diff options
author | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-01-13 09:35:28 +0000 |
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committer | fanquake <fanquake@gmail.com> | 2023-01-13 09:40:57 +0000 |
commit | 07c54de550035c3441f34ef6c34209666267eb38 (patch) | |
tree | 0fb9e6449729bec6fbdded2f4c3b938eb32a1670 /src/key.cpp | |
parent | dcae3c19b82c91e908a873e70f2e5ce1beb4c7af (diff) | |
parent | 202291722300b86f36e97de7960d40a32544c2d1 (diff) |
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#26691: Update secp256k1 subtree to libsecp256k1 version 0.2.0
202291722300b86f36e97de7960d40a32544c2d1 Add secp256k1_selftest call (Pieter Wuille)
3bfca788b0dae879bfc745cc52c2cb6edc49fd70 Remove explicit enabling of default modules (Pieter Wuille)
4462cb04986d77eddcfc6e8f75e04dc278a8147a Adapt to libsecp256k1 API changes (Pieter Wuille)
9d47e7b71b2805430e8c7b43816efd225a6ccd8c Squashed 'src/secp256k1/' changes from 44c2452fd3..21ffe4b22a (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Now that libsecp256k1 has a release (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2022-December/021271.html), update the subtree to match it.
The changes themselves are not very impactful for Bitcoin Core, but include:
* It's no longer needed to specify whether contexts are for signing or verification or both (all contexts support everything), so make use of that in this PR.
* Verification operations can use the static context now, removing the need for some infrastructure in pubkey.cpp to make sure a context exists.
* Most modules are now enabled by default, so we can drop explicit enabling for them.
* CI improvements (in particular, MSVC and more recent MacOS)
* Introduction of an internal int128 type, which has no effect for GCC/Clang builds, but enables 128-bit multiplication in MSVC, giving a ~20% speedup there (but still slower than GCC/Clang).
* Release process changes (process documentation, changelog, ...).
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
ACK 202291722300b86f36e97de7960d40a32544c2d1, but 4462cb04986d77eddcfc6e8f75e04dc278a8147a could use more eyes on it.
achow101:
ACK 202291722300b86f36e97de7960d40a32544c2d1
jonasnick:
utACK 202291722300b86f36e97de7960d40a32544c2d1
Tree-SHA512: 8a9fe28852abe74abd6f96fef16a94d5a427b1d99bff4caab1699014d24698aab9b966a5364a46ed1001c07a7c1d825154ed4e6557c7decce952b77330a8616b
Diffstat (limited to 'src/key.cpp')
-rw-r--r-- | src/key.cpp | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/key.cpp b/src/key.cpp index 0cb51cb9be..33913ed461 100644 --- a/src/key.cpp +++ b/src/key.cpp @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ bool CKey::Sign(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig, bool gr secp256k1_pubkey pk; ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_context_sign, &pk, begin()); assert(ret); - ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(GetVerifyContext(), &sig, hash.begin(), &pk); + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(secp256k1_context_static, &sig, hash.begin(), &pk); assert(ret); return true; } @@ -268,9 +268,9 @@ bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) secp256k1_pubkey epk, rpk; ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_context_sign, &epk, begin()); assert(ret); - ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(GetVerifyContext(), &rpk, &rsig, hash.begin()); + ret = secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(secp256k1_context_static, &rpk, &rsig, hash.begin()); assert(ret); - ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(GetVerifyContext(), &epk, &rpk); + ret = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_cmp(secp256k1_context_static, &epk, &rpk); assert(ret == 0); return true; } @@ -286,14 +286,14 @@ bool CKey::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint2 unsigned char pubkey_bytes[32]; if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_serialize(secp256k1_context_sign, pubkey_bytes, &pubkey)) return false; uint256 tweak = XOnlyPubKey(pubkey_bytes).ComputeTapTweakHash(merkle_root->IsNull() ? nullptr : merkle_root); - if (!secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(GetVerifyContext(), &keypair, tweak.data())) return false; + if (!secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(secp256k1_context_static, &keypair, tweak.data())) return false; } bool ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32(secp256k1_context_sign, sig.data(), hash.data(), &keypair, aux.data()); if (ret) { // Additional verification step to prevent using a potentially corrupted signature secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey_verify; - ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(GetVerifyContext(), &pubkey_verify, nullptr, &keypair); - ret &= secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(GetVerifyContext(), sig.data(), hash.begin(), 32, &pubkey_verify); + ret = secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_context_static, &pubkey_verify, nullptr, &keypair); + ret &= secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify(secp256k1_context_static, sig.data(), hash.begin(), 32, &pubkey_verify); } if (!ret) memory_cleanse(sig.data(), sig.size()); memory_cleanse(&keypair, sizeof(keypair)); @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ bool ECC_InitSanityCheck() { void ECC_Start() { assert(secp256k1_context_sign == nullptr); - secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); + secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE); assert(ctx != nullptr); { |