diff options
author | Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> | 2017-03-01 10:58:14 -0500 |
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committer | Matt Corallo <git@bluematt.me> | 2017-03-04 09:41:16 -0500 |
commit | eddc77a1b1a59df4c7ba1a0705d684529b2205a1 (patch) | |
tree | 5daf250a6afba939c4007f87319cd305f72ea0cf /contrib | |
parent | d9c450ffb2a5a619ce11304f31427af9c9bf7a92 (diff) |
Add comment re: why SHA1 is disabled
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib')
-rwxr-xr-x | contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh index 4df8bee3b3..61e7552863 100755 --- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh @@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ IFS=' if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" else + # Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling + # signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that + # collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself, + # in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's + # semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory + # an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that + # they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing + # it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure. + GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)" fi for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do |