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authorPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>2020-03-17 18:33:05 +0000
committerPeter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>2020-03-17 18:33:05 +0000
commitd649689a8ecb2e276cc20d3af6d416e3c299cb17 (patch)
tree0e95f648151a0d24a2b44a07e2588d1f10809e96 /docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc
parentcc818a2148c5f321bdeb8e5564bdb2914e824600 (diff)
parent32b9523ad5b44dea87792d5d8f71a87e8cc5803b (diff)
Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream' into staging
* Bugfixes all over the place * get/set_uint cleanups (Felipe) * Lock guard support (Stefan) * MemoryRegion ownership cleanup (Philippe) * AVX512 optimization for buffer_is_zero (Robert) # gpg: Signature made Tue 17 Mar 2020 15:01:54 GMT # gpg: using RSA key BFFBD25F78C7AE83 # gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full] # gpg: aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full] # Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4 E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1 # Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C 7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83 * remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream: (62 commits) hw/arm: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create hw/arm: Remove unnecessary memory_region_set_readonly() on ROM alias hw/ppc/ppc405: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/arm/stm32: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/char: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create hw/riscv: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create hw/dma: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create hw/display: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create hw/core: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create scripts/cocci: Patch to let devices own their MemoryRegions scripts/cocci: Patch to remove unnecessary memory_region_set_readonly() scripts/cocci: Patch to detect potential use of memory_region_init_rom hw/sparc: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/sh4: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/riscv: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/ppc: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/pci-host: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/net: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/m68k: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions hw/display: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions ... Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc')
-rw-r--r--docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc57
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc b/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc
index cbad930c70..9a2327828e 100644
--- a/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc
+++ b/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc
@@ -49,10 +49,15 @@ mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration
compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible
across all desired hosts.
-``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS``
+``Cascadelake-Server``, ``Cascadelake-Server-noTSX``
+ Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels 6
+ or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with *stepping 5 is
+ vulnerable to MDS variants*.)
+
+``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS-noTSX``
Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016)
-``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS``
+``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS}``
Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)
``Broadwell``, ``Broadwell-IBRS``, ``Broadwell-noTSX``, ``Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS``
@@ -148,6 +153,54 @@ features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model".
Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
can be used for guest CPUs.
+``mds-no``
+ Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is *not* vulnerable
+ to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS]
+ CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126).
+
+ This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID feature,
+ so it will not appear in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or
+ guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS
+ vulnerability file in ``sysfs``.
+
+ So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not
+ affected} in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds`` file.
+
+``taa-no``
+ Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is ``not``
+ vulnerable to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA).
+
+ This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux
+ ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest.
+
+ It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports ``Not affected``
+ in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort``
+ file.
+
+``tsx-ctrl``
+ Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX
+ (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the
+ processor is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a
+ processor-level instruction that performs checks on memory access) as
+ a mitigation for the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to
+ Intel's `deep dive into MDS
+ <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling>`_.)
+
+ Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX
+ enabled; *and* (b) the guest has ``rtm`` CPU flag enabled.
+
+ By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of
+ mitigating TSX-based attacks.
+
+ Note that ``tsx-ctrl`` too is an MSR feature, so it does not show
+ up in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest.
+
+ To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are
+ two ways: (a) check for the *absence* of ``rtm`` in the guest's
+ ``/proc/cpuinfo``; or (b) the
+ ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` file in
+ the guest should report ``Mitigation: TSX disabled``.
+
Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^