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| author | Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> | 2013-08-08 19:58:57 +1000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com> | 2013-08-08 19:58:57 +1000 |
| commit | 42656ea2e552b027e174fdceab7348ffcb8245c4 (patch) | |
| tree | 8bf5b945afc2d198727ce1cd94cc3766b4ce0d93 /src/bitcoinrpc.cpp | |
| parent | 6cc766fa55c0d74916d615c69689e9e798bf0aba (diff) | |
Make RPC password resistant to timing attacks
Fixes issue#2838; this is a tweaked version of pull#2845 that
should not leak the length of the password and is more generic,
in case we run into other situations where we need
timing-attack-resistant comparisons.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/bitcoinrpc.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/bitcoinrpc.cpp | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/bitcoinrpc.cpp b/src/bitcoinrpc.cpp index 7a3e6560ab..dfce9789a5 100644 --- a/src/bitcoinrpc.cpp +++ b/src/bitcoinrpc.cpp @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ bool HTTPAuthorized(map<string, string>& mapHeaders) return false; string strUserPass64 = strAuth.substr(6); boost::trim(strUserPass64); string strUserPass = DecodeBase64(strUserPass64); - return strUserPass == strRPCUserColonPass; + return TimingResistantEqual(strUserPass, strRPCUserColonPass); } // |