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authorCory Fields <cory-nospam-@coryfields.com>2015-01-09 12:27:06 +0100
committerWladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com>2015-01-10 09:13:53 +0100
commitf4134ee30100a3ba8a25e3f7ac6c4e0b39fb05a3 (patch)
treedde43d575a215169199c3798857f5e46e68ecb2e
parent03a7d673876dc8fbae876290b455c02b0cac80bd (diff)
downloadbitcoin-f4134ee30100a3ba8a25e3f7ac6c4e0b39fb05a3.tar.xz
consensus: guard against openssl's new strict DER checks
New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. However, it'll happily decode them. Decode then re-encode before verification in order to ensure that it is properly consumed. Github-Pull: #5634 Rebased-From: 488ed32f2ada1d1dd108fc245d025c4d5f252783
-rw-r--r--src/key.cpp15
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/src/key.cpp b/src/key.cpp
index 75114c6afe..8a1bfef771 100644
--- a/src/key.cpp
+++ b/src/key.cpp
@@ -376,11 +376,20 @@ bool CKey::SetCompactSignature(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& v
bool CKey::Verify(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)
{
- // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
- if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1)
+ // New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. de/re-serialize first.
+ unsigned char *norm_der = NULL;
+ ECDSA_SIG *norm_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+ const unsigned char* sigptr = &vchSig[0];
+ d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&norm_sig, &sigptr, vchSig.size());
+ int derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(norm_sig, &norm_der);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(norm_sig);
+ if (derlen <= 0)
return false;
- return true;
+ // -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
+ bool ret = ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), norm_der, derlen, pkey) == 1;
+ OPENSSL_free(norm_der);
+ return ret;
}
bool CKey::VerifyCompact(uint256 hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)