diff options
author | Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> | 2020-03-17 18:33:05 +0000 |
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committer | Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> | 2020-03-17 18:33:05 +0000 |
commit | d649689a8ecb2e276cc20d3af6d416e3c299cb17 (patch) | |
tree | 0e95f648151a0d24a2b44a07e2588d1f10809e96 /docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc | |
parent | cc818a2148c5f321bdeb8e5564bdb2914e824600 (diff) | |
parent | 32b9523ad5b44dea87792d5d8f71a87e8cc5803b (diff) |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream' into staging
* Bugfixes all over the place
* get/set_uint cleanups (Felipe)
* Lock guard support (Stefan)
* MemoryRegion ownership cleanup (Philippe)
* AVX512 optimization for buffer_is_zero (Robert)
# gpg: Signature made Tue 17 Mar 2020 15:01:54 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4 E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
# Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C 7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83
* remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream: (62 commits)
hw/arm: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
hw/arm: Remove unnecessary memory_region_set_readonly() on ROM alias
hw/ppc/ppc405: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/arm/stm32: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/char: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
hw/riscv: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
hw/dma: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
hw/display: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
hw/core: Let devices own the MemoryRegion they create
scripts/cocci: Patch to let devices own their MemoryRegions
scripts/cocci: Patch to remove unnecessary memory_region_set_readonly()
scripts/cocci: Patch to detect potential use of memory_region_init_rom
hw/sparc: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/sh4: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/riscv: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/ppc: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/pci-host: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/net: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/m68k: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
hw/display: Use memory_region_init_rom() with read-only regions
...
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc | 57 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc b/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc index cbad930c70..9a2327828e 100644 --- a/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc +++ b/docs/system/cpu-models-x86.rst.inc @@ -49,10 +49,15 @@ mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible across all desired hosts. -``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS`` +``Cascadelake-Server``, ``Cascadelake-Server-noTSX`` + Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels 6 + or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with *stepping 5 is + vulnerable to MDS variants*.) + +``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS-noTSX`` Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016) -``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS`` +``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS}`` Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015) ``Broadwell``, ``Broadwell-IBRS``, ``Broadwell-noTSX``, ``Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS`` @@ -148,6 +153,54 @@ features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model". Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can be used for guest CPUs. +``mds-no`` + Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is *not* vulnerable + to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS] + CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126). + + This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID feature, + so it will not appear in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or + guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS + vulnerability file in ``sysfs``. + + So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not + affected} in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds`` file. + +``taa-no`` + Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is ``not`` + vulnerable to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). + + This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux + ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest. + + It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports ``Not affected`` + in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` + file. + +``tsx-ctrl`` + Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX + (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the + processor is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a + processor-level instruction that performs checks on memory access) as + a mitigation for the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to + Intel's `deep dive into MDS + <https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling>`_.) + + Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX + enabled; *and* (b) the guest has ``rtm`` CPU flag enabled. + + By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of + mitigating TSX-based attacks. + + Note that ``tsx-ctrl`` too is an MSR feature, so it does not show + up in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest. + + To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are + two ways: (a) check for the *absence* of ``rtm`` in the guest's + ``/proc/cpuinfo``; or (b) the + ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` file in + the guest should report ``Mitigation: TSX disabled``. + Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |