From 90a4eb2a46fc3fd6908e8aacb7a2e379530513a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mario Preksavec Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2016 17:14:12 +0200 Subject: system/xen: Updated for version 4.6.3. Signed-off-by: Mario Preksavec --- system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh | 2 +- system/xen/patches/xsa154-4.6.patch | 359 --------------------- ...xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch | 56 ---- ...55-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch | 75 ----- ...en-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch | 41 --- system/xen/patches/xsa162-qemuu.patch | 42 --- system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch | 79 ----- system/xen/patches/xsa172.patch | 39 --- system/xen/patches/xsa173-4.6.patch | 244 -------------- system/xen/patches/xsa176.patch | 45 --- ...nked-access-bounds-checking-CVE-2016-3710.patch | 108 ------- ...qemuu-4.6-0002-vga-add-vbe_enabled-helper.patch | 68 ---- ....6-0003-vga-factor-out-vga-register-setup.patch | 127 -------- ...-update-vga-register-setup-on-vbe-changes.patch | 29 -- ...re-vga-register-setup-for-vbe-stays-intac.patch | 75 ----- system/xen/patches/xsa181.patch | 38 --- system/xen/xen.SlackBuild | 7 +- system/xen/xen.info | 6 +- system/xen/xsa/README.xsa | 1 + 19 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1434 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa154-4.6.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa162-qemuu.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa172.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa173-4.6.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa176.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0001-vga-fix-banked-access-bounds-checking-CVE-2016-3710.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0002-vga-add-vbe_enabled-helper.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0003-vga-factor-out-vga-register-setup.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0004-vga-update-vga-register-setup-on-vbe-changes.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0005-vga-make-sure-vga-register-setup-for-vbe-stays-intac.patch delete mode 100644 system/xen/patches/xsa181.patch create mode 100644 system/xen/xsa/README.xsa diff --git a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh index 5ab64f912694..9dd93ee6c4ea 100644 --- a/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh +++ b/system/xen/dom0/kernel-xen.sh @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # Modified by Mario Preksavec KERNEL=${KERNEL:-3.10.17} -XEN=${XEN:-4.6.1} +XEN=${XEN:-4.6.3} BOOTLOADER=${BOOTLOADER:-lilo} ROOTMOD=${ROOTMOD:-ext4} diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa154-4.6.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa154-4.6.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f1e598812bac..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa154-4.6.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,359 +0,0 @@ -x86: enforce consistent cachability of MMIO mappings - -We've been told by Intel that inconsistent cachability between -multiple mappings of the same page can affect system stability only -when the affected page is an MMIO one. Since the stale data issue is -of no relevance to the hypervisor (since all guest memory accesses go -through proper accessors and validation), handling of RAM pages -remains unchanged here. Any MMIO mapped by domains however needs to be -done consistently (all cachable mappings or all uncachable ones), in -order to avoid Machine Check exceptions. Since converting existing -cachable mappings to uncachable (at the time an uncachable mapping -gets established) would in the PV case require tracking all mappings, -allow MMIO to only get mapped uncachable (UC, UC-, or WC). - -This also implies that in the PV case we mustn't use the L1 PTE update -fast path when cachability flags get altered. - -Since in the HVM case at least for now we want to continue honoring -pinned cachability attributes for pages not mapped by the hypervisor, -special case handling of r/o MMIO pages (forcing UC) gets added there. -Arguably the counterpart change to p2m-pt.c may not be necessary, since -UC- (which already gets enforced there) is probably strict enough. - -Note that the shadow code changes include fixing the write protection -of r/o MMIO ranges: shadow_l1e_remove_flags() and its siblings, other -than l1e_remove_flags() and alike, return the new PTE (and hence -ignoring their return values makes them no-ops). - -This is CVE-2016-2270 / XSA-154. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich -Acked-by: Andrew Cooper - ---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown -+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown -@@ -1080,6 +1080,15 @@ limit is ignored by Xen. - - Specify if the MMConfig space should be enabled. - -+### mmio-relax -+> `= | all` -+ -+> Default: `false` -+ -+By default, domains may not create cached mappings to MMIO regions. -+This option relaxes the check for Domain 0 (or when using `all`, all PV -+domains), to permit the use of cacheable MMIO mappings. -+ - ### msi - > `= ` - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/mtrr.c -@@ -807,8 +807,17 @@ int epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, - if ( v->domain != d ) - v = d->vcpu ? d->vcpu[0] : NULL; - -- if ( !mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)) ) -+ if ( !mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)) || -+ rangeset_contains_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn), -+ mfn_x(mfn) + (1UL << order) - 1) ) -+ { -+ *ipat = 1; - return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE; -+ } -+ -+ if ( rangeset_overlaps_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn), -+ mfn_x(mfn) + (1UL << order) - 1) ) -+ return -1; - - switch ( hvm_get_mem_pinned_cacheattr(d, gfn, order, &type) ) - { ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c -@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static unsigned long p2m_type_to_flags(p - case p2m_mmio_direct: - if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn)) ) - flags |= _PAGE_RW; -+ else -+ flags |= _PAGE_PWT; - return flags | P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_PCD; - } - } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ _sh_propagate(struct vcpu *v, - gfn_t target_gfn = guest_l1e_get_gfn(guest_entry); - u32 pass_thru_flags; - u32 gflags, sflags; -+ bool_t mmio_mfn; - - /* We don't shadow PAE l3s */ - ASSERT(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS > 3 || level != 3); -@@ -559,7 +560,10 @@ _sh_propagate(struct vcpu *v, - // mfn means that we can not usefully shadow anything, and so we - // return early. - // -- if ( !mfn_valid(target_mfn) -+ mmio_mfn = !mfn_valid(target_mfn) -+ || (level == 1 -+ && page_get_owner(mfn_to_page(target_mfn)) == dom_io); -+ if ( mmio_mfn - && !(level == 1 && (!shadow_mode_refcounts(d) - || p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct)) ) - { -@@ -577,7 +581,7 @@ _sh_propagate(struct vcpu *v, - _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT); - if ( guest_supports_nx(v) ) - pass_thru_flags |= _PAGE_NX_BIT; -- if ( !shadow_mode_refcounts(d) && !mfn_valid(target_mfn) ) -+ if ( level == 1 && !shadow_mode_refcounts(d) && mmio_mfn ) - pass_thru_flags |= _PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT; - sflags = gflags & pass_thru_flags; - -@@ -676,10 +680,14 @@ _sh_propagate(struct vcpu *v, - } - - /* Read-only memory */ -- if ( p2m_is_readonly(p2mt) || -- (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct && -- rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(target_mfn))) ) -+ if ( p2m_is_readonly(p2mt) ) - sflags &= ~_PAGE_RW; -+ else if ( p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct && -+ rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(target_mfn)) ) -+ { -+ sflags &= ~(_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PAT); -+ sflags |= _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT; -+ } - - // protect guest page tables - // -@@ -1185,22 +1193,28 @@ static int shadow_set_l1e(struct domain - && !sh_l1e_is_magic(new_sl1e) ) - { - /* About to install a new reference */ -- if ( shadow_mode_refcounts(d) ) { -+ if ( shadow_mode_refcounts(d) ) -+ { -+#define PAGE_FLIPPABLE (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PAT) -+ int rc; -+ - TRACE_SHADOW_PATH_FLAG(TRCE_SFLAG_SHADOW_L1_GET_REF); -- switch ( shadow_get_page_from_l1e(new_sl1e, d, new_type) ) -+ switch ( rc = shadow_get_page_from_l1e(new_sl1e, d, new_type) ) - { - default: - /* Doesn't look like a pagetable. */ - flags |= SHADOW_SET_ERROR; - new_sl1e = shadow_l1e_empty(); - break; -- case 1: -- shadow_l1e_remove_flags(new_sl1e, _PAGE_RW); -+ case PAGE_FLIPPABLE & -PAGE_FLIPPABLE ... PAGE_FLIPPABLE: -+ ASSERT(!(rc & ~PAGE_FLIPPABLE)); -+ new_sl1e = shadow_l1e_flip_flags(new_sl1e, rc); - /* fall through */ - case 0: - shadow_vram_get_l1e(new_sl1e, sl1e, sl1mfn, d); - break; - } -+#undef PAGE_FLIPPABLE - } - } - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/types.h -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/types.h -@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ static inline u32 shadow_l4e_get_flags(s - static inline shadow_l1e_t - shadow_l1e_remove_flags(shadow_l1e_t sl1e, u32 flags) - { l1e_remove_flags(sl1e, flags); return sl1e; } -+static inline shadow_l1e_t -+shadow_l1e_flip_flags(shadow_l1e_t sl1e, u32 flags) -+{ l1e_flip_flags(sl1e, flags); return sl1e; } - - static inline shadow_l1e_t shadow_l1e_empty(void) - { return l1e_empty(); } ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c -@@ -178,6 +178,18 @@ static uint32_t base_disallow_mask; - is_pv_domain(d)) ? \ - L1_DISALLOW_MASK : (L1_DISALLOW_MASK & ~PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS)) - -+static s8 __read_mostly opt_mmio_relax; -+static void __init parse_mmio_relax(const char *s) -+{ -+ if ( !*s ) -+ opt_mmio_relax = 1; -+ else -+ opt_mmio_relax = parse_bool(s); -+ if ( opt_mmio_relax < 0 && strcmp(s, "all") ) -+ opt_mmio_relax = 0; -+} -+custom_param("mmio-relax", parse_mmio_relax); -+ - static void __init init_frametable_chunk(void *start, void *end) - { - unsigned long s = (unsigned long)start; -@@ -799,10 +811,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e( - if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) || - (real_pg_owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page)) == dom_io ) - { --#ifndef NDEBUG -- const unsigned long *ro_map; -- unsigned int seg, bdf; --#endif -+ int flip = 0; - - /* Only needed the reference to confirm dom_io ownership. */ - if ( mfn_valid(mfn) ) -@@ -836,24 +845,55 @@ get_page_from_l1e( - return -EINVAL; - } - -- if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) || -- !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) ) -- return 0; -+ if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) ) -+ { -+ /* MMIO pages must not be mapped cachable unless requested so. */ -+ switch ( opt_mmio_relax ) -+ { -+ case 0: -+ break; -+ case 1: -+ if ( is_hardware_domain(l1e_owner) ) -+ case -1: -+ return 0; -+ default: -+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); -+ } -+ } -+ else if ( l1f & _PAGE_RW ) -+ { - #ifndef NDEBUG -- if ( !pci_mmcfg_decode(mfn, &seg, &bdf) || -- ((ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(seg)) != NULL && -- test_bit(bdf, ro_map)) ) -- printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING -- "d%d: Forcing read-only access to MFN %lx\n", -- l1e_owner->domain_id, mfn); -- else -- rangeset_report_ranges(mmio_ro_ranges, 0, ~0UL, -- print_mmio_emul_range, -- &(struct mmio_emul_range_ctxt){ -- .d = l1e_owner, -- .mfn = mfn }); -+ const unsigned long *ro_map; -+ unsigned int seg, bdf; -+ -+ if ( !pci_mmcfg_decode(mfn, &seg, &bdf) || -+ ((ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(seg)) != NULL && -+ test_bit(bdf, ro_map)) ) -+ printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING -+ "d%d: Forcing read-only access to MFN %lx\n", -+ l1e_owner->domain_id, mfn); -+ else -+ rangeset_report_ranges(mmio_ro_ranges, 0, ~0UL, -+ print_mmio_emul_range, -+ &(struct mmio_emul_range_ctxt){ -+ .d = l1e_owner, -+ .mfn = mfn }); - #endif -- return 1; -+ flip = _PAGE_RW; -+ } -+ -+ switch ( l1f & PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS ) -+ { -+ case 0: /* WB */ -+ flip |= _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD; -+ break; -+ case _PAGE_PWT: /* WT */ -+ case _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PAT: /* WP */ -+ flip |= _PAGE_PCD | (l1f & _PAGE_PAT); -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ return flip; - } - - if ( unlikely( (real_pg_owner != pg_owner) && -@@ -1243,8 +1283,9 @@ static int alloc_l1_table(struct page_in - goto fail; - case 0: - break; -- case 1: -- l1e_remove_flags(pl1e[i], _PAGE_RW); -+ case _PAGE_RW ... _PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS: -+ ASSERT(!(ret & ~(_PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS))); -+ l1e_flip_flags(pl1e[i], ret); - break; - } - -@@ -1759,8 +1800,9 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl - return -EINVAL; - } - -- /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w and presence. */ -- if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) ) -+ /* Fast path for identical mapping, r/w, presence, and cachability. */ -+ if ( !l1e_has_changed(ol1e, nl1e, -+ PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_PRESENT) ) - { - adjust_guest_l1e(nl1e, pt_dom); - if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, pt_vcpu, -@@ -1783,8 +1825,9 @@ static int mod_l1_entry(l1_pgentry_t *pl - return rc; - case 0: - break; -- case 1: -- l1e_remove_flags(nl1e, _PAGE_RW); -+ case _PAGE_RW ... _PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS: -+ ASSERT(!(rc & ~(_PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS))); -+ l1e_flip_flags(nl1e, rc); - rc = 0; - break; - } -@@ -5000,6 +5043,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update( - l1_pgentry_t pte, ol1e, nl1e, *pl1e; - struct vcpu *v = current; - struct domain *d = v->domain; -+ int ret; - - /* Only allow naturally-aligned stores within the original %cr2 page. */ - if ( unlikely(((addr^ptwr_ctxt->cr2) & PAGE_MASK) || (addr & (bytes-1))) ) -@@ -5047,7 +5091,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update( - - /* Check the new PTE. */ - nl1e = l1e_from_intpte(val); -- switch ( get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, d, d) ) -+ switch ( ret = get_page_from_l1e(nl1e, d, d) ) - { - default: - if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) && (bytes == 4) && (unaligned_addr & 4) && -@@ -5071,8 +5115,9 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update( - break; - case 0: - break; -- case 1: -- l1e_remove_flags(nl1e, _PAGE_RW); -+ case _PAGE_RW ... _PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS: -+ ASSERT(!(ret & ~(_PAGE_RW | PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS))); -+ l1e_flip_flags(nl1e, ret); - break; - } - ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h -@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@ static inline l4_pgentry_t l4e_from_padd - #define l3e_remove_flags(x, flags) ((x).l3 &= ~put_pte_flags(flags)) - #define l4e_remove_flags(x, flags) ((x).l4 &= ~put_pte_flags(flags)) - -+/* Flip flags in an existing L1 PTE. */ -+#define l1e_flip_flags(x, flags) ((x).l1 ^= put_pte_flags(flags)) -+ - /* Check if a pte's page mapping or significant access flags have changed. */ - #define l1e_has_changed(x,y,flags) \ - ( !!(((x).l1 ^ (y).l1) & ((PADDR_MASK&PAGE_MASK)|put_pte_flags(flags))) ) diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7935e58c4021..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0001-xen-Add-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,56 +0,0 @@ -From 12b11658a9d6a654a1e7acbf2f2d56ce9a396c86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: David Vrabel -Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 11:59:05 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 1/3] xen: Add RING_COPY_REQUEST() - -Using RING_GET_REQUEST() on a shared ring is easy to use incorrectly -(i.e., by not considering that the other end may alter the data in the -shared ring while it is being inspected). Safe usage of a request -generally requires taking a local copy. - -Provide a RING_COPY_REQUEST() macro to use instead of -RING_GET_REQUEST() and an open-coded memcpy(). This takes care of -ensuring that the copy is done correctly regardless of any possible -compiler optimizations. - -Use a volatile source to prevent the compiler from reordering or -omitting the copy. - -This is part of XSA155. - -Signed-off-by: David Vrabel -Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk ---- -v2: Add comment about GCC bug. ---- - xen/include/public/io/ring.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/xen/include/public/io/ring.h b/xen/include/public/io/ring.h -index ba9401b..801c0da 100644 ---- a/xen/include/public/io/ring.h -+++ b/xen/include/public/io/ring.h -@@ -212,6 +212,20 @@ typedef struct __name##_back_ring __name##_back_ring_t - #define RING_GET_REQUEST(_r, _idx) \ - (&((_r)->sring->ring[((_idx) & (RING_SIZE(_r) - 1))].req)) - -+/* -+ * Get a local copy of a request. -+ * -+ * Use this in preference to RING_GET_REQUEST() so all processing is -+ * done on a local copy that cannot be modified by the other end. -+ * -+ * Note that https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145 may cause this -+ * to be ineffective where _req is a struct which consists of only bitfields. -+ */ -+#define RING_COPY_REQUEST(_r, _idx, _req) do { \ -+ /* Use volatile to force the copy into _req. */ \ -+ *(_req) = *(volatile typeof(_req))RING_GET_REQUEST(_r, _idx); \ -+} while (0) -+ - #define RING_GET_RESPONSE(_r, _idx) \ - (&((_r)->sring->ring[((_idx) & (RING_SIZE(_r) - 1))].rsp)) - --- -2.1.0 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2d80a7bd4317..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0002-blktap2-Use-RING_COPY_REQUEST.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -From 851ffb4eea917e2708c912291dea4d133026c0ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk -Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 12:16:02 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 2/3] blktap2: Use RING_COPY_REQUEST - -Instead of RING_GET_REQUEST. Using a local copy of the -ring (and also with proper memory barriers) will mean -we can do not have to worry about the compiler optimizing -the code and doing a double-fetch in the shared memory space. - -This is part of XSA155. - -Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk - ---- -v2: Fix compile issues with tapdisk-vbd ---- - tools/blktap2/drivers/block-log.c | 3 ++- - tools/blktap2/drivers/tapdisk-vbd.c | 8 ++++---- - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-log.c b/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-log.c -index 5330cdc..5f3bd35 100644 ---- a/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-log.c -+++ b/tools/blktap2/drivers/block-log.c -@@ -494,11 +494,12 @@ static int ctl_kick(struct tdlog_state* s, int fd) - reqstart = s->bring.req_cons; - reqend = s->sring->req_prod; - -+ xen_mb(); - BDPRINTF("ctl: ring kicked (start = %u, end = %u)", reqstart, reqend); - - while (reqstart != reqend) { - /* XXX actually submit these! */ -- memcpy(&req, RING_GET_REQUEST(&s->bring, reqstart), sizeof(req)); -+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&s->bring, reqstart, &req); - BDPRINTF("ctl: read request %"PRIu64":%u", req.sector, req.count); - s->bring.req_cons = ++reqstart; - -diff --git a/tools/blktap2/drivers/tapdisk-vbd.c b/tools/blktap2/drivers/tapdisk-vbd.c -index 6d1d94a..89ef9ed 100644 ---- a/tools/blktap2/drivers/tapdisk-vbd.c -+++ b/tools/blktap2/drivers/tapdisk-vbd.c -@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ tapdisk_vbd_pull_ring_requests(td_vbd_t *vbd) - int idx; - RING_IDX rp, rc; - td_ring_t *ring; -- blkif_request_t *req; -+ blkif_request_t req; - td_vbd_request_t *vreq; - - ring = &vbd->ring; -@@ -1566,16 +1566,16 @@ tapdisk_vbd_pull_ring_requests(td_vbd_t *vbd) - xen_rmb(); - - for (rc = ring->fe_ring.req_cons; rc != rp; rc++) { -- req = RING_GET_REQUEST(&ring->fe_ring, rc); -+ RING_COPY_REQUEST(&ring->fe_ring, rc, &req); - ++ring->fe_ring.req_cons; - -- idx = req->id; -+ idx = req.id; - vreq = &vbd->request_list[idx]; - - ASSERT(list_empty(&vreq->next)); - ASSERT(vreq->secs_pending == 0); - -- memcpy(&vreq->req, req, sizeof(blkif_request_t)); -+ memcpy(&vreq->req, &req, sizeof(blkif_request_t)); - vbd->received++; - vreq->vbd = vbd; - --- -2.1.4 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 56a6e538f400..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@ -From c1fce65e2b720684ea6ba76ae59921542bd154bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk -Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 12:22:14 -0500 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] libvchan: Read prod/cons only once. - -We must ensure that the prod/cons are only read once and that -the compiler won't try to optimize the reads. That is split -the read of these in multiple instructions influencing later -branch code. As such insert barriers when fetching the cons -and prod index. - -This is part of XSA155. - -Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk ---- - tools/libvchan/io.c | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/tools/libvchan/io.c b/tools/libvchan/io.c -index 8a9629b..381cc05 100644 ---- a/tools/libvchan/io.c -+++ b/tools/libvchan/io.c -@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static inline int send_notify(struct libxenvchan *ctrl, uint8_t bit) - static inline int raw_get_data_ready(struct libxenvchan *ctrl) - { - uint32_t ready = rd_prod(ctrl) - rd_cons(ctrl); -+ xen_mb(); /* Ensure 'ready' is read only once. */ - if (ready > rd_ring_size(ctrl)) - /* We have no way to return errors. Locking up the ring is - * better than the alternatives. */ -@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ int libxenvchan_data_ready(struct libxenvchan *ctrl) - static inline int raw_get_buffer_space(struct libxenvchan *ctrl) - { - uint32_t ready = wr_ring_size(ctrl) - (wr_prod(ctrl) - wr_cons(ctrl)); -+ xen_mb(); /* Ensure 'ready' is read only once. */ - if (ready > wr_ring_size(ctrl)) - /* We have no way to return errors. Locking up the ring is - * better than the alternatives. */ --- -2.1.0 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa162-qemuu.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa162-qemuu.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2e3352d88b62..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa162-qemuu.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -net: pcnet: add check to validate receive data size(CVE-2015-7504) - -In loopback mode, pcnet_receive routine appends CRC code to the -receive buffer. If the data size given is same as the buffer size, -the appended CRC code overwrites 4 bytes after s->buffer. Added a -check to avoid that. - -Reported-by: Qinghao Tang -Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit ---- - hw/net/pcnet.c | 10 ++++++---- - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c -index 3437376..5f55591 100644 ---- a/hw/net/pcnet.c -+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c -@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ ssize_t pcnet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size_) - uint32_t fcs = ~0; - uint8_t *p = src; - -- while (p != &src[size-4]) -+ while (p != &src[size]) - CRC(fcs, *p++); - crc_err = (*(uint32_t *)p != htonl(fcs)); - } -@@ -1234,8 +1234,10 @@ static void pcnet_transmit(PCNetState *s) - bcnt = 4096 - GET_FIELD(tmd.length, TMDL, BCNT); - - /* if multi-tmd packet outsizes s->buffer then skip it silently. -- Note: this is not what real hw does */ -- if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer)) { -+ * Note: this is not what real hw does. -+ * Last four bytes of s->buffer are used to store CRC FCS code. -+ */ -+ if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer) - 4) { - s->xmit_pos = -1; - goto txdone; - } --- -2.4.3 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f71fa19130c1..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa170.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest - -... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to -failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing -exactly the canonicalization being added here.) - -Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite -a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all -branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting -from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only -way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the -injection. - -Note further that there are a two early returns from -vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to -domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can -neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP, -so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic. - -This is XSA-170. - -Reported-by: 刘令 -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich -Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper -Tested-by: Andrew Cooper - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c -@@ -2968,7 +2968,7 @@ static int vmx_handle_apic_write(void) - void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) - { - unsigned long exit_qualification, exit_reason, idtv_info, intr_info = 0; -- unsigned int vector = 0; -+ unsigned int vector = 0, mode; - struct vcpu *v = current; - - __vmread(GUEST_RIP, ®s->rip); -@@ -3566,6 +3566,41 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_ - out: - if ( nestedhvm_vcpu_in_guestmode(v) ) - nvmx_idtv_handling(); -+ -+ /* -+ * VM entry will fail (causing the guest to get crashed) if rIP (and -+ * rFLAGS, but we don't have an issue there) doesn't meet certain -+ * criteria. As we must not allow less than fully privileged mode to have -+ * such an effect on the domain, we correct rIP in that case (accepting -+ * this not being architecturally correct behavior, as the injected #GP -+ * fault will then not see the correct [invalid] return address). -+ * And since we know the guest will crash, we crash it right away if it -+ * already is in most privileged mode. -+ */ -+ mode = vmx_guest_x86_mode(v); -+ if ( mode == 8 ? !is_canonical_address(regs->rip) -+ : regs->rip != regs->_eip ) -+ { -+ struct segment_register ss; -+ -+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Bad rIP %lx for mode %u\n", regs->rip, mode); -+ -+ vmx_get_segment_register(v, x86_seg_ss, &ss); -+ if ( ss.attr.fields.dpl ) -+ { -+ __vmread(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, &intr_info); -+ if ( !(intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) ) -+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0); -+ /* Need to fix rIP nevertheless. */ -+ if ( mode == 8 ) -+ regs->rip = (long)(regs->rip << (64 - VADDR_BITS)) >> -+ (64 - VADDR_BITS); -+ else -+ regs->rip = regs->_eip; -+ } -+ else -+ domain_crash(v->domain); -+ } - } - - void vmx_vmenter_helper(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs) diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa172.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa172.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8b1d01fa8449..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa172.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -x86: fix information leak on AMD CPUs - -The fix for XSA-52 was wrong, and so was the change synchronizing that -new behavior to the FXRSTOR logic: AMD's manuals explictly state that -writes to the ES bit are ignored, and it instead gets calculated from -the exception and mask bits (it gets set whenever there is an unmasked -exception, and cleared otherwise). Hence we need to follow that model -in our workaround. - -This is XSA-172. - -The first hunk (xen/arch/x86/i387.c:fpu_fxrstor) is CVE-2016-3159. -The second hunk (xen/arch/x86/xstate.c:xrstor) is CVE-2016-3158. - -Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich -Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c -@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static inline void fpu_fxrstor(struct vc - * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved - * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1. - */ -- if ( !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & 0x0080) && -+ if ( !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & ~fpu_ctxt->fcw & 0x003f) && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) - { - asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" ---- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c -@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mas - * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1. - */ - if ( (mask & ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv & XSTATE_FP) && -- !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & 0x0080) && -+ !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & ~ptr->fpu_sse.fcw & 0x003f) && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) - asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" /* clear exceptions */ - "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */ diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa173-4.6.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa173-4.6.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aecf120c74fd..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa173-4.6.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,244 +0,0 @@ -commit 54a4651cb4e744960fb375ed99909d7dfb943caf -Author: Tim Deegan -Date: Wed Mar 16 16:51:27 2016 +0000 - - x86: limit GFNs to 32 bits for shadowed superpages. - - Superpage shadows store the shadowed GFN in the backpointer field, - which for non-BIGMEM builds is 32 bits wide. Shadowing a superpage - mapping of a guest-physical address above 2^44 would lead to the GFN - being truncated there, and a crash when we come to remove the shadow - from the hash table. - - Track the valid width of a GFN for each guest, including reporting it - through CPUID, and enforce it in the shadow pagetables. Set the - maximum witth to 32 for guests where this truncation could occur. - - This is XSA-173. - - Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan - Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich - -Reported-by: Ling Liu -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c -index 35ef21b..528c283 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c -@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ integer_param("cpuid_mask_ext_edx", opt_cpuid_mask_ext_edx); - const struct cpu_dev *__read_mostly cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {}; - - unsigned int paddr_bits __read_mostly = 36; -+unsigned int hap_paddr_bits __read_mostly = 36; - - /* - * Default host IA32_CR_PAT value to cover all memory types. -@@ -211,7 +212,7 @@ static void __init early_cpu_detect(void) - - static void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) - { -- u32 tfms, capability, excap, ebx; -+ u32 tfms, capability, excap, ebx, eax; - - /* Get vendor name */ - cpuid(0x00000000, &c->cpuid_level, -@@ -248,8 +249,11 @@ static void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) - } - if ( c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000004 ) - get_model_name(c); /* Default name */ -- if ( c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008 ) -- paddr_bits = cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff; -+ if ( c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008 ) { -+ eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000008); -+ paddr_bits = eax & 0xff; -+ hap_paddr_bits = ((eax >> 16) & 0xff) ?: paddr_bits; -+ } - } - - /* Might lift BIOS max_leaf=3 limit. */ -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c -index e200aab..0b4d9f0 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c -@@ -4567,8 +4567,7 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx, - break; - - case 0x80000008: -- count = cpuid_eax(0x80000008); -- count = (count >> 16) & 0xff ?: count & 0xff; -+ count = d->arch.paging.gfn_bits + PAGE_SHIFT; - if ( (*eax & 0xff) > count ) - *eax = (*eax & ~0xff) | count; - -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c -index 773454d..06543d3 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c -@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ void *map_domain_gfn(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn, mfn_t *mfn, - struct page_info *page; - void *map; - -+ if ( gfn_x(gfn) >> p2m->domain->arch.paging.gfn_bits ) -+ { -+ *rc = _PAGE_INVALID_BIT; -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ - /* Translate the gfn, unsharing if shared */ - page = get_page_from_gfn_p2m(p2m->domain, p2m, gfn_x(gfn), p2mt, NULL, - q); -@@ -326,20 +332,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, - flags &= ~_PAGE_PAT; - - if ( gfn_x(start) & GUEST_L2_GFN_MASK & ~0x1 ) -- { --#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 2 -- /* -- * Note that _PAGE_INVALID_BITS is zero in this case, yielding a -- * no-op here. -- * -- * Architecturally, the walk should fail if bit 21 is set (others -- * aren't being checked at least in PSE36 mode), but we'll ignore -- * this here in order to avoid specifying a non-natural, non-zero -- * _PAGE_INVALID_BITS value just for that case. -- */ --#endif - rc |= _PAGE_INVALID_BITS; -- } -+ - /* Increment the pfn by the right number of 4k pages. - * Mask out PAT and invalid bits. */ - start = _gfn((gfn_x(start) & ~GUEST_L2_GFN_MASK) + -@@ -422,5 +416,11 @@ set_ad: - put_page(mfn_to_page(mfn_x(gw->l1mfn))); - } - -+ /* If this guest has a restricted physical address space then the -+ * target GFN must fit within it. */ -+ if ( !(rc & _PAGE_PRESENT) -+ && gfn_x(guest_l1e_get_gfn(gw->l1e)) >> d->arch.paging.gfn_bits ) -+ rc |= _PAGE_INVALID_BITS; -+ - return rc; - } -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -index 6eb2167..f3475c6 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c -@@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ void hap_domain_init(struct domain *d) - { - INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.paging.hap.freelist); - -+ d->arch.paging.gfn_bits = hap_paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT; -+ - /* Use HAP logdirty mechanism. */ - paging_log_dirty_init(d, hap_enable_log_dirty, - hap_disable_log_dirty, -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -index bad8360..98d0d2c 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c -@@ -51,6 +51,16 @@ int shadow_domain_init(struct domain *d, unsigned int domcr_flags) - INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.paging.shadow.freelist); - INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&d->arch.paging.shadow.pinned_shadows); - -+ d->arch.paging.gfn_bits = paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT; -+#ifndef CONFIG_BIGMEM -+ /* -+ * Shadowed superpages store GFNs in 32-bit page_info fields. -+ * Note that we cannot use guest_supports_superpages() here. -+ */ -+ if ( !is_pv_domain(d) || opt_allow_superpage ) -+ d->arch.paging.gfn_bits = 32; -+#endif -+ - /* Use shadow pagetables for log-dirty support */ - paging_log_dirty_init(d, sh_enable_log_dirty, - sh_disable_log_dirty, sh_clean_dirty_bitmap); -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -index 43c9488..71477fe 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c -@@ -525,7 +525,8 @@ _sh_propagate(struct vcpu *v, - ASSERT(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS > 3 || level != 3); - - /* Check there's something for the shadows to map to */ -- if ( !p2m_is_valid(p2mt) && !p2m_is_grant(p2mt) ) -+ if ( (!p2m_is_valid(p2mt) && !p2m_is_grant(p2mt)) -+ || gfn_x(target_gfn) >> d->arch.paging.gfn_bits ) - { - *sp = shadow_l1e_empty(); - goto done; -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -index c6c6e71..74c3a52 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -@@ -193,6 +193,9 @@ struct paging_domain { - /* log dirty support */ - struct log_dirty_domain log_dirty; - -+ /* Number of valid bits in a gfn. */ -+ unsigned int gfn_bits; -+ - /* preemption handling */ - struct { - const struct domain *dom; -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_pt.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_pt.h -index f8a0d76..b5db401 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_pt.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/guest_pt.h -@@ -210,15 +210,17 @@ guest_supports_nx(struct vcpu *v) - } - - --/* Some bits are invalid in any pagetable entry. */ --#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 2 --#define _PAGE_INVALID_BITS (0) --#elif GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 3 --#define _PAGE_INVALID_BITS \ -- get_pte_flags(((1ull<<63) - 1) & ~((1ull< -Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper -Tested-by: Andrew Cooper - ---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c -@@ -226,6 +226,11 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct - rc |= _PAGE_PRESENT; - goto out; - } -+ if ( gflags & _PAGE_PSE ) -+ { -+ rc |= _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_INVALID_BIT; -+ goto out; -+ } - rc |= ((gflags & mflags) ^ mflags); - - /* Map the l3 table */ -@@ -247,7 +252,7 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct - } - rc |= ((gflags & mflags) ^ mflags); - -- pse1G = (gflags & _PAGE_PSE) && guest_supports_1G_superpages(v); -+ pse1G = !!(gflags & _PAGE_PSE); - - if ( pse1G ) - { -@@ -267,6 +272,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct - /* _PAGE_PSE_PAT not set: remove _PAGE_PAT from flags. */ - flags &= ~_PAGE_PAT; - -+ if ( !guest_supports_1G_superpages(v) ) -+ rc |= _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_INVALID_BIT; - if ( gfn_x(start) & GUEST_L3_GFN_MASK & ~0x1 ) - rc |= _PAGE_INVALID_BITS; - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0001-vga-fix-banked-access-bounds-checking-CVE-2016-3710.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0001-vga-fix-banked-access-bounds-checking-CVE-2016-3710.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3ad3cf43271e..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0001-vga-fix-banked-access-bounds-checking-CVE-2016-3710.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -From b16db5ab2d0c5ff755e08942f4c8e8f9f8618eae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann -Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 08:49:10 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] vga: fix banked access bounds checking (CVE-2016-3710) - -vga allows banked access to video memory using the window at 0xa00000 -and it supports a different access modes with different address -calculations. - -The VBE bochs extentions support banked access too, using the -VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BANK register. The code tries to take the different -address calculations into account and applies different limits to -VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BANK depending on the current access mode. - -Which is probably effective in stopping misprogramming by accident. -But from a security point of view completely useless as an attacker -can easily change access modes after setting the bank register. - -Drop the bogus check, add range checks to vga_mem_{readb,writeb} -instead. - -Fixes: CVE-2016-3710 -Reported-by: Qinghao Tang -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann -Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini ---- - hw/display/vga.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/display/vga.c b/hw/display/vga.c -index 52eaf05..b577712 100644 ---- a/hw/display/vga.c -+++ b/hw/display/vga.c -@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static void vga_update_memory_access(VGACommonState *s) - break; - } - base += isa_mem_base; -+ assert(offset + size <= s->vram_size); - memory_region_init_alias(&s->chain4_alias, memory_region_owner(&s->vram), - "vga.chain4", &s->vram, offset, size); - memory_region_add_subregion_overlap(s->legacy_address_space, base, -@@ -715,11 +716,7 @@ void vbe_ioport_write_data(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - vbe_fixup_regs(s); - break; - case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BANK: -- if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP] == 4) { -- val &= (s->vbe_bank_mask >> 2); -- } else { -- val &= s->vbe_bank_mask; -- } -+ val &= s->vbe_bank_mask; - s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val; - s->bank_offset = (val << 16); - vga_update_memory_access(s); -@@ -818,13 +815,21 @@ uint32_t vga_mem_readb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr) - - if (s->sr[VGA_SEQ_MEMORY_MODE] & VGA_SR04_CHN_4M) { - /* chain 4 mode : simplest access */ -+ assert(addr < s->vram_size); - ret = s->vram_ptr[addr]; - } else if (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] & 0x10) { - /* odd/even mode (aka text mode mapping) */ - plane = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_PLANE_READ] & 2) | (addr & 1); -- ret = s->vram_ptr[((addr & ~1) << 1) | plane]; -+ addr = ((addr & ~1) << 1) | plane; -+ if (addr >= s->vram_size) { -+ return 0xff; -+ } -+ ret = s->vram_ptr[addr]; - } else { - /* standard VGA latched access */ -+ if (addr * sizeof(uint32_t) >= s->vram_size) { -+ return 0xff; -+ } - s->latch = ((uint32_t *)s->vram_ptr)[addr]; - - if (!(s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] & 0x08)) { -@@ -881,6 +886,7 @@ void vga_mem_writeb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val) - plane = addr & 3; - mask = (1 << plane); - if (s->sr[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE] & mask) { -+ assert(addr < s->vram_size); - s->vram_ptr[addr] = val; - #ifdef DEBUG_VGA_MEM - printf("vga: chain4: [0x" TARGET_FMT_plx "]\n", addr); -@@ -894,6 +900,9 @@ void vga_mem_writeb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val) - mask = (1 << plane); - if (s->sr[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE] & mask) { - addr = ((addr & ~1) << 1) | plane; -+ if (addr >= s->vram_size) { -+ return; -+ } - s->vram_ptr[addr] = val; - #ifdef DEBUG_VGA_MEM - printf("vga: odd/even: [0x" TARGET_FMT_plx "]\n", addr); -@@ -967,6 +976,9 @@ void vga_mem_writeb(VGACommonState *s, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val) - mask = s->sr[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE]; - s->plane_updated |= mask; /* only used to detect font change */ - write_mask = mask16[mask]; -+ if (addr * sizeof(uint32_t) >= s->vram_size) { -+ return; -+ } - ((uint32_t *)s->vram_ptr)[addr] = - (((uint32_t *)s->vram_ptr)[addr] & ~write_mask) | - (val & write_mask); --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0002-vga-add-vbe_enabled-helper.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0002-vga-add-vbe_enabled-helper.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0daa3141ebab..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0002-vga-add-vbe_enabled-helper.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -From e026859e9aecf8635daf06e9fc2325239f458959 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann -Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:11:34 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] vga: add vbe_enabled() helper - -Makes code a bit easier to read. - -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann -Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini ---- - hw/display/vga.c | 13 +++++++++---- - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/display/vga.c b/hw/display/vga.c -index b577712..ebf63ff 100644 ---- a/hw/display/vga.c -+++ b/hw/display/vga.c -@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static uint32_t expand4[256]; - static uint16_t expand2[256]; - static uint8_t expand4to8[16]; - -+static inline bool vbe_enabled(VGACommonState *s) -+{ -+ return s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED; -+} -+ - static void vga_update_memory_access(VGACommonState *s) - { - hwaddr base, offset, size; -@@ -563,7 +568,7 @@ static void vbe_fixup_regs(VGACommonState *s) - uint16_t *r = s->vbe_regs; - uint32_t bits, linelength, maxy, offset; - -- if (!(r[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED)) { -+ if (!vbe_enabled(s)) { - /* vbe is turned off -- nothing to do */ - return; - } -@@ -1057,7 +1062,7 @@ static void vga_get_offsets(VGACommonState *s, - { - uint32_t start_addr, line_offset, line_compare; - -- if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED) { -+ if (vbe_enabled(s)) { - line_offset = s->vbe_line_offset; - start_addr = s->vbe_start_addr; - line_compare = 65535; -@@ -1382,7 +1387,7 @@ static int vga_get_bpp(VGACommonState *s) - { - int ret; - -- if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED) { -+ if (vbe_enabled(s)) { - ret = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP]; - } else { - ret = 0; -@@ -1394,7 +1399,7 @@ static void vga_get_resolution(VGACommonState *s, int *pwidth, int *pheight) - { - int width, height; - -- if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED) { -+ if (vbe_enabled(s)) { - width = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES]; - height = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES]; - } else { --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0003-vga-factor-out-vga-register-setup.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0003-vga-factor-out-vga-register-setup.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 70e4bdbca8d9..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0003-vga-factor-out-vga-register-setup.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,127 +0,0 @@ -From b36a4e26caf7a050a6e8593527c26bfa4f47a758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann -Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 15:24:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 3/5] vga: factor out vga register setup - -When enabling vbe mode qemu will setup a bunch of vga registers to make -sure the vga emulation operates in correct mode for a linear -framebuffer. Move that code to a separate function so we can call it -from other places too. - -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann -Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini ---- - hw/display/vga.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ - 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/hw/display/vga.c b/hw/display/vga.c -index ebf63ff..fb822f4 100644 ---- a/hw/display/vga.c -+++ b/hw/display/vga.c -@@ -643,6 +643,49 @@ static void vbe_fixup_regs(VGACommonState *s) - s->vbe_start_addr = offset / 4; - } - -+/* we initialize the VGA graphic mode */ -+static void vbe_update_vgaregs(VGACommonState *s) -+{ -+ int h, shift_control; -+ -+ if (!vbe_enabled(s)) { -+ /* vbe is turned off -- nothing to do */ -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ /* graphic mode + memory map 1 */ -+ s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] & ~0x0c) | 0x04 | -+ VGA_GR06_GRAPHICS_MODE; -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MODE] |= 3; /* no CGA modes */ -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OFFSET] = s->vbe_line_offset >> 3; -+ /* width */ -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_H_DISP] = -+ (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES] >> 3) - 1; -+ /* height (only meaningful if < 1024) */ -+ h = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES] - 1; -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_V_DISP_END] = h; -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] = (s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & ~0x42) | -+ ((h >> 7) & 0x02) | ((h >> 3) & 0x40); -+ /* line compare to 1023 */ -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_LINE_COMPARE] = 0xff; -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] |= 0x10; -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] |= 0x40; -+ -+ if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP] == 4) { -+ shift_control = 0; -+ s->sr[VGA_SEQ_CLOCK_MODE] &= ~8; /* no double line */ -+ } else { -+ shift_control = 2; -+ /* set chain 4 mode */ -+ s->sr[VGA_SEQ_MEMORY_MODE] |= VGA_SR04_CHN_4M; -+ /* activate all planes */ -+ s->sr[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE] |= VGA_SR02_ALL_PLANES; -+ } -+ s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] & ~0x60) | -+ (shift_control << 5); -+ s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] &= ~0x9f; /* no double scan */ -+} -+ - static uint32_t vbe_ioport_read_index(void *opaque, uint32_t addr) - { - VGACommonState *s = opaque; -@@ -729,52 +772,19 @@ void vbe_ioport_write_data(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE: - if ((val & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED) && - !(s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED)) { -- int h, shift_control; - - s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_VIRT_WIDTH] = 0; - s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_X_OFFSET] = 0; - s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_Y_OFFSET] = 0; - s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] |= VBE_DISPI_ENABLED; - vbe_fixup_regs(s); -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - - /* clear the screen */ - if (!(val & VBE_DISPI_NOCLEARMEM)) { - memset(s->vram_ptr, 0, - s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES] * s->vbe_line_offset); - } -- -- /* we initialize the VGA graphic mode */ -- /* graphic mode + memory map 1 */ -- s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] & ~0x0c) | 0x04 | -- VGA_GR06_GRAPHICS_MODE; -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MODE] |= 3; /* no CGA modes */ -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OFFSET] = s->vbe_line_offset >> 3; -- /* width */ -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_H_DISP] = -- (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES] >> 3) - 1; -- /* height (only meaningful if < 1024) */ -- h = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES] - 1; -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_V_DISP_END] = h; -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] = (s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & ~0x42) | -- ((h >> 7) & 0x02) | ((h >> 3) & 0x40); -- /* line compare to 1023 */ -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_LINE_COMPARE] = 0xff; -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] |= 0x10; -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] |= 0x40; -- -- if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP] == 4) { -- shift_control = 0; -- s->sr[VGA_SEQ_CLOCK_MODE] &= ~8; /* no double line */ -- } else { -- shift_control = 2; -- /* set chain 4 mode */ -- s->sr[VGA_SEQ_MEMORY_MODE] |= VGA_SR04_CHN_4M; -- /* activate all planes */ -- s->sr[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE] |= VGA_SR02_ALL_PLANES; -- } -- s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] & ~0x60) | -- (shift_control << 5); -- s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] &= ~0x9f; /* no double scan */ - } else { - s->bank_offset = 0; - } --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0004-vga-update-vga-register-setup-on-vbe-changes.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0004-vga-update-vga-register-setup-on-vbe-changes.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0638edb91be8..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0004-vga-update-vga-register-setup-on-vbe-changes.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From ef8bd1b26a597ae7c306227655626640093cb7a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann -Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 15:39:22 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] vga: update vga register setup on vbe changes - -Call the new vbe_update_vgaregs() function on vbe configuration -changes, to make sure vga registers are up-to-date. - -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann -Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini ---- - hw/display/vga.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/hw/display/vga.c b/hw/display/vga.c -index fb822f4..3739758 100644 ---- a/hw/display/vga.c -+++ b/hw/display/vga.c -@@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ void vbe_ioport_write_data(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_Y_OFFSET: - s->vbe_regs[s->vbe_index] = val; - vbe_fixup_regs(s); -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - break; - case VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BANK: - val &= s->vbe_bank_mask; --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0005-vga-make-sure-vga-register-setup-for-vbe-stays-intac.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0005-vga-make-sure-vga-register-setup-for-vbe-stays-intac.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c22f2d719519..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa179-qemuu-4.6-0005-vga-make-sure-vga-register-setup-for-vbe-stays-intac.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,75 +0,0 @@ -From 92456c0c361d5da858d544647c6246ec78ed922b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Gerd Hoffmann -Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:48:06 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 5/5] vga: make sure vga register setup for vbe stays intact - (CVE-2016-3712). - -Call vbe_update_vgaregs() when the guest touches GFX, SEQ or CRT -registers, to make sure the vga registers will always have the -values needed by vbe mode. This makes sure the sanity checks -applied by vbe_fixup_regs() are effective. - -Without this guests can muck with shift_control, can turn on planar -vga modes or text mode emulation while VBE is active, making qemu -take code paths meant for CGA compatibility, but with the very -large display widths and heigts settable using VBE registers. - -Which is good for one or another buffer overflow. Not that -critical as they typically read overflows happening somewhere -in the display code. So guests can DoS by crashing qemu with a -segfault, but it is probably not possible to break out of the VM. - -Fixes: CVE-2016-3712 -Reported-by: Zuozhi Fzz -Reported-by: P J P -Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann -Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini ---- - hw/display/vga.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/hw/display/vga.c b/hw/display/vga.c -index 3739758..e7be97e 100644 ---- a/hw/display/vga.c -+++ b/hw/display/vga.c -@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ static uint32_t expand4[256]; - static uint16_t expand2[256]; - static uint8_t expand4to8[16]; - -+static void vbe_update_vgaregs(VGACommonState *s); -+ - static inline bool vbe_enabled(VGACommonState *s) - { - return s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ENABLE] & VBE_DISPI_ENABLED; -@@ -483,6 +485,7 @@ void vga_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - printf("vga: write SR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->sr_index, val); - #endif - s->sr[s->sr_index] = val & sr_mask[s->sr_index]; -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - if (s->sr_index == VGA_SEQ_CLOCK_MODE) { - s->update_retrace_info(s); - } -@@ -514,6 +517,7 @@ void vga_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - printf("vga: write GR%x = 0x%02x\n", s->gr_index, val); - #endif - s->gr[s->gr_index] = val & gr_mask[s->gr_index]; -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - vga_update_memory_access(s); - break; - case VGA_CRT_IM: -@@ -532,10 +536,12 @@ void vga_ioport_write(void *opaque, uint32_t addr, uint32_t val) - if (s->cr_index == VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW) { - s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] = (s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & ~0x10) | - (val & 0x10); -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - } - return; - } - s->cr[s->cr_index] = val; -+ vbe_update_vgaregs(s); - - switch(s->cr_index) { - case VGA_CRTC_H_TOTAL: --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/system/xen/patches/xsa181.patch b/system/xen/patches/xsa181.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c44541ec4d93..000000000000 --- a/system/xen/patches/xsa181.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -From ee488e2133e581967d13d5287d7bd654e9b2e2a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Andrew Cooper -Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2016 14:19:00 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] xen/arm: Don't free p2m->root in p2m_teardown() before it has - been allocated - -If p2m_init() didn't complete successfully, (e.g. due to VMID -exhaustion), p2m_teardown() is called and unconditionally tries to free -p2m->root before it has been allocated. free_domheap_pages() doesn't -tolerate NULL pointers. - -This is XSA-181 - -Reported-by: Aaron Cornelius -Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich -Reviewed-by: Julien Grall ---- - xen/arch/arm/p2m.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -index 838d004..6a19c57 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -+++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c -@@ -1408,7 +1408,8 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct domain *d) - while ( (pg = page_list_remove_head(&p2m->pages)) ) - free_domheap_page(pg); - -- free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER); -+ if ( p2m->root ) -+ free_domheap_pages(p2m->root, P2M_ROOT_ORDER); - - p2m->root = NULL; - --- -2.1.4 - diff --git a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild index 1380cd38bc21..54b8d190ad78 100644 --- a/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild +++ b/system/xen/xen.SlackBuild @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ # ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. PRGNAM=xen -VERSION=${VERSION:-4.6.1} +VERSION=${VERSION:-4.6.3} BUILD=${BUILD:-1} TAG=${TAG:-_SBo} @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ find -L . \ -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) -exec chmod 644 {} \; # Apply Xen Security Advisory patches -for i in $CWD/patches/xsa* ; do +for i in $CWD/xsa/* ; do case $i in *qemut*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen-traditional -p1 <$i ;; *qemu*.patch) patch -d tools/qemu-xen -p1 <$i ;; @@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ cp $CWD/ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz \ cp $CWD/{lwip,zlib,newlib,pciutils,grub,gmp,tpm_emulator}-*.tar.?z* \ $CWD/polarssl-*.tgz stubdom -# Fix: custom memory allocation vtable not supported -patch -p1 <$CWD/patches/remove_malloc_tracing.diff - CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \ CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \ ./configure \ diff --git a/system/xen/xen.info b/system/xen/xen.info index 666c39ebd547..2c2c3068adf0 100644 --- a/system/xen/xen.info +++ b/system/xen/xen.info @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ PRGNAM="xen" -VERSION="4.6.1" +VERSION="4.6.3" HOMEPAGE="http://www.xenproject.org/" -DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.6.1.tar.gz \ +DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.6.3.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/ipxe-git-9a93db3f0947484e30e753bbd61a10b17336e20e.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz \ @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ DOWNLOAD="http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen/xen-4.6.1.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/gmp-4.3.2.tar.bz2 \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/tpm_emulator-0.7.4.tar.gz \ http://mirror.slackware.hr/sources/xen-extfiles/seabios-1.8.2.tar.gz" -MD5SUM="df2d854c3c90ffeefaf71e7f868fb326 \ +MD5SUM="26419d8477082dbdb32ec75b00f00643 \ 7496268cebf47d5c9ccb0696e3b26065 \ 36cc57650cffda9a0269493be2a169bb \ debc62758716a169df9f62e6ab2bc634 \ diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/README.xsa b/system/xen/xsa/README.xsa new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2237ecb39277 --- /dev/null +++ b/system/xen/xsa/README.xsa @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Xen Security Advisories can be found here: http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/ -- cgit v1.2.3