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authorWladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>2016-06-16 11:03:16 +0200
committerWladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>2016-06-16 11:03:52 +0200
commite4bb4a85a551367d9479301bbad1b089781e494d (patch)
tree6a0c3ded67d9446278197a49c354fb1eba9b7512 /src/net.cpp
parent0a64777b909e7c29ae69a3fcf4d4e859ff375dec (diff)
parent6ee7f05622c32431a9815a96b31a6a65a821fdcc (diff)
downloadbitcoin-e4bb4a85a551367d9479301bbad1b089781e494d.tar.xz
Merge #8084: Add recently accepted blocks and txn to AttemptToEvictConnection.
6ee7f05 Allow disconnecting a netgroup with only one member in eviction. (Gregory Maxwell) 5d0ca81 Add recently accepted blocks and txn to AttemptToEvictConnection. (Gregory Maxwell)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/net.cpp55
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp
index 5e791291c7..1c63d51746 100644
--- a/src/net.cpp
+++ b/src/net.cpp
@@ -841,6 +841,11 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate
NodeId id;
int64_t nTimeConnected;
int64_t nMinPingUsecTime;
+ int64_t nLastBlockTime;
+ int64_t nLastTXTime;
+ bool fNetworkNode;
+ bool fRelayTxes;
+ bool fBloomFilter;
CAddress addr;
uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup;
};
@@ -857,7 +862,24 @@ static bool ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, cons
static bool CompareNetGroupKeyed(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b) {
return a.nKeyedNetGroup < b.nKeyedNetGroup;
-};
+}
+
+static bool CompareNodeBlockTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
+{
+ // There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have many peers which have not yet relayed a block.
+ if (a.nLastBlockTime != b.nLastBlockTime) return a.nLastBlockTime < b.nLastBlockTime;
+ if (a.fNetworkNode != b.fNetworkNode) return b.fNetworkNode;
+ return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
+}
+
+static bool CompareNodeTXTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
+{
+ // There is a fall-through here because it is common for a node to have more than a few peers that have not yet relayed txn.
+ if (a.nLastTXTime != b.nLastTXTime) return a.nLastTXTime < b.nLastTXTime;
+ if (a.fRelayTxes != b.fRelayTxes) return b.fRelayTxes;
+ if (a.fBloomFilter != b.fBloomFilter) return a.fBloomFilter;
+ return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
+}
/** Try to find a connection to evict when the node is full.
* Extreme care must be taken to avoid opening the node to attacker
@@ -867,7 +889,7 @@ static bool CompareNetGroupKeyed(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvict
* to forge. In order to partition a node the attacker must be
* simultaneously better at all of them than honest peers.
*/
-static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
+static bool AttemptToEvictConnection() {
std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> vEvictionCandidates;
{
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
@@ -879,7 +901,9 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
continue;
if (node->fDisconnect)
continue;
- NodeEvictionCandidate candidate = {node->id, node->nTimeConnected, node->nMinPingUsecTime, node->addr, node->nKeyedNetGroup};
+ NodeEvictionCandidate candidate = {node->id, node->nTimeConnected, node->nMinPingUsecTime,
+ node->nLastBlockTime, node->nLastTXTime, node->fNetworkNode,
+ node->fRelayTxes, node->pfilter != NULL, node->addr, node->nKeyedNetGroup};
vEvictionCandidates.push_back(candidate);
}
}
@@ -902,6 +926,20 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return false;
+ // Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us transactions.
+ // An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
+ std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), CompareNodeTXTime);
+ vEvictionCandidates.erase(vEvictionCandidates.end() - std::min(4, static_cast<int>(vEvictionCandidates.size())), vEvictionCandidates.end());
+
+ if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return false;
+
+ // Protect 4 nodes that most recently sent us blocks.
+ // An attacker cannot manipulate this metric without performing useful work.
+ std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), CompareNodeBlockTime);
+ vEvictionCandidates.erase(vEvictionCandidates.end() - std::min(4, static_cast<int>(vEvictionCandidates.size())), vEvictionCandidates.end());
+
+ if (vEvictionCandidates.empty()) return false;
+
// Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest.
// This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later.
std::sort(vEvictionCandidates.begin(), vEvictionCandidates.end(), ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected);
@@ -930,13 +968,6 @@ static bool AttemptToEvictConnection(bool fPreferNewConnection) {
// Reduce to the network group with the most connections
vEvictionCandidates = std::move(mapAddrCounts[naMostConnections]);
- // Do not disconnect peers if there is only one unprotected connection from their network group.
- // This step excessively favors netgroup diversity, and should be removed once more protective criteria are established.
- if (vEvictionCandidates.size() <= 1)
- // unless we prefer the new connection (for whitelisted peers)
- if (!fPreferNewConnection)
- return false;
-
// Disconnect from the network group with the most connections
NodeId evicted = vEvictionCandidates.front().id;
LOCK(cs_vNodes);
@@ -1002,7 +1033,7 @@ static void AcceptConnection(const ListenSocket& hListenSocket) {
if (nInbound >= nMaxInbound)
{
- if (!AttemptToEvictConnection(whitelisted)) {
+ if (!AttemptToEvictConnection()) {
// No connection to evict, disconnect the new connection
LogPrint("net", "failed to find an eviction candidate - connection dropped (full)\n");
CloseSocket(hSocket);
@@ -2380,6 +2411,8 @@ CNode::CNode(SOCKET hSocketIn, const CAddress& addrIn, const std::string& addrNa
fSentAddr = false;
pfilter = new CBloomFilter();
timeLastMempoolReq = 0;
+ nLastBlockTime = 0;
+ nLastTXTime = 0;
nPingNonceSent = 0;
nPingUsecStart = 0;
nPingUsecTime = 0;