diff options
| author | Cory Fields <cory-nospam-@coryfields.com> | 2015-01-09 12:27:06 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2015-01-10 09:13:53 +0100 |
| commit | f4134ee30100a3ba8a25e3f7ac6c4e0b39fb05a3 (patch) | |
| tree | dde43d575a215169199c3798857f5e46e68ecb2e | |
| parent | 03a7d673876dc8fbae876290b455c02b0cac80bd (diff) | |
consensus: guard against openssl's new strict DER checks
New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. However,
it'll happily decode them. Decode then re-encode before verification in order
to ensure that it is properly consumed.
Github-Pull: #5634
Rebased-From: 488ed32f2ada1d1dd108fc245d025c4d5f252783
| -rw-r--r-- | src/key.cpp | 15 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/key.cpp b/src/key.cpp index 75114c6afe..8a1bfef771 100644 --- a/src/key.cpp +++ b/src/key.cpp @@ -376,11 +376,20 @@ bool CKey::SetCompactSignature(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& v bool CKey::Verify(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) { - // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good - if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1) + // New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. de/re-serialize first. + unsigned char *norm_der = NULL; + ECDSA_SIG *norm_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new(); + const unsigned char* sigptr = &vchSig[0]; + d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&norm_sig, &sigptr, vchSig.size()); + int derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(norm_sig, &norm_der); + ECDSA_SIG_free(norm_sig); + if (derlen <= 0) return false; - return true; + // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good + bool ret = ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), norm_der, derlen, pkey) == 1; + OPENSSL_free(norm_der); + return ret; } bool CKey::VerifyCompact(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) |