Merge pull request #6085

b05a89b Non-grammatical language improvements (Luke Dashjr)
7e6d23b Bugfix: Grammar fixes (Corinne Dashjr)

1 files changed, 23 insertions, 22 deletions

diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp
index a6b717d57f..7d7e670119 100644
--- a/src/main.cpp
+++ b/src/main.cpp
@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
     uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
 
     /**
-     * Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
-     * them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
+     * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
+     * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
+     * cs_main.
      */
     map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
 
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
     }
 
     // If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
-    // of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
+    // of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
     state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
     if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
         return;
@@ -941,7 +942,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
 
         // do all inputs exist?
         // Note that this does not check for the presence of actual outputs (see the next check for that),
-        // only helps filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
+        // and only helps with filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
         BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn txin, tx.vin) {
             if (!view.HaveCoins(txin.prevout.hash)) {
                 if (pfMissingInputs)
@@ -1277,8 +1278,8 @@ void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex* pindexNewForkTip)
         pfork = pfork->pprev;
     }
 
-    // We define a condition which we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
-    // who's tip is within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
+    // We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
+    // with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
     // We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just under 10% of sustained network
     // hash rate operating on the fork.
     // or a chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this should be detected by both)
@@ -1719,9 +1720,9 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
     // See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
     // This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool
     // already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
-    // This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
+    // This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
     // Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
-    // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
+    // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
     // initial block download.
     bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
                           !((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
@@ -1984,7 +1985,7 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) {
         if (nUpgraded > 100/2)
         {
             // strMiscWarning is read by GetWarnings(), called by Qt and the JSON-RPC code to warn the user:
-            strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete, upgrade required!");
+            strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete; upgrade required!");
             CAlert::Notify(strMiscWarning, true);
             fWarned = true;
         }
@@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
     }
 
     // The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
-    // add them again.
+    // add it again.
     BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
     while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
         if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
@@ -3733,7 +3734,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
                             pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock);
                             // CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see
                             // This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip
-                            // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didnt send here -
+                            // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here -
                             // they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block.
                             // Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here,
                             // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs
@@ -3746,7 +3747,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
                             // no response
                     }
 
-                    // Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
+                    // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
                     if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
                     {
                         // Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
@@ -4060,7 +4061,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
             if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) {
                 UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash);
                 if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) {
-                    // First request the headers preceeding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
+                    // First request the headers preceding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
                     // case where a new block is announced that succeeds the current tip (no reorganization),
                     // there are no such headers.
                     // Secondly, and only when we are close to being synced, we request the announced block directly,
@@ -4142,8 +4143,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
             pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
             if (--nLimit <= 0)
             {
-                // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
-                // getblocks the next batch of inventory.
+                // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
+                // trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
                 LogPrint("net", "  getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
                 pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
                 break;
@@ -4380,9 +4381,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
 
     // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
     // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
-    // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. 
-    // Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore 
-    // getaddr message mitigates the attack.
+    // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
+    // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
+    // the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
     else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
     {
         pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
@@ -4467,7 +4468,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
                     // Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
                     sProblem = "Nonce mismatch";
                     if (nonce == 0) {
-                        // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
+                        // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
                         bPingFinished = true;
                         sProblem = "Nonce zero";
                     }
@@ -4476,7 +4477,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
                 sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping";
             }
         } else {
-            // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
+            // This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
             bPingFinished = true;
             sProblem = "Short payload";
         }
@@ -4735,7 +4736,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
 {
     const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
     {
-        // Don't send anything until we get their version message
+        // Don't send anything until we get its version message
         if (pto->nVersion == 0)
             return true;
 
@@ -4919,7 +4920,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
         // In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for (2 + 0.5 * N) times the block interval
         // (with N the number of validated blocks that were in flight at the time it was requested), disconnect due to
         // timeout. We compensate for in-flight blocks to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link
-        // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertize nonexisting block hashes
+        // being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
         // to unreasonably increase our timeout.
         if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0 && state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nTime < nNow - 500000 * consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (4 + state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nValidatedQueuedBefore)) {
             LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", state.vBlocksInFlight.front().hash.ToString(), pto->id);