diff options
author | Matt Corallo <git@bluematt.me> | 2019-01-16 13:11:13 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com> | 2019-05-02 14:55:13 -0400 |
commit | 34477ccd39a8d4bfa8ad612f22d5a46291922185 (patch) | |
tree | cb10c04ca46dc532d59d8da2c5ca797e54093b9e | |
parent | 6a7f8777a0b193fae4f976196f3464ffac01bf1b (diff) |
[refactor] Add useful-for-dos "reason" field to CValidationState
This is a first step towards cleaning up our DoS interface - make
validation return *why* something is invalid, and let net_processing
figure out what that implies in terms of banning/disconnection/etc.
Behavior change: peers will now be banned for providing blocks
with premature coinbase spends.
Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
Suhas Daftuar <sdaftuar@gmail.com>
-rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/tx_check.cpp | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/consensus/validation.h | 85 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/validation.cpp | 131 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | test/functional/feature_block.py | 4 |
7 files changed, 173 insertions, 78 deletions
diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp index 638f6b808d..3aa6d3ae1f 100644 --- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp +++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp @@ -11,24 +11,24 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe { // Basic checks that don't depend on any context if (tx.vin.empty()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty"); if (tx.vout.empty()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty"); // Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability) if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize"); // Check for negative or overflow output values CAmount nValueOut = 0; for (const auto& txout : tx.vout) { if (txout.nValue < 0) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative"); if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge"); nValueOut += txout.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut)) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge"); } // Check for duplicate inputs - note that this check is slow so we skip it in CheckBlock @@ -37,20 +37,20 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate"); } } if (tx.IsCoinBase()) { if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length"); } else { for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) if (txin.prevout.IsNull()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null"); } return true; diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp index 24b5338503..62a1676e2b 100644 --- a/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp +++ b/src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c { // are the actual inputs available? if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", false, strprintf("%s: inputs missing/spent", __func__)); } @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c // If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", false, strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight)); } @@ -180,20 +180,20 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c // Check for negative or overflow input values nValueIn += coin.out.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange"); } } const CAmount value_out = tx.GetValueOut(); if (nValueIn < value_out) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false, + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false, strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(value_out))); } // Tally transaction fees const CAmount txfee_aux = nValueIn - value_out; if (!MoneyRange(txfee_aux)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange"); } txfee = txfee_aux; diff --git a/src/consensus/validation.h b/src/consensus/validation.h index 163b17e629..787b171eea 100644 --- a/src/consensus/validation.h +++ b/src/consensus/validation.h @@ -22,6 +22,50 @@ static const unsigned char REJECT_NONSTANDARD = 0x40; static const unsigned char REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE = 0x42; static const unsigned char REJECT_CHECKPOINT = 0x43; +/** A "reason" why something was invalid, suitable for determining whether the + * provider of the object should be banned/ignored/disconnected/etc. + * These are much more granular than the rejection codes, which may be more + * useful for some other use-cases. + */ +enum class ValidationInvalidReason { + // txn and blocks: + NONE, //!< not actually invalid + CONSENSUS, //!< invalid by consensus rules (excluding any below reasons) + /** + * Invalid by a change to consensus rules more recent than SegWit. + * Currently unused as there are no such consensus rule changes, and any download + * sources realistically need to support SegWit in order to provide useful data, + * so differentiating between always-invalid and invalid-by-pre-SegWit-soft-fork + * is uninteresting. + */ + RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE, + // Only blocks (or headers): + CACHED_INVALID, //!< this object was cached as being invalid, but we don't know why + BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, //!< invalid proof of work or time too old + BLOCK_MUTATED, //!< the block's data didn't match the data committed to by the PoW + BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, //!< We don't have the previous block the checked one is built on + BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, //!< A block this one builds on is invalid + BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, //!< block timestamp was > 2 hours in the future (or our clock is bad) + BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, //!< the block failed to meet one of our checkpoints + // Only loose txn: + TX_NOT_STANDARD, //!< didn't meet our local policy rules + TX_MISSING_INPUTS, //!< a transaction was missing some of its inputs (or its inputs were spent at < coinbase maturity height) + /** + * Transaction might be missing a witness, have a witness prior to SegWit + * activation, or witness may have been malleated (which includes + * non-standard witnesses). + */ + TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, + /** + * Tx already in mempool or conflicts with a tx in the chain + * (if it conflicts with another tx in mempool, we use MEMPOOL_POLICY as it failed to reach the RBF threshold) + * TODO: Currently this is only used if the transaction already exists in the mempool or on chain, + * TODO: ATMP's fMissingInputs and a valid CValidationState being used to indicate missing inputs + */ + TX_CONFLICT, + TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, //!< violated mempool's fee/size/descendant/RBF/etc limits +}; + /** Capture information about block/transaction validation */ class CValidationState { private: @@ -30,31 +74,35 @@ private: MODE_INVALID, //!< network rule violation (DoS value may be set) MODE_ERROR, //!< run-time error } mode; + ValidationInvalidReason m_reason; int nDoS; std::string strRejectReason; unsigned int chRejectCode; bool corruptionPossible; std::string strDebugMessage; public: - CValidationState() : mode(MODE_VALID), nDoS(0), chRejectCode(0), corruptionPossible(false) {} - bool DoS(int level, bool ret = false, + CValidationState() : mode(MODE_VALID), m_reason(ValidationInvalidReason::NONE), nDoS(0), chRejectCode(0), corruptionPossible(false) {} + bool DoS(int level, ValidationInvalidReason reasonIn, bool ret = false, unsigned int chRejectCodeIn=0, const std::string &strRejectReasonIn="", bool corruptionIn=false, const std::string &strDebugMessageIn="") { + m_reason = reasonIn; chRejectCode = chRejectCodeIn; strRejectReason = strRejectReasonIn; corruptionPossible = corruptionIn; strDebugMessage = strDebugMessageIn; + nDoS += level; + assert(nDoS == GetDoSForReason()); + assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED)); if (mode == MODE_ERROR) return ret; - nDoS += level; mode = MODE_INVALID; return ret; } - bool Invalid(bool ret = false, + bool Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason _reason, bool ret = false, unsigned int _chRejectCode=0, const std::string &_strRejectReason="", const std::string &_strDebugMessage="") { - return DoS(0, ret, _chRejectCode, _strRejectReason, false, _strDebugMessage); + return DoS(0, _reason, ret, _chRejectCode, _strRejectReason, false, _strDebugMessage); } bool Error(const std::string& strRejectReasonIn) { if (mode == MODE_VALID) @@ -72,12 +120,39 @@ public: return mode == MODE_ERROR; } bool CorruptionPossible() const { + assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED)); return corruptionPossible; } void SetCorruptionPossible() { corruptionPossible = true; + assert(corruptionPossible == (m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED || m_reason == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED)); } int GetDoS(void) const { return nDoS; } + int GetDoSForReason() const { + switch (m_reason) { + case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE: + return 0; + case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: + return 100; + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: + return 10; + case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID: + case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + return 0; + } + return 0; + } + ValidationInvalidReason GetReason() const { return m_reason; } unsigned int GetRejectCode() const { return chRejectCode; } std::string GetRejectReason() const { return strRejectReason; } std::string GetDebugMessage() const { return strDebugMessage; } diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index a416093db1..489ffcdc66 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -961,6 +961,7 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) { + assert(state.GetDoS() == state.GetDoSForReason()); return (state.GetDoS() > 0); } @@ -975,6 +976,7 @@ static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. */ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { + assert(state.GetDoS() == state.GetDoSForReason()); int nDoS = state.GetDoS(); if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) { LOCK(cs_main); diff --git a/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp b/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp index 4876c44f10..aa30129361 100644 --- a/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp +++ b/src/test/txvalidation_tests.cpp @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_CASE(tx_mempool_reject_coinbase, TestChain100Setup) // Check that the validation state reflects the unsuccessful attempt. BOOST_CHECK(state.IsInvalid()); BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state.GetRejectReason(), "coinbase"); + BOOST_CHECK(state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS); } BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END() diff --git a/src/validation.cpp b/src/validation.cpp index 0951b3cf97..5f6d578c2b 100644 --- a/src/validation.cpp +++ b/src/validation.cpp @@ -579,28 +579,28 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction if (tx.IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "coinbase"); // Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest) std::string reason; if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, reason); // Do not work on transactions that are too small. // A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes. // Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to reduce unnecessary malloc overhead. if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small"); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "tx-size-small"); // Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't // be mined yet. if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final"); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final"); // is it already in the memory pool? if (pool.exists(hash)) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-in-mempool"); } // Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions @@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool } } if (fReplacementOptOut) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-mempool-conflict"); } setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash()); @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) { // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs if (pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) { - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT, false, REJECT_DUPLICATE, "txn-already-known"); } } // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own if (!CheckSequenceLocks(pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final"); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final"); CAmount nFees = 0; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, GetSpendHeight(view), nFees)) { @@ -694,11 +694,11 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view)) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); // Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, view)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-witness-nonstandard", true); int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS); @@ -722,21 +722,21 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize(); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false, strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost)); CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize); if (!bypass_limits && mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee)); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, mempoolRejectFee)); } // No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected blocks if (!bypass_limits && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "min relay fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nModifiedFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))); } if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee) - return state.Invalid(false, + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee)); @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000; std::string errString; if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too-long-mempool-chain", false, errString); } // A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash(); if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", false, strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s", hash.ToString(), @@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize()); if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate) { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s", hash.ToString(), @@ -832,7 +832,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize(); } } else { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "too many potential replacements", false, strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n", hash.ToString(), @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a // tx that's in the mempool. if (pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed", false, strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d", hash.ToString(), j)); @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool // transactions would not be paid for. if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees) { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees))); @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees; if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize)) { - return state.DoS(0, false, + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s", hash.ToString(), @@ -898,7 +898,8 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) && !CheckInputs(tx, stateDummy, view, true, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) { // Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine. - state.SetCorruptionPossible(); + state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), true, state.GetDebugMessage()); } return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs } @@ -956,7 +957,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool if (!bypass_limits) { LimitMempoolSize(pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY) * 60 * 60); if (!pool.exists(hash)) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full"); + return state.DoS(0, ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool full"); } } @@ -1357,6 +1358,9 @@ void InitScriptExecutionCache() { * which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache * entry again. * + * Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking + * callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases. + * * Non-static (and re-declared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp */ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsViewCache &inputs, bool fScriptChecks, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, std::vector<CScriptCheck> *pvChecks) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) @@ -1418,7 +1422,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i, flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata); if (check2()) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } // Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is // invalid in new blocks, e.g. an invalid P2SH. We DoS ban @@ -1427,7 +1431,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi // as to the correct behavior - we may want to continue // peering with non-upgraded nodes even after soft-fork // super-majority signaling has occurred. - return state.DoS(100,false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } } @@ -1922,7 +1926,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) { if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) { - return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"), + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-BIP30"); } } @@ -1962,11 +1966,17 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl { CAmount txfee = 0; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) { + if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) { + // CheckTxInputs may return MISSING_INPUTS but we can't return that, as + // it's not defined for a block, so we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here. + state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage()); + } return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } nFees += txfee; if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) { - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__), + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange"); } @@ -1979,7 +1989,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl } if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) { - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); } } @@ -1990,7 +2000,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl // * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase) nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"), + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): too many sigops"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops"); txdata.emplace_back(tx); @@ -1999,9 +2009,16 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks; bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */ if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, fScriptChecks, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) { - // With parallel script checks, we always set DoS to 100; do - // that here as well for simplicity (for now). - state.DoS(100, false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage()); + if (state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD) { + // CheckInputs may return NOT_STANDARD for extra flags we passed, + // but we can't return that, as it's not defined for a block, so + // we reset the reason flag to CONSENSUS here. + // In the event of a future soft-fork, we may need to + // consider whether rewriting to CONSENSUS or + // RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE would be more appropriate. + state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, + state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), state.CorruptionPossible(), state.GetDebugMessage()); + } return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } @@ -2019,13 +2036,13 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBl CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus()); if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) - return state.DoS(100, + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-amount"); if (!control.Wait()) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, error("%s: CheckQueue failed", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "block-validation-failed"); int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2; LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal); @@ -3051,7 +3068,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state, { // Check proof of work matches claimed amount if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams)) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed"); return true; } @@ -3073,13 +3090,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P bool mutated; uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, // while still invalidating it. if (mutated) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction"); } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any @@ -3090,19 +3107,19 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P // Size limits if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed"); // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase"); for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase"); // Check transactions for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, state, true)) - return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), + return state.Invalid(state.GetReason(), false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage())); unsigned int nSigOps = 0; @@ -3111,7 +3128,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const Consensus::P nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx); } if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; @@ -3204,7 +3221,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta // Check proof of work const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus(); if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work"); // Check against checkpoints if (fCheckpointsEnabled) { @@ -3213,23 +3230,23 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta // MapBlockIndex. CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = Checkpoints::GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints()); if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, error("%s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)", __func__, nHeight), REJECT_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint"); } // Check timestamp against prev if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", false, "block's timestamp is too early"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", false, "block's timestamp is too early"); // Check timestamp if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME) - return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); // Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) || (block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) || (block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height)) - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), false, + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), false, strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion)); return true; @@ -3259,7 +3276,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // Check that all transactions are finalized for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction"); } } @@ -3269,7 +3286,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight; if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() || !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase"); } } @@ -3291,11 +3308,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the // witness tree. if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-nonce-size", true, strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); } CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin()); if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-witness-merkle-match", true, strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); } fHaveWitness = true; } @@ -3305,7 +3322,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c if (!fHaveWitness) { for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (tx->HasWitness()) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, REJECT_INVALID, "unexpected-witness", true, strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); } } } @@ -3317,7 +3334,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c // the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently // failed). if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) { - return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-weight", false, strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); } return true; @@ -3337,7 +3354,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& if (ppindex) *ppindex = pindex; if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) - return state.Invalid(error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate"); + return state.Invalid(ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID, error("%s: block %s is marked invalid", __func__, hash.ToString()), 0, "duplicate"); return true; } @@ -3348,10 +3365,10 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr; BlockMap::iterator mi = mapBlockIndex.find(block.hashPrevBlock); if (mi == mapBlockIndex.end()) - return state.DoS(10, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found"); + return state.DoS(10, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, error("%s: prev block not found", __func__), 0, "prev-blk-not-found"); pindexPrev = (*mi).second; if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime())) return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); @@ -3388,7 +3405,7 @@ bool CChainState::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(invalid_walk); invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev; } - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); + return state.DoS(100, ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, error("%s: prev block invalid", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-prevblk"); } } } diff --git a/test/functional/feature_block.py b/test/functional/feature_block.py index 9e00e2d23c..9a9424b82b 100755 --- a/test/functional/feature_block.py +++ b/test/functional/feature_block.py @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework): self.log.info("Reject a block spending an immature coinbase.") self.move_tip(15) b20 = self.next_block(20, spend=out[7]) - self.send_blocks([b20], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase') + self.send_blocks([b20], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase', reconnect=True) # Attempt to spend a coinbase at depth too low (on a fork this time) # genesis -> b1 (0) -> b2 (1) -> b5 (2) -> b6 (3) @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework): self.send_blocks([b21], False) b22 = self.next_block(22, spend=out[5]) - self.send_blocks([b22], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase') + self.send_blocks([b22], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase', reconnect=True) # Create a block on either side of MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE and make sure its accepted/rejected # genesis -> b1 (0) -> b2 (1) -> b5 (2) -> b6 (3) |