Merge #19871: doc: Clarify scope of eviction protection of outbound block-relay peers

d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4 [doc] Clarify semantic of peer's m_protect w.r.t to outbound eviction logics (Antoine Riard)
ac71fe936da290adf5a3155fe8db5f78b485f1f1 [doc] Clarify scope of eviction protection of outbound block-relay peers (Antoine Riard)

Pull request description:

  Block-relay-only peers were introduced by #15759. According to its
  author, it was intented to make them only immune to outbound peer
  rotation-based eviction and not from all eviction as modified comment
  leans to think of.

  Clearly indicate that outbound block-relay peers aren't protected
  from eviction by the bad/lagging chain logic.

  Fix #19863

ACKs for top commit:
  naumenkogs:
    ACK d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4
  jonatack:
    ACK d76925478efd35e6fd835370639f2139b28381e4

Tree-SHA512: 597fbd62838a6e39276024165b11514cad20a2e9d33cf9202d261cbadcb62b2df427c858e0cb57e585840d4c1d4600104aa53916bb868541f2580e4eed9b4b52

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index d3a357fee2..9603d098a4 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -334,10 +334,17 @@ struct CNodeState {
      */
     bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion;
 
-    /** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT
-      * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual, full-relay connections, with
-      * m_protect == false
-      * Algorithm: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip,
+    /** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT and EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL logic.
+      *
+      * Both are only in effect for outbound, non-manual, non-protected connections.
+      * Any peer protected (m_protect = true) is not chosen for eviction. A peer is
+      * marked as protected if all of these are true:
+      *   - its connection type is IsBlockOnlyConn() == false
+      *   - it gave us a valid connecting header
+      *   - we haven't reached MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT yet
+      *   - it has a better chain than we have
+      *
+      * CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip,
       * set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future:
       *   - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip
       *     when the timeout was set, then either reset the timeout or clear it
@@ -347,6 +354,9 @@ struct CNodeState {
       *     and set a shorter timeout, HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future.
       *     If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is
       *     reached, disconnect.
+      *
+      * EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL: after each interval, if we have too many outbound peers,
+      * drop the outbound one that least recently announced us a new block.
       */
     struct ChainSyncTimeoutState {
         //! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced
@@ -2018,11 +2028,12 @@ void PeerManager::ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::vector<CBlockHe
             }
         }
 
+        // If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
+        // it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
+        // Note that outbound block-relay peers are excluded from this protection, and
+        // thus always subject to eviction under the bad/lagging chain logic.
+        // See ChainSyncTimeoutState.
         if (!pfrom.fDisconnect && pfrom.IsFullOutboundConn() && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) {
-            // If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
-            // it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
-            // Note that block-relay-only peers are already implicitly protected, so we
-            // only consider setting m_protect for the full-relay peers.
             if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) {
                 LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom.GetId());
                 nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true;