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authorSuhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>2019-03-09 12:55:06 -0500
committerSuhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>2019-09-04 14:58:36 -0400
commit3a5e885306ea954d7eccdc11502e91a51dab8ec6 (patch)
treed0fa4fd1f947425ca84bf0c4b6f93a033c58c75d /src/net_processing.cpp
parentb83f51a4bbe29bf130a2b0c0e85e5bffea107f75 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-3a5e885306ea954d7eccdc11502e91a51dab8ec6.tar.xz
Add 2 outbound block-relay-only connections
Transaction relay is primarily optimized for balancing redundancy/robustness with bandwidth minimization -- as a result transaction relay leaks information that adversaries can use to infer the network topology. Network topology is better kept private for (at least) two reasons: (a) Knowledge of the network graph can make it easier to find the source IP of a given transaction. (b) Knowledge of the network graph could be used to split a target node or nodes from the honest network (eg by knowing which peers to attack in order to achieve a network split). We can eliminate the risks of (b) by separating block relay from transaction relay; inferring network connectivity from the relay of blocks/block headers is much more expensive for an adversary. After this commit, bitcoind will make 2 additional outbound connections that are only used for block relay. (In the future, we might consider rotating our transaction-relay peers to help limit the effects of (a).)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp25
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 0802cf424d..48a7b91dcb 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ struct CNodeState {
bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion;
/** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT
- * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual connections, with
+ * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual, full-relay connections, with
* m_protect == false
* Algorithm: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip,
* set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future:
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ static void PushNodeVersion(CNode *pnode, CConnman* connman, int64_t nTime)
CAddress addrMe = CAddress(CService(), nLocalNodeServices);
connman->PushMessage(pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::VERSION, PROTOCOL_VERSION, (uint64_t)nLocalNodeServices, nTime, addrYou, addrMe,
- nonce, strSubVersion, nNodeStartingHeight, ::g_relay_txes));
+ nonce, strSubVersion, nNodeStartingHeight, ::g_relay_txes && pnode->m_tx_relay != nullptr));
if (fLogIPs) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, them=%s, peer=%d\n", PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, addrMe.ToString(), addrYou.ToString(), nodeid);
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node, int64_t time_in_seconds)
}
// Returns true for outbound peers, excluding manual connections, feelers, and
-// one-shots
+// one-shots.
static bool IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(const CNode *node)
{
return !(node->fInbound || node->m_manual_connection || node->fFeeler || node->fOneShot);
@@ -1772,9 +1772,11 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve
}
}
- if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) {
- // If this is an outbound peer, check to see if we should protect
+ if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) {
+ // If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
// it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
+ // Note that block-relay-only peers are already implicitly protected, so we
+ // only consider setting m_protect for the full-relay peers.
if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom->GetId());
nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true;
@@ -2088,9 +2090,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
// Mark this node as currently connected, so we update its timestamp later.
LOCK(cs_main);
State(pfrom->GetId())->fCurrentlyConnected = true;
- LogPrintf("New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s\n",
- pfrom->nVersion.load(), pfrom->nStartingHeight, pfrom->GetId(),
- (fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom->addr.ToString()) : ""));
+ LogPrintf("New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s (%s)\n",
+ pfrom->nVersion.load(), pfrom->nStartingHeight,
+ pfrom->GetId(), (fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom->addr.ToString()) : ""),
+ pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr ? "block-relay" : "full-relay");
}
if (pfrom->nVersion >= SENDHEADERS_VERSION) {
@@ -2214,7 +2217,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr
return false;
}
- bool fBlocksOnly = !g_relay_txes;
+ // We won't accept tx inv's if we're in blocks-only mode, or this is a
+ // block-relay-only peer
+ bool fBlocksOnly = !g_relay_txes || (pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr);
// Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true
if (pfrom->HasPermission(PF_RELAY))
@@ -3453,6 +3458,8 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::EvictExtraOutboundPeers(int64_t time_in_seconds)
if (state == nullptr) return; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case
// Don't evict our protected peers
if (state->m_chain_sync.m_protect) return;
+ // Don't evict our block-relay-only peers.
+ if (pnode->m_tx_relay == nullptr) return;
if (state->m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement || (state->m_last_block_announcement == oldest_block_announcement && pnode->GetId() > worst_peer)) {
worst_peer = pnode->GetId();
oldest_block_announcement = state->m_last_block_announcement;