aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/share
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJonas Schnelli <jonas.schnelli@include7.ch>2015-05-07 10:12:27 +0200
committerJonas Schnelli <jonas.schnelli@include7.ch>2015-05-19 11:03:49 +0200
commit7cef321e65c87b2d1ea49e9b471f43b36eab6a16 (patch)
treee22f6c6ef05baa7e853a3eac735a0e094cae7079 /share
parent26e08a16a6fb64b535d10f5d459183092deefa50 (diff)
[Mac only] rename Bitcoin-Qt.app to "Bitcoin Core.app"
Diffstat (limited to 'share')
-rw-r--r--share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md b/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md
index da299d168f..cbd060c268 100644
--- a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md
+++ b/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ signing requests.
For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine.
The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is
-unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle.
+unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Core.app bundle.
For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine.
The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Threat analysis
--
Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys,
-allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid
+allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Core.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid
signature but containing a malicious binary.
Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or