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authorJorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon.cc>2016-07-11 16:34:21 +0200
committerJorge Timón <jtimon@jtimon.cc>2017-04-06 23:36:46 +0200
commit618d07faa2cc2f061a2e8035c3edbffc192480d7 (patch)
tree62691192bc28a8b89b98fa8e922662b8f8864235 /src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
parent8c28670e92b6422eb7576f074446238f9f221999 (diff)
MOVEONLY: tx functions to consensus/tx_verify.o
Functions related to transaction verification.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp')
-rw-r--r--src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp246
1 files changed, 246 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..043f4cf95c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2017-2017 The Bitcoin Core developers
+// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+#include "tx_verify.h"
+
+#include "consensus.h"
+#include "primitives/transaction.h"
+#include "script/interpreter.h"
+#include "validation.h"
+
+// TODO remove the following dependencies
+#include "chain.h"
+#include "coins.h"
+#include "utilmoneystr.h"
+
+bool IsFinalTx(const CTransaction &tx, int nBlockHeight, int64_t nBlockTime)
+{
+ if (tx.nLockTime == 0)
+ return true;
+ if ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD ? (int64_t)nBlockHeight : nBlockTime))
+ return true;
+ for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) {
+ if (!(txin.nSequence == CTxIn::SEQUENCE_FINAL))
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+std::pair<int, int64_t> CalculateSequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector<int>* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block)
+{
+ assert(prevHeights->size() == tx.vin.size());
+
+ // Will be set to the equivalent height- and time-based nLockTime
+ // values that would be necessary to satisfy all relative lock-
+ // time constraints given our view of block chain history.
+ // The semantics of nLockTime are the last invalid height/time, so
+ // use -1 to have the effect of any height or time being valid.
+ int nMinHeight = -1;
+ int64_t nMinTime = -1;
+
+ // tx.nVersion is signed integer so requires cast to unsigned otherwise
+ // we would be doing a signed comparison and half the range of nVersion
+ // wouldn't support BIP 68.
+ bool fEnforceBIP68 = static_cast<uint32_t>(tx.nVersion) >= 2
+ && flags & LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE;
+
+ // Do not enforce sequence numbers as a relative lock time
+ // unless we have been instructed to
+ if (!fEnforceBIP68) {
+ return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime);
+ }
+
+ for (size_t txinIndex = 0; txinIndex < tx.vin.size(); txinIndex++) {
+ const CTxIn& txin = tx.vin[txinIndex];
+
+ // Sequence numbers with the most significant bit set are not
+ // treated as relative lock-times, nor are they given any
+ // consensus-enforced meaning at this point.
+ if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_DISABLE_FLAG) {
+ // The height of this input is not relevant for sequence locks
+ (*prevHeights)[txinIndex] = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ int nCoinHeight = (*prevHeights)[txinIndex];
+
+ if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG) {
+ int64_t nCoinTime = block.GetAncestor(std::max(nCoinHeight-1, 0))->GetMedianTimePast();
+ // NOTE: Subtract 1 to maintain nLockTime semantics
+ // BIP 68 relative lock times have the semantics of calculating
+ // the first block or time at which the transaction would be
+ // valid. When calculating the effective block time or height
+ // for the entire transaction, we switch to using the
+ // semantics of nLockTime which is the last invalid block
+ // time or height. Thus we subtract 1 from the calculated
+ // time or height.
+
+ // Time-based relative lock-times are measured from the
+ // smallest allowed timestamp of the block containing the
+ // txout being spent, which is the median time past of the
+ // block prior.
+ nMinTime = std::max(nMinTime, nCoinTime + (int64_t)((txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) << CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_GRANULARITY) - 1);
+ } else {
+ nMinHeight = std::max(nMinHeight, nCoinHeight + (int)(txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) - 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime);
+}
+
+bool EvaluateSequenceLocks(const CBlockIndex& block, std::pair<int, int64_t> lockPair)
+{
+ assert(block.pprev);
+ int64_t nBlockTime = block.pprev->GetMedianTimePast();
+ if (lockPair.first >= block.nHeight || lockPair.second >= nBlockTime)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool SequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector<int>* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block)
+{
+ return EvaluateSequenceLocks(block, CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, flags, prevHeights, block));
+}
+
+unsigned int GetLegacySigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx)
+{
+ unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
+ for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
+ {
+ nSigOps += txin.scriptSig.GetSigOpCount(false);
+ }
+ for (const auto& txout : tx.vout)
+ {
+ nSigOps += txout.scriptPubKey.GetSigOpCount(false);
+ }
+ return nSigOps;
+}
+
+unsigned int GetP2SHSigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs)
+{
+ if (tx.IsCoinBase())
+ return 0;
+
+ unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++)
+ {
+ const CTxOut &prevout = inputs.GetOutputFor(tx.vin[i]);
+ if (prevout.scriptPubKey.IsPayToScriptHash())
+ nSigOps += prevout.scriptPubKey.GetSigOpCount(tx.vin[i].scriptSig);
+ }
+ return nSigOps;
+}
+
+int64_t GetTransactionSigOpCost(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int flags)
+{
+ int64_t nSigOps = GetLegacySigOpCount(tx) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+
+ if (tx.IsCoinBase())
+ return nSigOps;
+
+ if (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH) {
+ nSigOps += GetP2SHSigOpCount(tx, inputs) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+ }
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++)
+ {
+ const CTxOut &prevout = inputs.GetOutputFor(tx.vin[i]);
+ nSigOps += CountWitnessSigOps(tx.vin[i].scriptSig, prevout.scriptPubKey, &tx.vin[i].scriptWitness, flags);
+ }
+ return nSigOps;
+}
+
+bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fCheckDuplicateInputs)
+{
+ // Basic checks that don't depend on any context
+ if (tx.vin.empty())
+ return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
+ if (tx.vout.empty())
+ return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
+ // Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability)
+ if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
+
+ // Check for negative or overflow output values
+ CAmount nValueOut = 0;
+ for (const auto& txout : tx.vout)
+ {
+ if (txout.nValue < 0)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative");
+ if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge");
+ nValueOut += txout.nValue;
+ if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut))
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge");
+ }
+
+ // Check for duplicate inputs - note that this check is slow so we skip it in CheckBlock
+ if (fCheckDuplicateInputs) {
+ std::set<COutPoint> vInOutPoints;
+ for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
+ {
+ if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tx.IsCoinBase())
+ {
+ if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
+ if (txin.prevout.IsNull())
+ return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int nSpendHeight)
+{
+ // This doesn't trigger the DoS code on purpose; if it did, it would make it easier
+ // for an attacker to attempt to split the network.
+ if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx))
+ return state.Invalid(false, 0, "", "Inputs unavailable");
+
+ CAmount nValueIn = 0;
+ CAmount nFees = 0;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++)
+ {
+ const COutPoint &prevout = tx.vin[i].prevout;
+ const CCoins *coins = inputs.AccessCoins(prevout.hash);
+ assert(coins);
+
+ // If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured
+ if (coins->IsCoinBase()) {
+ if (nSpendHeight - coins->nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY)
+ return state.Invalid(false,
+ REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase",
+ strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coins->nHeight));
+ }
+
+ // Check for negative or overflow input values
+ nValueIn += coins->vout[prevout.n].nValue;
+ if (!MoneyRange(coins->vout[prevout.n].nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn))
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange");
+
+ }
+
+ if (nValueIn < tx.GetValueOut())
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false,
+ strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(tx.GetValueOut())));
+
+ // Tally transaction fees
+ CAmount nTxFee = nValueIn - tx.GetValueOut();
+ if (nTxFee < 0)
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-negative");
+ nFees += nTxFee;
+ if (!MoneyRange(nFees))
+ return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
+ return true;
+}