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authorfanquake <fanquake@gmail.com>2024-03-22 13:39:23 +0000
committerfanquake <fanquake@gmail.com>2024-03-22 13:40:07 +0000
commitd5bad0d2d16c2ddd6bfaeccbca2a31a30227ba2c (patch)
tree983636b811b9d7824aa4f46296c9d25f8c238890
parent1ce5accc325cd7d3382f67a314dec018cfdc0a3e (diff)
parent27cfda1baec63ee4fb0f743576227528104fe495 (diff)
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#29531: [25.x] backportsv25.2rc2
27cfda1baec63ee4fb0f743576227528104fe495 doc: Update release notes for 25.2rc2 (Ava Chow) daba5e2c5be67a1bcb9af2e65464d3b92b042460 doc: Update manpages for 25.2rc2 (Ava Chow) 8a0c980d6e8941cb55933f6bcb44bed500e1648e build: Bump to 25.2rc2 (Ava Chow) cf7d3a8cd07c26c700eee4bc1a16092982625326 p2p: Don't consider blocks mutated if they don't connect to known prev block (Greg Sanders) 3eaaafa225c489405d71d0de1daff8b403e60ef7 [test] IsBlockMutated unit tests (dergoegge) 0667441a7b34dde79fe0ecfc0cddc3314fa05f63 [validation] Cache merkle root and witness commitment checks (dergoegge) de97ecf14f2bd8cc42e8703ac028251ecd8e42d9 [test] Add regression test for #27608 (dergoegge) 8cc4b24c74ecf7a3c3d2853fe8ecb474eb77284c [net processing] Don't process mutated blocks (dergoegge) 098f07dc8d79f1bf55441e23b98d609e425d7d16 [validation] Merkle root malleation should be caught by IsBlockMutated (dergoegge) 8804c368f5b5745ae4e7bcbc60bae36658d7e2c4 [validation] Introduce IsBlockMutated (dergoegge) 4f5baac6ca46435ed7546e1577f9f6120aae5355 [validation] Isolate merkle root checks (dergoegge) f93be0103fe9cb92a376848fc534233b48977918 test: make sure keypool sizes do not change on `getrawchangeaddress`/`getnewaddress` failures (UdjinM6) 7c08ccf19bf0a7970f543a3756d8861f81c17197 wallet: Avoid updating `ReserveDestination::nIndex` when `GetReservedDestination` fails (UdjinM6) Pull request description: Backport: * #29510 * #29412 * #29524 ACKs for top commit: glozow: utACK 27cfda1baec63ee4fb0f743576227528104fe495 Tree-SHA512: 37feadd65d9ea55c0a92c9d2a6f74f87cafed3bc67f8deeaaafc5b7042f954e55ea34816612e1a49088f4f1906f104e00c7c3bec7affd1c1f48220b57a8769c5
-rw-r--r--configure.ac2
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoin-cli.16
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoin-qt.16
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoin-tx.16
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoin-util.16
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoin-wallet.16
-rw-r--r--doc/man/bitcoind.16
-rw-r--r--doc/release-notes.md15
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp12
-rw-r--r--src/primitives/block.h8
-rw-r--r--src/test/validation_tests.cpp216
-rw-r--r--src/validation.cpp127
-rw-r--r--src/validation.h3
-rw-r--r--src/wallet/wallet.cpp4
-rwxr-xr-xtest/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py116
-rwxr-xr-xtest/functional/test_runner.py1
-rwxr-xr-xtest/functional/wallet_keypool.py16
17 files changed, 491 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 9e2af8d8b5..3d9460a1e4 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.69])
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR, 25)
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR, 2)
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD, 0)
-define(_CLIENT_VERSION_RC, 1)
+define(_CLIENT_VERSION_RC, 2)
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, true)
define(_COPYRIGHT_YEAR, 2023)
define(_COPYRIGHT_HOLDERS,[The %s developers])
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoin-cli.1 b/doc/man/bitcoin-cli.1
index 2dbe83068e..d55dfddde5 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoin-cli.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoin-cli.1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIN-CLI "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-cli v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIN-CLI "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-cli v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v25.2.0rc2
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B bitcoin-cli
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,<command> \/\fR[\fI\,params\/\fR] \fI\,Send command to Bitcoin Core\/\fR
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v25.2.0rc1
.B bitcoin-cli
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,help <command> Get help for a command\/\fR
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core RPC client version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core RPC client version v25.2.0rc2
.SH OPTIONS
.HP
\-?
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoin-qt.1 b/doc/man/bitcoin-qt.1
index 4204d5ca73..219fdea2ae 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoin-qt.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoin-qt.1
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIN-QT "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-qt v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIN-QT "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-qt v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoin-qt \- manual page for bitcoin-qt v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoin-qt \- manual page for bitcoin-qt v25.2.0rc2
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B bitcoin-qt
[\fI\,command-line options\/\fR]
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core version v25.2.0rc2
.SH OPTIONS
.HP
\-?
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoin-tx.1 b/doc/man/bitcoin-tx.1
index b97f1bd9aa..a30db47356 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoin-tx.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoin-tx.1
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIN-TX "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-tx v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIN-TX "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-tx v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v25.2.0rc2
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B bitcoin-tx
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,<hex-tx> \/\fR[\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Update hex-encoded bitcoin transaction\/\fR
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v25.2.0rc1
.B bitcoin-tx
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,-create \/\fR[\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Create hex-encoded bitcoin transaction\/\fR
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-tx utility version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-tx utility version v25.2.0rc2
.SH OPTIONS
.HP
\-?
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoin-util.1 b/doc/man/bitcoin-util.1
index 02593581c1..92631434c5 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoin-util.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoin-util.1
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIN-UTIL "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-util v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIN-UTIL "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-util v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoin-util \- manual page for bitcoin-util v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoin-util \- manual page for bitcoin-util v25.2.0rc2
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B bitcoin-util
[\fI\,options\/\fR] [\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Do stuff\/\fR
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-util utility version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-util utility version v25.2.0rc2
.SH OPTIONS
.HP
\-?
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoin-wallet.1 b/doc/man/bitcoin-wallet.1
index dda630ff6a..9d21044f84 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoin-wallet.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoin-wallet.1
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIN-WALLET "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-wallet v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIN-WALLET "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-wallet v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoin-wallet \- manual page for bitcoin-wallet v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoin-wallet \- manual page for bitcoin-wallet v25.2.0rc2
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-wallet version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-wallet version v25.2.0rc2
.PP
bitcoin\-wallet is an offline tool for creating and interacting with Bitcoin Core wallet files.
By default bitcoin\-wallet will act on wallets in the default mainnet wallet directory in the datadir.
diff --git a/doc/man/bitcoind.1 b/doc/man/bitcoind.1
index 30fe309972..3e3325e8e5 100644
--- a/doc/man/bitcoind.1
+++ b/doc/man/bitcoind.1
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.3.
-.TH BITCOIND "1" "February 2024" "bitcoind v25.2.0rc1" "User Commands"
+.TH BITCOIND "1" "March 2024" "bitcoind v25.2.0rc2" "User Commands"
.SH NAME
-bitcoind \- manual page for bitcoind v25.2.0rc1
+bitcoind \- manual page for bitcoind v25.2.0rc2
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B bitcoind
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,Start Bitcoin Core\/\fR
.SH DESCRIPTION
-Bitcoin Core version v25.2.0rc1
+Bitcoin Core version v25.2.0rc2
.SH OPTIONS
.HP
\-?
diff --git a/doc/release-notes.md b/doc/release-notes.md
index eb85c31a6b..32072de6a9 100644
--- a/doc/release-notes.md
+++ b/doc/release-notes.md
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-25.2rc1 Release Notes
+25.2rc2 Release Notes
==================
-Bitcoin Core version 25.2rc1 is now available from:
+Bitcoin Core version 25.2rc2 is now available from:
- <https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-25.2/test.rc1>
+ <https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-25.2/test.rc2>
This release includes various bug fixes and performance
improvements, as well as updated translations.
@@ -51,6 +51,12 @@ Notable changes
### Wallet
- #29176 wallet: Fix use-after-free in WalletBatch::EraseRecords
+- #29510 wallet: `getrawchangeaddress` and `getnewaddress` failures should not affect keypools for descriptor wallets
+
+### P2P and network changes
+
+- #29412 p2p: Don't process mutated blocks
+- #29524 p2p: Don't consider blocks mutated if they don't connect to known prev block
Credits
=======
@@ -60,6 +66,9 @@ Thanks to everyone who directly contributed to this release:
- Martin Zumsande
- Sebastian Falbesoner
- MarcoFalke
+- UdjinM6
+- dergoegge
+- Greg Sanders
As well as to everyone that helped with translations on
[Transifex](https://www.transifex.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/).
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index d48a118dd6..43e15487f3 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -4629,6 +4629,17 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received block %s peer=%d\n", pblock->GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
+ const CBlockIndex* prev_block{WITH_LOCK(m_chainman.GetMutex(), return m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock))};
+
+ // Check for possible mutation if it connects to something we know so we can check for DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT being active
+ if (prev_block && IsBlockMutated(/*block=*/*pblock,
+ /*check_witness_root=*/DeploymentActiveAfter(prev_block, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT))) {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Received mutated block from peer=%d\n", peer->m_id);
+ Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "mutated block");
+ WITH_LOCK(cs_main, RemoveBlockRequest(pblock->GetHash(), peer->m_id));
+ return;
+ }
+
bool forceProcessing = false;
const uint256 hash(pblock->GetHash());
bool min_pow_checked = false;
@@ -4644,7 +4655,6 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), true));
// Check work on this block against our anti-dos thresholds.
- const CBlockIndex* prev_block = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock);
if (prev_block && prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork({pblock->GetBlockHeader()}) >= GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
min_pow_checked = true;
}
diff --git a/src/primitives/block.h b/src/primitives/block.h
index bd11279a6e..6117c477f8 100644
--- a/src/primitives/block.h
+++ b/src/primitives/block.h
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ public:
// network and disk
std::vector<CTransactionRef> vtx;
- // memory only
- mutable bool fChecked;
+ // Memory-only flags for caching expensive checks
+ mutable bool fChecked; // CheckBlock()
+ mutable bool m_checked_witness_commitment{false}; // CheckWitnessCommitment()
+ mutable bool m_checked_merkle_root{false}; // CheckMerkleRoot()
CBlock()
{
@@ -96,6 +98,8 @@ public:
CBlockHeader::SetNull();
vtx.clear();
fChecked = false;
+ m_checked_witness_commitment = false;
+ m_checked_merkle_root = false;
}
CBlockHeader GetBlockHeader() const
diff --git a/src/test/validation_tests.cpp b/src/test/validation_tests.cpp
index 0b4c491615..c9b9671671 100644
--- a/src/test/validation_tests.cpp
+++ b/src/test/validation_tests.cpp
@@ -4,11 +4,16 @@
#include <chainparams.h>
#include <consensus/amount.h>
+#include <consensus/merkle.h>
+#include <core_io.h>
+#include <hash.h>
#include <net.h>
#include <signet.h>
#include <uint256.h>
#include <validation.h>
+#include <string>
+
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
@@ -144,4 +149,215 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(test_assumeutxo)
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(out210.nChainTx, 200U);
}
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(block_malleation)
+{
+ // Test utilities that calls `IsBlockMutated` and then clears the validity
+ // cache flags on `CBlock`.
+ auto is_mutated = [](CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root) {
+ bool mutated{IsBlockMutated(block, check_witness_root)};
+ block.fChecked = false;
+ block.m_checked_witness_commitment = false;
+ block.m_checked_merkle_root = false;
+ return mutated;
+ };
+ auto is_not_mutated = [&is_mutated](CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root) {
+ return !is_mutated(block, check_witness_root);
+ };
+
+ // Test utilities to create coinbase transactions and insert witness
+ // commitments.
+ //
+ // Note: this will not include the witness stack by default to avoid
+ // triggering the "no witnesses allowed for blocks that don't commit to
+ // witnesses" rule when testing other malleation vectors.
+ auto create_coinbase_tx = [](bool include_witness = false) {
+ CMutableTransaction coinbase;
+ coinbase.vin.resize(1);
+ if (include_witness) {
+ coinbase.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1);
+ coinbase.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = std::vector<unsigned char>(32, 0x00);
+ }
+
+ coinbase.vout.resize(1);
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey.resize(MINIMUM_WITNESS_COMMITMENT);
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[0] = OP_RETURN;
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[1] = 0x24;
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[2] = 0xaa;
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[3] = 0x21;
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[4] = 0xa9;
+ coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[5] = 0xed;
+
+ auto tx = MakeTransactionRef(coinbase);
+ assert(tx->IsCoinBase());
+ return tx;
+ };
+ auto insert_witness_commitment = [](CBlock& block, uint256 commitment) {
+ assert(!block.vtx.empty() && block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase() && !block.vtx[0]->vout.empty());
+
+ CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[0]};
+ CHash256().Write(commitment).Write(std::vector<unsigned char>(32, 0x00)).Finalize(commitment);
+ memcpy(&mtx.vout[0].scriptPubKey[6], commitment.begin(), 32);
+ block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
+ };
+
+ {
+ CBlock block;
+
+ // Empty block is expected to have merkle root of 0x0.
+ BOOST_CHECK(block.vtx.empty());
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = uint256{1};
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = uint256{};
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+
+ // Block with a single coinbase tx is mutated if the merkle root is not
+ // equal to the coinbase tx's hash.
+ block.vtx.push_back(create_coinbase_tx());
+ BOOST_CHECK(block.vtx[0]->GetHash() != block.hashMerkleRoot);
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = block.vtx[0]->GetHash();
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+
+ // Block with two transactions is mutated if the merkle root does not
+ // match the double sha256 of the concatenation of the two transaction
+ // hashes.
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(CMutableTransaction{}));
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ HashWriter hasher;
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[0]->GetHash().data()), 32));
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[1]->GetHash().data()), 32));
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = hasher.GetHash();
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+
+ // Block with two transactions is mutated if any node is duplicate.
+ {
+ block.vtx[1] = block.vtx[0];
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ HashWriter hasher;
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[0]->GetHash().data()), 32));
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[1]->GetHash().data()), 32));
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = hasher.GetHash();
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ }
+
+ // Blocks with 64-byte coinbase transactions are not considered mutated
+ block.vtx.clear();
+ {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.vin.resize(1);
+ mtx.vout.resize(1);
+ mtx.vout[0].scriptPubKey.resize(4);
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(mtx));
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = block.vtx.back()->GetHash();
+ assert(block.vtx.back()->IsCoinBase());
+ assert(GetSerializeSize(block.vtx.back(), PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64);
+ }
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ }
+
+ {
+ // Test merkle root malleation
+
+ // Pseudo code to mine transactions tx{1,2,3}:
+ //
+ // ```
+ // loop {
+ // tx1 = random_tx()
+ // tx2 = random_tx()
+ // tx3 = deserialize_tx(txid(tx1) || txid(tx2));
+ // if serialized_size_without_witness(tx3) == 64 {
+ // print(hex(tx3))
+ // break
+ // }
+ // }
+ // ```
+ //
+ // The `random_tx` function used to mine the txs below simply created
+ // empty transactions with a random version field.
+ CMutableTransaction tx1;
+ BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx1, "ff204bd0000000000000", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
+ CMutableTransaction tx2;
+ BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx2, "8ae53c92000000000000", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
+ CMutableTransaction tx3;
+ BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx3, "cdaf22d00002c6a7f848f8ae4d30054e61dcf3303d6fe01d282163341f06feecc10032b3160fcab87bdfe3ecfb769206ef2d991b92f8a268e423a6ef4d485f06", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
+ {
+ // Verify that double_sha256(txid1||txid2) == txid3
+ HashWriter hasher;
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(tx1.GetHash().data()), 32));
+ hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(tx2.GetHash().data()), 32));
+ assert(hasher.GetHash() == tx3.GetHash());
+ // Verify that tx3 is 64 bytes in size (without witness).
+ assert(GetSerializeSize(tx3, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64);
+ }
+
+ CBlock block;
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx1));
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx2));
+ uint256 merkle_root = block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+
+ // Mutate the block by replacing the two transactions with one 64-byte
+ // transaction that serializes into the concatenation of the txids of
+ // the transactions in the unmutated block.
+ block.vtx.clear();
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx3));
+ BOOST_CHECK(!block.vtx.back()->IsCoinBase());
+ BOOST_CHECK(BlockMerkleRoot(block) == merkle_root);
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ }
+
+ {
+ CBlock block;
+ block.vtx.push_back(create_coinbase_tx(/*include_witness=*/true));
+ {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx;
+ mtx.vin.resize(1);
+ mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1);
+ mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = {0};
+ block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(mtx));
+ }
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ // Block with witnesses is considered mutated if the witness commitment
+ // is not validated.
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
+ // Block with invalid witness commitment is considered mutated.
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
+
+ // Block with valid commitment is not mutated
+ {
+ auto commitment{BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block)};
+ insert_witness_commitment(block, commitment);
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ }
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
+
+ // Malleating witnesses should be caught by `IsBlockMutated`.
+ {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[1]};
+ assert(!mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].empty());
+ ++mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0];
+ block.vtx[1] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
+ }
+ // Without also updating the witness commitment, the merkle root should
+ // not change when changing one of the witnesses.
+ BOOST_CHECK(block.hashMerkleRoot == BlockMerkleRoot(block));
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
+ {
+ auto commitment{BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block)};
+ insert_witness_commitment(block, commitment);
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ }
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
+
+ // Test malleating the coinbase witness reserved value
+ {
+ CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[0]};
+ mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(0);
+ block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
+ block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
+ }
+ BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
+ }
+}
+
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp
index 1fd8f0e326..5ef371b97b 100644
--- a/src/validation.cpp
+++ b/src/validation.cpp
@@ -3486,6 +3486,60 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st
return true;
}
+static bool CheckMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state)
+{
+ if (block.m_checked_merkle_root) return true;
+
+ bool mutated;
+ uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
+ if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
+ return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
+
+ // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
+ // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
+ // while still invalidating it.
+ if (mutated)
+ return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
+
+ block.m_checked_merkle_root = true;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool CheckWitnessMalleation(const CBlock& block, bool expect_witness_commitment, BlockValidationState& state)
+{
+ if (expect_witness_commitment) {
+ if (block.m_checked_witness_commitment) return true;
+
+ int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
+ if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
+ bool malleated = false;
+ uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated);
+ // The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself
+ // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
+ // witness tree.
+ if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
+ return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
+ }
+ CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness);
+ if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
+ return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
+ }
+
+ block.m_checked_witness_commitment = true;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam
+ for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
+ if (tx->HasWitness()) {
+ return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot)
{
// These are checks that are independent of context.
@@ -3504,17 +3558,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
}
// Check the merkle root.
- if (fCheckMerkleRoot) {
- bool mutated;
- uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
- if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
- return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
-
- // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
- // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
- // while still invalidating it.
- if (mutated)
- return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
+ if (fCheckMerkleRoot && !CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) {
+ return false;
}
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
@@ -3605,6 +3650,37 @@ bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const Consens
[&](const auto& header) { return CheckProofOfWork(header.GetHash(), header.nBits, consensusParams);});
}
+bool IsBlockMutated(const CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root)
+{
+ BlockValidationState state;
+ if (!CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString());
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) {
+ // Consider the block mutated if any transaction is 64 bytes in size (see 3.1
+ // in "Weaknesses in Bitcoin’s Merkle Root Construction":
+ // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20190225/a27d8837/attachment-0001.pdf).
+ //
+ // Note: This is not a consensus change as this only applies to blocks that
+ // don't have a coinbase transaction and would therefore already be invalid.
+ return std::any_of(block.vtx.begin(), block.vtx.end(),
+ [](auto& tx) { return ::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64; });
+ } else {
+ // Theoretically it is still possible for a block with a 64 byte
+ // coinbase transaction to be mutated but we neglect that possibility
+ // here as it requires at least 224 bits of work.
+ }
+
+ if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, check_witness_root, state)) {
+ LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString());
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers)
{
arith_uint256 total_work{0};
@@ -3713,33 +3789,8 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
// * There must be at least one output whose scriptPubKey is a single 36-byte push, the first 4 bytes of which are
// {0xaa, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xed}, and the following 32 bytes are SHA256^2(witness root, witness reserved value). In case there are
// multiple, the last one is used.
- bool fHaveWitness = false;
- if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
- int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
- if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
- bool malleated = false;
- uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated);
- // The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself
- // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
- // witness tree.
- if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
- return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
- }
- CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness);
- if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
- return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
- }
- fHaveWitness = true;
- }
- }
-
- // No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam
- if (!fHaveWitness) {
- for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
- if (tx->HasWitness()) {
- return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
- }
- }
+ if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT), state)) {
+ return false;
}
// After the coinbase witness reserved value and commitment are verified,
diff --git a/src/validation.h b/src/validation.h
index fd0e2115f7..b6e2e66a44 100644
--- a/src/validation.h
+++ b/src/validation.h
@@ -352,6 +352,9 @@ bool TestBlockValidity(BlockValidationState& state,
/** Check with the proof of work on each blockheader matches the value in nBits */
bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams);
+/** Check if a block has been mutated (with respect to its merkle root and witness commitments). */
+bool IsBlockMutated(const CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root);
+
/** Return the sum of the work on a given set of headers */
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers);
diff --git a/src/wallet/wallet.cpp b/src/wallet/wallet.cpp
index 0d664a4539..e6276d7f78 100644
--- a/src/wallet/wallet.cpp
+++ b/src/wallet/wallet.cpp
@@ -2596,8 +2596,10 @@ util::Result<CTxDestination> ReserveDestination::GetReservedDestination(bool int
if (nIndex == -1) {
CKeyPool keypool;
- auto op_address = m_spk_man->GetReservedDestination(type, internal, nIndex, keypool);
+ int64_t index;
+ auto op_address = m_spk_man->GetReservedDestination(type, internal, index, keypool);
if (!op_address) return op_address;
+ nIndex = index;
address = *op_address;
fInternal = keypool.fInternal;
}
diff --git a/test/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py b/test/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..737edaf5bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+# Copyright (c) The Bitcoin Core developers
+# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+"""
+Test that an attacker can't degrade compact block relay by sending unsolicited
+mutated blocks to clear in-flight blocktxn requests from other honest peers.
+"""
+
+from test_framework.p2p import P2PInterface
+from test_framework.messages import (
+ BlockTransactions,
+ msg_cmpctblock,
+ msg_block,
+ msg_blocktxn,
+ HeaderAndShortIDs,
+)
+from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
+from test_framework.blocktools import (
+ COINBASE_MATURITY,
+ create_block,
+ add_witness_commitment,
+ NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS,
+)
+from test_framework.util import assert_equal
+from test_framework.wallet import MiniWallet
+import copy
+
+class MutatedBlocksTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
+ def set_test_params(self):
+ self.setup_clean_chain = True
+ self.num_nodes = 1
+ self.extra_args = [
+ [
+ "-testactivationheight=segwit@1", # causes unconnected headers/blocks to not have segwit considered deployed
+ ],
+ ]
+
+ def run_test(self):
+ self.wallet = MiniWallet(self.nodes[0])
+ self.generate(self.wallet, COINBASE_MATURITY)
+
+ honest_relayer = self.nodes[0].add_outbound_p2p_connection(P2PInterface(), p2p_idx=0, connection_type="outbound-full-relay")
+ attacker = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
+
+ # Create new block with two transactions (coinbase + 1 self-transfer).
+ # The self-transfer transaction is needed to trigger a compact block
+ # `getblocktxn` roundtrip.
+ tx = self.wallet.create_self_transfer()["tx"]
+ block = create_block(tmpl=self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate(NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS), txlist=[tx])
+ add_witness_commitment(block)
+ block.solve()
+
+ # Create mutated version of the block by changing the transaction
+ # version on the self-transfer.
+ mutated_block = copy.deepcopy(block)
+ mutated_block.vtx[1].nVersion = 4
+
+ # Announce the new block via a compact block through the honest relayer
+ cmpctblock = HeaderAndShortIDs()
+ cmpctblock.initialize_from_block(block, use_witness=True)
+ honest_relayer.send_message(msg_cmpctblock(cmpctblock.to_p2p()))
+
+ # Wait for a `getblocktxn` that attempts to fetch the self-transfer
+ def self_transfer_requested():
+ if not honest_relayer.last_message.get('getblocktxn'):
+ return False
+
+ get_block_txn = honest_relayer.last_message['getblocktxn']
+ return get_block_txn.block_txn_request.blockhash == block.sha256 and \
+ get_block_txn.block_txn_request.indexes == [1]
+ honest_relayer.wait_until(self_transfer_requested, timeout=5)
+
+ # Block at height 101 should be the only one in flight from peer 0
+ peer_info_prior_to_attack = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()
+ assert_equal(peer_info_prior_to_attack[0]['id'], 0)
+ assert_equal([101], peer_info_prior_to_attack[0]["inflight"])
+
+ # Attempt to clear the honest relayer's download request by sending the
+ # mutated block (as the attacker).
+ with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["Block mutated: bad-txnmrklroot, hashMerkleRoot mismatch"]):
+ attacker.send_message(msg_block(mutated_block))
+ # Attacker should get disconnected for sending a mutated block
+ attacker.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=5)
+
+ # Block at height 101 should *still* be the only block in-flight from
+ # peer 0
+ peer_info_after_attack = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()
+ assert_equal(peer_info_after_attack[0]['id'], 0)
+ assert_equal([101], peer_info_after_attack[0]["inflight"])
+
+ # The honest relayer should be able to complete relaying the block by
+ # sending the blocktxn that was requested.
+ block_txn = msg_blocktxn()
+ block_txn.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(blockhash=block.sha256, transactions=[tx])
+ honest_relayer.send_and_ping(block_txn)
+ assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
+
+ # Check that unexpected-witness mutation check doesn't trigger on a header that doesn't connect to anything
+ assert_equal(len(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()), 1)
+ attacker = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
+ block_missing_prev = copy.deepcopy(block)
+ block_missing_prev.hashPrevBlock = 123
+ block_missing_prev.solve()
+
+ # Attacker gets a DoS score of 10, not immediately disconnected, so we do it 10 times to get to 100
+ for _ in range(10):
+ assert_equal(len(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()), 2)
+ with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["AcceptBlock FAILED (prev-blk-not-found)"]):
+ attacker.send_message(msg_block(block_missing_prev))
+ attacker.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=5)
+
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+ MutatedBlocksTest().main()
diff --git a/test/functional/test_runner.py b/test/functional/test_runner.py
index 2ff877e820..2b04a5a7d2 100755
--- a/test/functional/test_runner.py
+++ b/test/functional/test_runner.py
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ BASE_SCRIPTS = [
'wallet_crosschain.py',
'mining_basic.py',
'feature_signet.py',
+ 'p2p_mutated_blocks.py',
'wallet_implicitsegwit.py --legacy-wallet',
'rpc_named_arguments.py',
'feature_startupnotify.py',
diff --git a/test/functional/wallet_keypool.py b/test/functional/wallet_keypool.py
index bd97851153..6331a5f456 100755
--- a/test/functional/wallet_keypool.py
+++ b/test/functional/wallet_keypool.py
@@ -103,11 +103,18 @@ class KeyPoolTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
- addr = set()
+ # remember keypool sizes
+ wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
+ kp_size_before = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
# the next one should fail
assert_raises_rpc_error(-12, "Keypool ran out", nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress)
+ # check that keypool sizes did not change
+ wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
+ kp_size_after = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
+ assert_equal(kp_size_before, kp_size_after)
# drain the external keys
+ addr = set()
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
@@ -115,8 +122,15 @@ class KeyPoolTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
assert len(addr) == 6
+ # remember keypool sizes
+ wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
+ kp_size_before = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
# the next one should fail
assert_raises_rpc_error(-12, "Error: Keypool ran out, please call keypoolrefill first", nodes[0].getnewaddress)
+ # check that keypool sizes did not change
+ wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
+ kp_size_after = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
+ assert_equal(kp_size_before, kp_size_after)
# refill keypool with three new addresses
nodes[0].walletpassphrase('test', 1)