diff options
author | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2017-03-01 12:40:06 +0100 |
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committer | Wladimir J. van der Laan <laanwj@gmail.com> | 2017-03-01 12:41:53 +0100 |
commit | d19d45a1e6a4345a57d5983d466b16dadbec0da9 (patch) | |
tree | af6dcbf0bb26adeeabe4eb5c19a5c31108bab9f3 | |
parent | cbdb4732f10cb00ec46a35e5c7adb2c4cdf1d64d (diff) | |
parent | 7e6dcd9995b99e894b8017f09016c405b066ca36 (diff) |
Merge #9821: util: Specific GetOSRandom for Linux/FreeBSD/OpenBSD
7e6dcd9 random: Add fallback if getrandom syscall not available (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
7cad849 sanity: Move OS random to sanity check function (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
aa09ccb squashme: comment that NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES should not be changed lightly (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
224e6eb util: Specific GetOSRandom for Linux/FreeBSD/OpenBSD (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
Tree-SHA512: 9fd408b1316c69de86674f342339b2f89192fd317c8c036b5df4320f828fa263c7966146bfc1904c51137ee4a26e4cb0f560b2cd05e18cde4d808b9b92ad15c4
-rw-r--r-- | configure.ac | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/Makefile.test.include | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/init.cpp | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/random.cpp | 115 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/random.h | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/test/random_tests.cpp | 19 |
6 files changed, 174 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 5a09befea2..0de89288d0 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -574,6 +574,33 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([ ] ) +# Check for different ways of gathering OS randomness +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for Linux getrandom syscall) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <unistd.h> + #include <sys/syscall.h> + #include <linux/random.h>]], + [[ syscall(SYS_getrandom, nullptr, 32, 0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes); AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM, 1,[Define this symbol if the Linux getrandom system call is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for getentropy) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <unistd.h>]], + [[ getentropy(nullptr, 32) ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes); AC_DEFINE(HAVE_GETENTROPY, 1,[Define this symbol if the BSD getentropy system call is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING(for sysctl KERN_ARND) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/sysctl.h>]], + [[ static const int name[2] = {CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND}; + sysctl(name, 2, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes); AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND, 1,[Define this symbol if the BSD sysctl(KERN_ARND) is available]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] +) + +# Check for reduced exports if test x$use_reduce_exports = xyes; then AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fvisibility=hidden],[RE_CXXFLAGS="-fvisibility=hidden"], [AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot set default symbol visibility. Use --disable-reduce-exports.])]) diff --git a/src/Makefile.test.include b/src/Makefile.test.include index 4d44b35bb6..55a587cf87 100644 --- a/src/Makefile.test.include +++ b/src/Makefile.test.include @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ BITCOIN_TESTS =\ test/policyestimator_tests.cpp \ test/pow_tests.cpp \ test/prevector_tests.cpp \ + test/random_tests.cpp \ test/raii_event_tests.cpp \ test/reverselock_tests.cpp \ test/rpc_tests.cpp \ diff --git a/src/init.cpp b/src/init.cpp index 1c8c3bc620..da389fd23d 100644 --- a/src/init.cpp +++ b/src/init.cpp @@ -683,9 +683,15 @@ bool InitSanityCheck(void) InitError("Elliptic curve cryptography sanity check failure. Aborting."); return false; } + if (!glibc_sanity_test() || !glibcxx_sanity_test()) return false; + if (!Random_SanityCheck()) { + InitError("OS cryptographic RNG sanity check failure. Aborting."); + return false; + } + return true; } diff --git a/src/random.cpp b/src/random.cpp index 6634019bea..8284f457c9 100644 --- a/src/random.cpp +++ b/src/random.cpp @@ -21,6 +21,17 @@ #include <sys/time.h> #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY +#include <unistd.h> +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#endif + #include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/rand.h> @@ -91,34 +102,86 @@ static void RandAddSeedPerfmon() #endif } +#ifndef WIN32 +/** Fallback: get 32 bytes of system entropy from /dev/urandom. The most + * compatible way to get cryptographic randomness on UNIX-ish platforms. + */ +void GetDevURandom(unsigned char *ent32) +{ + int f = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); + if (f == -1) { + RandFailure(); + } + int have = 0; + do { + ssize_t n = read(f, ent32 + have, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have); + if (n <= 0 || n + have > NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) { + RandFailure(); + } + have += n; + } while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES); + close(f); +} +#endif + /** Get 32 bytes of system entropy. */ -static void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32) +void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32) { -#ifdef WIN32 +#if defined(WIN32) HCRYPTPROV hProvider; int ret = CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT); if (!ret) { RandFailure(); } - ret = CryptGenRandom(hProvider, 32, ent32); + ret = CryptGenRandom(hProvider, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, ent32); if (!ret) { RandFailure(); } CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); -#else - int f = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); - if (f == -1) { +#elif defined(HAVE_SYS_GETRANDOM) + /* Linux. From the getrandom(2) man page: + * "If the urandom source has been initialized, reads of up to 256 bytes + * will always return as many bytes as requested and will not be + * interrupted by signals." + */ + int rv = syscall(SYS_getrandom, ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES, 0); + if (rv != NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) { + if (rv < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) { + /* Fallback for kernel <3.17: the return value will be -1 and errno + * ENOSYS if the syscall is not available, in that case fall back + * to /dev/urandom. + */ + GetDevURandom(ent32); + } else { + RandFailure(); + } + } +#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) + /* On OpenBSD this can return up to 256 bytes of entropy, will return an + * error if more are requested. + * The call cannot return less than the requested number of bytes. + */ + if (getentropy(ent32, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES) != 0) { RandFailure(); } +#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + /* FreeBSD and similar. It is possible for the call to return less + * bytes than requested, so need to read in a loop. + */ + static const int name[2] = {CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND}; int have = 0; do { - ssize_t n = read(f, ent32 + have, 32 - have); - if (n <= 0 || n + have > 32) { + size_t len = NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES - have; + if (sysctl(name, ARRAYLEN(name), ent32 + have, &len, NULL, 0) != 0) { RandFailure(); } - have += n; - } while (have < 32); - close(f); + have += len; + } while (have < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES); +#else + /* Fall back to /dev/urandom if there is no specific method implemented to + * get system entropy for this OS. + */ + GetDevURandom(ent32); #endif } @@ -195,3 +258,33 @@ FastRandomContext::FastRandomContext(bool fDeterministic) } } +bool Random_SanityCheck() +{ + /* This does not measure the quality of randomness, but it does test that + * OSRandom() overwrites all 32 bytes of the output given a maximum + * number of tries. + */ + static const ssize_t MAX_TRIES = 1024; + uint8_t data[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES]; + bool overwritten[NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES] = {}; /* Tracks which bytes have been overwritten at least once */ + int num_overwritten; + int tries = 0; + /* Loop until all bytes have been overwritten at least once, or max number tries reached */ + do { + memset(data, 0, NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES); + GetOSRand(data); + for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) { + overwritten[x] |= (data[x] != 0); + } + + num_overwritten = 0; + for (int x=0; x < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES; ++x) { + if (overwritten[x]) { + num_overwritten += 1; + } + } + + tries += 1; + } while (num_overwritten < NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES && tries < MAX_TRIES); + return (num_overwritten == NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES); /* If this failed, bailed out after too many tries */ +} diff --git a/src/random.h b/src/random.h index 664f030eba..0464bdce14 100644 --- a/src/random.h +++ b/src/random.h @@ -46,4 +46,21 @@ public: uint32_t Rw; }; +/* Number of random bytes returned by GetOSRand. + * When changing this constant make sure to change all call sites, and make + * sure that the underlying OS APIs for all platforms support the number. + * (many cap out at 256 bytes). + */ +static const ssize_t NUM_OS_RANDOM_BYTES = 32; + +/** Get 32 bytes of system entropy. Do not use this in application code: use + * GetStrongRandBytes instead. + */ +void GetOSRand(unsigned char *ent32); + +/** Check that OS randomness is available and returning the requested number + * of bytes. + */ +bool Random_SanityCheck(); + #endif // BITCOIN_RANDOM_H diff --git a/src/test/random_tests.cpp b/src/test/random_tests.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d2c46c0daa --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/random_tests.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017 The Bitcoin Core developers +// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying +// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. + +#include "random.h" + +#include "test/test_bitcoin.h" + +#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp> + +BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(random_tests, BasicTestingSetup) + +BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(osrandom_tests) +{ + BOOST_CHECK(Random_SanityCheck()); +} + +BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END() + |