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| author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2018-07-09 20:23:46 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2018-07-09 20:25:50 +0200 |
| commit | 7e74c54fed364a2974b6033da12de65abc07df93 (patch) | |
| tree | 7af8425faeb6467e2bc09d8db5dc56de163c5d66 /src/crypto | |
| parent | 8cc048ee53e5ec8f6378c4e702083548706adcf0 (diff) | |
| parent | d280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 (diff) | |
| download | bitcoin-7e74c54fed364a2974b6033da12de65abc07df93.tar.xz | |
Merge #13452: rpc: have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure
d280617bf569f84457eaea546541dc74c67cd1e4 [qa] Add a test for merkle proof malleation (Suhas Daftuar)
ed82f1700006830b6fe34572b66245c1487ccd29 have verifytxoutproof check the number of txns in proof structure (Gregory Sanders)
Pull request description:
Recent publication of a weakness in Bitcoin's merkle tree construction demonstrates many SPV applications vulnerable to an expensive to pull off yet still plausible attack: https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design/
This change would at least allow `verifytxoutproof` to properly validate that the proof matches a known block, with known number of transactions any time after the full block is processed. This should neuter the attack entirely.
The negative is that a header-only processed block/future syncing mode would cause this to fail until the node has imported the data required.
related: #13451
`importprunedfunds` needs this check as well. Can expand it to cover this if people like the idea.
Tree-SHA512: 0682ec2b622a38b29f3f635323e0a8b6fc071e8a6fd134c954579926ee7b516e642966bafa667016744ce49c16e19b24dbc8801f982a36ad0a6a4aff6d93f82b
Diffstat (limited to 'src/crypto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions