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authorLuke Dashjr <luke-jr+git@utopios.org>2015-04-28 14:47:17 +0000
committerLuke Dashjr <luke-jr+git@utopios.org>2015-05-02 15:23:59 +0000
commitb05a89b2def301704df8f22f05a45ccf891c2b83 (patch)
treeda028bc52de857c1a89fb223ae8973859b1cf150 /src/main.cpp
parent7e6d23b1719191f83af7d3e7b134a90889b5c1ef (diff)
downloadbitcoin-b05a89b2def301704df8f22f05a45ccf891c2b83.tar.xz
Non-grammatical language improvements
Diffstat (limited to 'src/main.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/main.cpp25
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp
index 263c2abf6f..07156a9af2 100644
--- a/src/main.cpp
+++ b/src/main.cpp
@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
/**
- * Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
- * them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
+ * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
+ * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
+ * cs_main.
*/
map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
- // of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
+ // of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
return;
@@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
- // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
+ // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
// initial block download.
bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
!((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
@@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
}
// The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
- // add them again.
+ // add it again.
BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
@@ -3745,7 +3746,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
// no response
}
- // Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
+ // Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
{
// Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
@@ -4141,8 +4142,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
if (--nLimit <= 0)
{
- // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
- // getblocks the next batch of inventory.
+ // When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
+ // trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
LogPrint("net", " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
break;
@@ -4379,9 +4380,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
- // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
- // Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore
- // getaddr message mitigates the attack.
+ // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
+ // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
+ // the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
{
pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
@@ -4734,7 +4735,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
{
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
{
- // Don't send anything until we get their version message
+ // Don't send anything until we get its version message
if (pto->nVersion == 0)
return true;