From e74aabcffb74e6c15de05255480d43771ec63d8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Daniel P. Berrange" Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 12:43:29 +0100 Subject: crypto: use correct derived key size when timing pbkdf Currently when timing the pbkdf algorithm a fixed key size of 32 bytes is used. This results in inaccurate timings for certain hashes depending on their digest size. For example when using sha1 with aes-256, this causes us to measure time for the master key digest doing 2 sha1 operations per iteration, instead of 1. Instead we should pass in the desired key size to the timing routine that matches the key size that will be used for real later. Reviewed-by: Eric Blake Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange --- tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c') diff --git a/tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c b/tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c index 8ceceb1827..a651dc50a3 100644 --- a/tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c +++ b/tests/test-crypto-pbkdf.c @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ static void test_pbkdf_timing(void) iters = qcrypto_pbkdf2_count_iters(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, key, sizeof(key), salt, sizeof(salt), + 32, &error_abort); g_assert(iters >= (1 << 15)); -- cgit v1.2.3