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authorHennadii Stepanov <32963518+hebasto@users.noreply.github.com>2021-05-24 19:26:49 +0300
committerHennadii Stepanov <32963518+hebasto@users.noreply.github.com>2021-05-24 19:26:49 +0300
commit8caf60dbbe16afa3c52574a7f6710d74c0bfd4ab (patch)
tree2a52559c19a0f5fe287a0982dc50cc774ca0afcc /src/addrman.h
parent5cd7f8abe3996d303774b6cddeb419337d605d02 (diff)
downloadbitcoin-8caf60dbbe16afa3c52574a7f6710d74c0bfd4ab.tar.xz
move-only: Group and re-order CAddrMan members by access type
Easy to verify with `git diff --color-moved=dimmed-zebra`.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/addrman.h')
-rw-r--r--src/addrman.h266
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 134 deletions
diff --git a/src/addrman.h b/src/addrman.h
index 9a2cb079a5..41994288db 100644
--- a/src/addrman.h
+++ b/src/addrman.h
@@ -172,139 +172,6 @@ static const int64_t ADDRMAN_TEST_WINDOW = 40*60; // 40 minutes
*/
class CAddrMan
{
-friend class CAddrManTest;
-private:
- //! critical section to protect the inner data structures
- mutable RecursiveMutex cs;
-
- //! Serialization versions.
- enum Format : uint8_t {
- V0_HISTORICAL = 0, //!< historic format, before commit e6b343d88
- V1_DETERMINISTIC = 1, //!< for pre-asmap files
- V2_ASMAP = 2, //!< for files including asmap version
- V3_BIP155 = 3, //!< same as V2_ASMAP plus addresses are in BIP155 format
- };
-
- //! The maximum format this software knows it can unserialize. Also, we always serialize
- //! in this format.
- //! The format (first byte in the serialized stream) can be higher than this and
- //! still this software may be able to unserialize the file - if the second byte
- //! (see `lowest_compatible` in `Unserialize()`) is less or equal to this.
- static constexpr Format FILE_FORMAT = Format::V3_BIP155;
-
- //! The initial value of a field that is incremented every time an incompatible format
- //! change is made (such that old software versions would not be able to parse and
- //! understand the new file format). This is 32 because we overtook the "key size"
- //! field which was 32 historically.
- //! @note Don't increment this. Increment `lowest_compatible` in `Serialize()` instead.
- static constexpr uint8_t INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE = 32;
-
- //! last used nId
- int nIdCount GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! table with information about all nIds
- std::map<int, CAddrInfo> mapInfo GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! find an nId based on its network address
- std::map<CNetAddr, int> mapAddr GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! randomly-ordered vector of all nIds
- std::vector<int> vRandom GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- // number of "tried" entries
- int nTried GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! list of "tried" buckets
- int vvTried[ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! number of (unique) "new" entries
- int nNew GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! list of "new" buckets
- int vvNew[ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! last time Good was called (memory only)
- int64_t nLastGood GUARDED_BY(cs);
-
- //! Holds addrs inserted into tried table that collide with existing entries. Test-before-evict discipline used to resolve these collisions.
- std::set<int> m_tried_collisions;
-
-protected:
- //! secret key to randomize bucket select with
- uint256 nKey;
-
- //! Source of random numbers for randomization in inner loops
- FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
-
-private:
- //! Find an entry.
- CAddrInfo* Find(const CNetAddr& addr, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! find an entry, creating it if necessary.
- //! nTime and nServices of the found node are updated, if necessary.
- CAddrInfo* Create(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr &addrSource, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Swap two elements in vRandom.
- void SwapRandom(unsigned int nRandomPos1, unsigned int nRandomPos2) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Move an entry from the "new" table(s) to the "tried" table
- void MakeTried(CAddrInfo& info, int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Delete an entry. It must not be in tried, and have refcount 0.
- void Delete(int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Clear a position in a "new" table. This is the only place where entries are actually deleted.
- void ClearNew(int nUBucket, int nUBucketPos) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Mark an entry "good", possibly moving it from "new" to "tried".
- void Good_(const CService &addr, bool test_before_evict, int64_t time) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Add an entry to the "new" table.
- bool Add_(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Mark an entry as attempted to connect.
- void Attempt_(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Select an address to connect to, if newOnly is set to true, only the new table is selected from.
- CAddrInfo Select_(bool newOnly) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions.
- void ResolveCollisions_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Return a random to-be-evicted tried table address.
- CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_ADDRMAN
- //! Perform consistency check. Returns an error code or zero.
- int Check_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-#endif
-
- /**
- * Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network.
- *
- * @param[out] vAddr Vector of randomly selected addresses from vRandom.
- * @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all).
- * @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all).
- * @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all).
- */
- void GetAddr_(std::vector<CAddress>& vAddr, size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional<Network> network) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- /** We have successfully connected to this peer. Calling this function
- * updates the CAddress's nTime, which is used in our IsTerrible()
- * decisions and gossiped to peers. Callers should be careful that updating
- * this information doesn't leak topology information to network spies.
- *
- * net_processing calls this function when it *disconnects* from a peer to
- * not leak information about currently connected peers.
- *
- * @param[in] addr The address of the peer we were connected to
- * @param[in] nTime The time that we were last connected to this peer
- */
- void Connected_(const CService& addr, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
- //! Update an entry's service bits.
- void SetServices_(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
-
public:
// Compressed IP->ASN mapping, loaded from a file when a node starts.
// Should be always empty if no file was provided.
@@ -325,7 +192,6 @@ public:
// Read asmap from provided binary file
static std::vector<bool> DecodeAsmap(fs::path path);
-
/**
* Serialized format.
* * format version byte (@see `Format`)
@@ -759,6 +625,138 @@ public:
Check();
}
+protected:
+ //! secret key to randomize bucket select with
+ uint256 nKey;
+
+ //! Source of random numbers for randomization in inner loops
+ FastRandomContext insecure_rand;
+
+private:
+ //! critical section to protect the inner data structures
+ mutable RecursiveMutex cs;
+
+ //! Serialization versions.
+ enum Format : uint8_t {
+ V0_HISTORICAL = 0, //!< historic format, before commit e6b343d88
+ V1_DETERMINISTIC = 1, //!< for pre-asmap files
+ V2_ASMAP = 2, //!< for files including asmap version
+ V3_BIP155 = 3, //!< same as V2_ASMAP plus addresses are in BIP155 format
+ };
+
+ //! The maximum format this software knows it can unserialize. Also, we always serialize
+ //! in this format.
+ //! The format (first byte in the serialized stream) can be higher than this and
+ //! still this software may be able to unserialize the file - if the second byte
+ //! (see `lowest_compatible` in `Unserialize()`) is less or equal to this.
+ static constexpr Format FILE_FORMAT = Format::V3_BIP155;
+
+ //! The initial value of a field that is incremented every time an incompatible format
+ //! change is made (such that old software versions would not be able to parse and
+ //! understand the new file format). This is 32 because we overtook the "key size"
+ //! field which was 32 historically.
+ //! @note Don't increment this. Increment `lowest_compatible` in `Serialize()` instead.
+ static constexpr uint8_t INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE = 32;
+
+ //! last used nId
+ int nIdCount GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! table with information about all nIds
+ std::map<int, CAddrInfo> mapInfo GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! find an nId based on its network address
+ std::map<CNetAddr, int> mapAddr GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! randomly-ordered vector of all nIds
+ std::vector<int> vRandom GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ // number of "tried" entries
+ int nTried GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! list of "tried" buckets
+ int vvTried[ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! number of (unique) "new" entries
+ int nNew GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! list of "new" buckets
+ int vvNew[ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! last time Good was called (memory only)
+ int64_t nLastGood GUARDED_BY(cs);
+
+ //! Holds addrs inserted into tried table that collide with existing entries. Test-before-evict discipline used to resolve these collisions.
+ std::set<int> m_tried_collisions;
+
+ //! Find an entry.
+ CAddrInfo* Find(const CNetAddr& addr, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! find an entry, creating it if necessary.
+ //! nTime and nServices of the found node are updated, if necessary.
+ CAddrInfo* Create(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr &addrSource, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Swap two elements in vRandom.
+ void SwapRandom(unsigned int nRandomPos1, unsigned int nRandomPos2) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Move an entry from the "new" table(s) to the "tried" table
+ void MakeTried(CAddrInfo& info, int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Delete an entry. It must not be in tried, and have refcount 0.
+ void Delete(int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Clear a position in a "new" table. This is the only place where entries are actually deleted.
+ void ClearNew(int nUBucket, int nUBucketPos) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Mark an entry "good", possibly moving it from "new" to "tried".
+ void Good_(const CService &addr, bool test_before_evict, int64_t time) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Add an entry to the "new" table.
+ bool Add_(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Mark an entry as attempted to connect.
+ void Attempt_(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Select an address to connect to, if newOnly is set to true, only the new table is selected from.
+ CAddrInfo Select_(bool newOnly) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions.
+ void ResolveCollisions_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Return a random to-be-evicted tried table address.
+ CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_ADDRMAN
+ //! Perform consistency check. Returns an error code or zero.
+ int Check_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+#endif
+
+ /**
+ * Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network.
+ *
+ * @param[out] vAddr Vector of randomly selected addresses from vRandom.
+ * @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all).
+ * @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all).
+ * @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all).
+ */
+ void GetAddr_(std::vector<CAddress>& vAddr, size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional<Network> network) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ /** We have successfully connected to this peer. Calling this function
+ * updates the CAddress's nTime, which is used in our IsTerrible()
+ * decisions and gossiped to peers. Callers should be careful that updating
+ * this information doesn't leak topology information to network spies.
+ *
+ * net_processing calls this function when it *disconnects* from a peer to
+ * not leak information about currently connected peers.
+ *
+ * @param[in] addr The address of the peer we were connected to
+ * @param[in] nTime The time that we were last connected to this peer
+ */
+ void Connected_(const CService& addr, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ //! Update an entry's service bits.
+ void SetServices_(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs);
+
+ friend class CAddrManTest;
};
#endif // BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H