_cs_orphans); + std::set<NodeId> setMisbehaving; + bool done = false; + while (!done && !orphan_work_set.empty()) { + const uint256 orphanHash = *orphan_work_set.begin(); + orphan_work_set.erase(orphan_work_set.begin()); + + auto orphan_it = mapOrphanTransactions.find(orphanHash); + if (orphan_it == mapOrphanTransactions.end()) continue; + + const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it->second.tx; + const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; + NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer; + bool fMissingInputs2 = false; + // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan + // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get + // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned) + CValidationState stateDummy; + + if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue; + if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { + auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(COutPoint(orphanHash, i)); + if (it_by_prev != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) { + for (const auto& elem : it_by_prev->second) { + orphan_work_set.insert(elem->first); + } + } + } + EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); + done = true; + } else if (!fMissingInputs2) { + int nDos = 0; + if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) { + // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx + Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos); + setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + } + // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool + // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); + if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) { + // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or + // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. + // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. + assert(recentRejects); + recentRejects->insert(orphanHash); + } + EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); + done = true; + } + mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); + } +} + bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc, bool enable_bip61) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId()); @@ -2342,8 +2403,6 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr return true; } - std::deque<COutPoint> vWorkQueue; - std::vector<uint256> vEraseQueue; CTransactionRef ptx; vRecv >> ptx; const CTransaction& tx = *ptx; @@ -2368,7 +2427,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); RelayTransaction(tx, connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) { - vWorkQueue.emplace_back(inv.hash, i); + auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(COutPoint(inv.hash, i)); + if (it_by_prev != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) { + for (const auto& elem : it_by_prev->second) { + pfrom->orphan_work_set.insert(elem->first); + } + } } pfrom->nLastTXTime = GetTime(); @@ -2379,65 +2443,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr mempool.size(), mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000); // Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one - std::set<NodeId> setMisbehaving; - while (!vWorkQueue.empty()) { - auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(vWorkQueue.front()); - vWorkQueue.pop_front(); - if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) - continue; - for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin(); - mi != itByPrev->second.end(); - ++mi) - { - const CTransactionRef& porphanTx = (*mi)->second.tx; - const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; - const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash(); - NodeId fromPeer = (*mi)->second.fromPeer; - bool fMissingInputs2 = false; - // Use a dummy CValidationState so someone can't setup nodes to counter-DoS based on orphan - // resolution (that is, feeding people an invalid transaction based on LegitTxX in order to get - // anyone relaying LegitTxX banned) - CValidationState stateDummy; - - - if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) - continue; - if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, stateDummy, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { - LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - RelayTransaction(orphanTx, connman); - for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { - vWorkQueue.emplace_back(orphanHash, i); - } - vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash); - } - else if (!fMissingInputs2) - { - int nDos = 0; - if (stateDummy.IsInvalid(nDos) && nDos > 0) - { - // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx - Misbehaving(fromPeer, nDos); - setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); - LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - } - // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool - // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee - LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - vEraseQueue.push_back(orphanHash); - if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && !stateDummy.CorruptionPossible()) { - // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or - // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. - // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. - assert(recentRejects); - recentRejects->insert(orphanHash); - } - } - mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); - } - } - - for (const uint256& hash : vEraseQueue) - EraseOrphanTx(hash); + ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn); } else if (fMissingInputs) { @@ -3145,11 +3151,21 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + if (!pfrom->orphan_work_set.empty()) { + std::list<CTransactionRef> removed_txn; + LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); + ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, removed_txn); + for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : removed_txn) { + AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx); + } + } + if (pfrom->fDisconnect) return false; // this maintains the order of responses if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) return true; + if (!pfrom->orphan_work_set.empty()) return true; // Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway if (pfrom->fPauseSend) |