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authorAmit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>2010-12-10 17:29:49 +0530
committerAmit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>2011-01-20 14:38:21 +0530
commit471344db88cc3e7adf7664aa34d54ce0cacc3419 (patch)
tree2ccb7824ae371a0e8055e19e269d92f06d781359 /hw/virtio-serial-bus.c
parent6bff86560d42a9c391cf1e502ebd764c293c4d02 (diff)
virtio-serial: Don't copy over guest buffer to host
When the guest writes something to a host, we copied over the entire buffer first into the host and then processed it. Do away with that, it could result in a malicious guest causing a DoS on the host. Reported-by: Paul Brook <paul@codesourcery.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'hw/virtio-serial-bus.c')
-rw-r--r--hw/virtio-serial-bus.c15
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/hw/virtio-serial-bus.c b/hw/virtio-serial-bus.c
index e8c2a168ec..6726f72b6f 100644
--- a/hw/virtio-serial-bus.c
+++ b/hw/virtio-serial-bus.c
@@ -132,16 +132,17 @@ static void do_flush_queued_data(VirtIOSerialPort *port, VirtQueue *vq,
assert(virtio_queue_ready(vq));
while (!port->throttled && virtqueue_pop(vq, &elem)) {
- uint8_t *buf;
- size_t ret, buf_size;
+ unsigned int i;
- buf_size = iov_size(elem.out_sg, elem.out_num);
- buf = qemu_malloc(buf_size);
- ret = iov_to_buf(elem.out_sg, elem.out_num, buf, 0, buf_size);
+ for (i = 0; i < elem.out_num; i++) {
+ size_t buf_size;
- port->info->have_data(port, buf, ret);
- qemu_free(buf);
+ buf_size = elem.out_sg[i].iov_len;
+ port->info->have_data(port,
+ elem.out_sg[i].iov_base,
+ buf_size);
+ }
virtqueue_push(vq, &elem, 0);
}
virtio_notify(vdev, vq);