Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Co-authored-by: andrewtoth <andrewstoth@gmail.com>
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Co-authored-by: andrewtoth <andrewstoth@gmail.com>
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Also change the phrasing to more clearly indicate when block-relay-only peering
was deployed.
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"Variable length string identifier" is not defined anywhere, and the suggestion
to use "0x00" is also deeply unclear. I assumed it meant a nul-terminated
string!
Be explicit: you mean it must be a compact siz1\e unsigned int length, followed
by that many identifier bytes, followed by a compact size unsigned int subtype,
followed by optional keydata.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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Since the sigOpCount calculation was copied from P2SH, and P2SH
restricts the use of CHECKMULTISIG with pushed integers the reference
implementation would not take into account the number of public keys for
17 to 20 keys (not representable with an OP_N) even for P2WSH.
Therefore it fallbacks to accounting for 20 sigops in this case, which
this sentence seemed to mismatch with.
Btcd and Libbitcoin use the same calculation as in Bitcoin Core.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Poinsot <darosior@protonmail.com>
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This message, valid between version/verack for peers with version >= 70017,
would allow establishing at the time of connection that no transactions will be
announced/requested between those peers.
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signature types
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Add Portuguese wordlist to BIP39
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Signed-off-by: koushiro <koushiro.cqx@gmail.com>
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e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2 BIP155: change when sendaddrv2 is to be sent (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Mandate to send `sendaddrv2` to the peer before sending our `verack`
to them.
This way we know that the peer does not support `addrv2` if we did not
receive `sendaddrv2` from them before receiving their `verack`.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
harding:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
jnewbery:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
laanwj:
re-ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2
jonatack:
ACK e549ed3
hebasto:
ACK e549ed36e8bbb0d15b1bd245cc5bb2c5664d5aa2, I believe that the establishing of connection invariants in a such manner--in response to the `version` and prior to sending the `verack`--is the right way both for new `addrv2` message and for other future features.
Tree-SHA512: ec8c40a7f857cc8b7df10812cb34d526299b6908b06049dfea24e25d830fc2d01bf4c052e9e4cd575ce4a1b93032cbe27323a390fe7fb90803a5975dd363d150
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Mandate to send `sendaddrv2` to the peer before sending our `verack`
to them.
This way we know that the peer does not support `addrv2` if we did not
receive `sendaddrv2` from them before receiving their `verack`.
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Non minimal encodings are rejected by the bitcoin-core client because it
only checks against a specific encoding
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Add Python-HDWallet on Other Implementation.
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BIP-322: switch to using tx based approach
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Co-authored-by: Stepan Snigirev <stepan.snigirev@mpq.mpg.de>
Co-authored-by: Luke Dashjr <luke_github1@dashjr.org>
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BIP8: clarify timeoutheight behaviour and requirements
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Using the same threshold for MUST_SIGNAL as STARTED means that any chain
that would have resulted in activation with lockinontimeout=false will
also result in activation with lockinontimeout=true (and vice-versa).
This reduces the ways in which a consensus split can occur, and avoids
a way in which miners could attempt to discourage users from setting
lockinontimeout=true.
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When lockinontimeout is true, we don't transition directly from STARTED
to LOCKED_IN, so don't imply that we do.
If startheight or timeoutheight are not on a retarget boundary, they
behave as if they had been rounded up to the next retarget boundary,
so to keep things simple, require them to be at a boundary.
If timeoutheight is less than two retarget periods later than startheight,
behaviour when lockinontimeout is true (one retarget period of STARTED,
one of MUST_SIGNAL, one of LOCKED_IN, then ACTIVE) will not match
behaviour when lockinontimeout is false (one retarget period of STARTED,
then either LOCKED_IN or FAILED), so disallow that as well.
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This removes the FAILING state and adds compulsory signalling during a
new MUST_SIGNAL phase during the last retarget period prior to the
timeout height.
This ensures that if a deployment occurs using bip8 with
lockinontimeout=false and timeoutheight=N, that a later deployment using
bip8 with lockinontimeout=true and timeoutheight=K, where K<N that any
chain where LOCKED_IN is reached prior to height K, will be accepted as
valid by nodes using either set of deployment parameters.
It also ensures that the soft-fork's changed rules are only enforced
on chain a retarget period after signalling indicates enforcement is
expected (which was not previously the case if the FAILING to ACTIVE
transition took place).
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bip-325: add Anthony Towns to authors and change status to Proposed
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Fix typo in BIP 49
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bip-325: correct placement of challenge
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