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author | Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> | 2016-03-09 21:52:08 +0100 |
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committer | Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> | 2016-03-09 21:52:17 +0100 |
commit | c8d2473e6cb042e7275a10c49d3f6a4a91bf0166 (patch) | |
tree | 8ef1bc702734c284946e2ae91fe9729a182dc6a7 | |
parent | 386f4385ab04b0b2c3d47bddc0dc0f2de7354964 (diff) | |
parent | 9988554fc76250b1f695c616341c8dd3278c928b (diff) |
Merge #7642: Avoid "Unknown command" messages when receiving getaddr on outbound c…
9988554 No "Unknown command" for getaddr command. (R E Broadley)
-rw-r--r-- | src/main.cpp | 17 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index babdff54ef..378c454cd2 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -5064,13 +5064,18 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced - // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses - // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. - // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore - // the getaddr message mitigates the attack. - else if ((strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR) && (pfrom->fInbound)) + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR) { + // This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced + // to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses + // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. + // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore + // the getaddr message mitigates the attack. + if (!pfrom->fInbound) { + LogPrint("net", "Ignoring \"getaddr\" from outbound connection. peer=%d\n", pfrom->id); + return true; + } + pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear(); vector<CAddress> vAddr = addrman.GetAddr(); BOOST_FOREACH(const CAddress &addr, vAddr) |