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authorPieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>2018-07-16 10:28:42 -0700
committerPieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com>2018-07-16 10:37:02 -0700
commitf8d470e24606297dab95e30b1d39ff664fbda31d (patch)
treee9dae171054bb1692c7ae097794e30245e4a3b4f
parent17943f77bda22d515e29662d31c8ac936b85f470 (diff)
parentd45b344ffd46b0226449cbd46cdaff9577402cf0 (diff)
Merge #13298: Net: Bucketing INV delays (1 bucket) for incoming connections to hide tx time
d45b344ffd Bucket for inbound when scheduling invs to hide tx time (Gleb) Pull request description: It has been brought up to my attention that current random delays mechanism (originally intended to obfuscate transaction metadata) allows to easily estimate the time a transaction was received by a node. It may be done by connecting multiple observer nodes to the same node. Each of those nodes will generate its own schedule of delays. Combined metadata regarding those events from different sources allows an observer to estimate transaction time. After this patch a spy won't gain additional information by just creating multiple connections to a target. Tree-SHA512: c71dae5ff350b614cb40a8e201fd0562d3e03e3e72a5099718cd451f0d84c66d5e52bbaf0d5b4b75137514c8efdedcc6ef4df90142b360153f04ad0721545ab1
-rw-r--r--src/net.cpp16
-rw-r--r--src/net.h11
-rw-r--r--src/net_processing.cpp23
-rw-r--r--src/validation.h14
4 files changed, 45 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp
index d806059ece..e44aa1fdb4 100644
--- a/src/net.cpp
+++ b/src/net.cpp
@@ -2864,8 +2864,20 @@ bool CConnman::ForNode(NodeId id, std::function<bool(CNode* pnode)> func)
return found != nullptr && NodeFullyConnected(found) && func(found);
}
-int64_t PoissonNextSend(int64_t nNow, int average_interval_seconds) {
- return nNow + (int64_t)(log1p(GetRand(1ULL << 48) * -0.0000000000000035527136788 /* -1/2^48 */) * average_interval_seconds * -1000000.0 + 0.5);
+int64_t CConnman::PoissonNextSendInbound(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds)
+{
+ if (m_next_send_inv_to_incoming < now) {
+ // If this function were called from multiple threads simultaneously
+ // it would possible that both update the next send variable, and return a different result to their caller.
+ // This is not possible in practice as only the net processing thread invokes this function.
+ m_next_send_inv_to_incoming = PoissonNextSend(now, average_interval_seconds);
+ }
+ return m_next_send_inv_to_incoming;
+}
+
+int64_t PoissonNextSend(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds)
+{
+ return now + (int64_t)(log1p(GetRand(1ULL << 48) * -0.0000000000000035527136788 /* -1/2^48 */) * average_interval_seconds * -1000000.0 + 0.5);
}
CSipHasher CConnman::GetDeterministicRandomizer(uint64_t id) const
diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index 697aa37a58..d152fbfbdd 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -310,6 +310,13 @@ public:
unsigned int GetReceiveFloodSize() const;
void WakeMessageHandler();
+
+ /** Attempts to obfuscate tx time through exponentially distributed emitting.
+ Works assuming that a single interval is used.
+ Variable intervals will result in privacy decrease.
+ */
+ int64_t PoissonNextSendInbound(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds);
+
private:
struct ListenSocket {
SOCKET socket;
@@ -434,6 +441,8 @@ private:
* This takes the place of a feeler connection */
std::atomic_bool m_try_another_outbound_peer;
+ std::atomic<int64_t> m_next_send_inv_to_incoming;
+
friend struct CConnmanTest;
};
extern std::unique_ptr<CConnman> g_connman;
@@ -863,6 +872,6 @@ public:
/** Return a timestamp in the future (in microseconds) for exponentially distributed events. */
-int64_t PoissonNextSend(int64_t nNow, int average_interval_seconds);
+int64_t PoissonNextSend(int64_t now, int average_interval_seconds);
#endif // BITCOIN_NET_H
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp
index 0bc508980e..a0136675f3 100644
--- a/src/net_processing.cpp
+++ b/src/net_processing.cpp
@@ -78,6 +78,21 @@ void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer);
/** Increase a node's misbehavior score. */
void Misbehaving(NodeId nodeid, int howmuch, const std::string& message="");
+/** Average delay between local address broadcasts in seconds. */
+static constexpr unsigned int AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60;
+/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts in seconds. */
+static const unsigned int AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 30;
+/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds.
+ * Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */
+static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5;
+/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission.
+ * Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods. */
+static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL;
+/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */
+static constexpr unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60;
+/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */
+static constexpr unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60;
+
// Internal stuff
namespace {
/** Number of nodes with fSyncStarted. */
@@ -3515,8 +3530,12 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
bool fSendTrickle = pto->fWhitelisted;
if (pto->nNextInvSend < nNow) {
fSendTrickle = true;
- // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them.
- pto->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> !pto->fInbound);
+ if (pto->fInbound) {
+ pto->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL);
+ } else {
+ // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them.
+ pto->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1);
+ }
}
// Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions.
diff --git a/src/validation.h b/src/validation.h
index 07fe99c079..869f847cdb 100644
--- a/src/validation.h
+++ b/src/validation.h
@@ -104,20 +104,6 @@ static const unsigned int DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL = 60 * 60;
static const unsigned int DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60;
/** Maximum length of reject messages. */
static const unsigned int MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 111;
-/** Average delay between local address broadcasts in seconds. */
-static const unsigned int AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60;
-/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts in seconds. */
-static const unsigned int AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 30;
-/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds.
- * Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this, outbound peers get half this delay. */
-static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5;
-/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission.
- * Limits the impact of low-fee transaction floods. */
-static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL;
-/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */
-static const unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60;
-/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */
-static const unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60;
/** Block download timeout base, expressed in millionths of the block interval (i.e. 10 min) */
static const int64_t BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 1000000;
/** Additional block download timeout per parallel downloading peer (i.e. 5 min) */