diff options
author | Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> | 2016-06-09 13:55:12 -0400 |
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committer | Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> | 2016-06-09 13:58:29 -0400 |
commit | 966151e71dc33cb5b97cf4243efd18afb4cf279d (patch) | |
tree | 633a56b7e095bc224f9a1d4497263a44cea6be71 /contrib/verify-commits/README.md | |
parent | 11164ec0b4c1790059220b09b5827e5618a46c76 (diff) |
Add README for verify-commits
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/verify-commits/README.md')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/verify-commits/README.md | 26 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/README.md b/contrib/verify-commits/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9e3f65da2 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +Tooling for verification of PGP signed commits +---------------------------------------------- + +This is an incomplete work in progress, but currently includes a pre-push hook +script (`pre-push-hook.sh`) for maintainers to ensure that their own commits +are PGP signed (nearly always merge commits), as well as a script to verify +commits against a trusted keys list. + + +Using verify-commits.sh safely +------------------------------ + +Remember that you can't use an untrusted script to verify itself. This means +that checking out code, then running `verify-commits.sh` against `HEAD` is +_not_ safe, because the version of `verify-commits.sh` that you just ran could +be backdoored. Instead, you need to use a trusted version of verify-commits +prior to checkout to make sure you're checking out only code signed by trusted +keys: + + git fetch origin && \ + ./contrib/verify-commits/verify-commits.sh origin/master && \ + git checkout origin/master + +Note that the above isn't a good UI/UX yet, and needs significant improvements +to make it more convenient and reduce the chance of errors; pull-reqs +improving this process would be much appreciated. |