// Copyright (c) 2017-2017 The Bitcoin Core developers // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. #include "tx_verify.h" #include "consensus.h" #include "primitives/transaction.h" #include "script/interpreter.h" #include "validation.h" // TODO remove the following dependencies #include "chain.h" #include "coins.h" #include "utilmoneystr.h" bool IsFinalTx(const CTransaction &tx, int nBlockHeight, int64_t nBlockTime) { if (tx.nLockTime == 0) return true; if ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD ? (int64_t)nBlockHeight : nBlockTime)) return true; for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { if (!(txin.nSequence == CTxIn::SEQUENCE_FINAL)) return false; } return true; } std::pair CalculateSequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block) { assert(prevHeights->size() == tx.vin.size()); // Will be set to the equivalent height- and time-based nLockTime // values that would be necessary to satisfy all relative lock- // time constraints given our view of block chain history. // The semantics of nLockTime are the last invalid height/time, so // use -1 to have the effect of any height or time being valid. int nMinHeight = -1; int64_t nMinTime = -1; // tx.nVersion is signed integer so requires cast to unsigned otherwise // we would be doing a signed comparison and half the range of nVersion // wouldn't support BIP 68. bool fEnforceBIP68 = static_cast(tx.nVersion) >= 2 && flags & LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE; // Do not enforce sequence numbers as a relative lock time // unless we have been instructed to if (!fEnforceBIP68) { return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime); } for (size_t txinIndex = 0; txinIndex < tx.vin.size(); txinIndex++) { const CTxIn& txin = tx.vin[txinIndex]; // Sequence numbers with the most significant bit set are not // treated as relative lock-times, nor are they given any // consensus-enforced meaning at this point. if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_DISABLE_FLAG) { // The height of this input is not relevant for sequence locks (*prevHeights)[txinIndex] = 0; continue; } int nCoinHeight = (*prevHeights)[txinIndex]; if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG) { int64_t nCoinTime = block.GetAncestor(std::max(nCoinHeight-1, 0))->GetMedianTimePast(); // NOTE: Subtract 1 to maintain nLockTime semantics // BIP 68 relative lock times have the semantics of calculating // the first block or time at which the transaction would be // valid. When calculating the effective block time or height // for the entire transaction, we switch to using the // semantics of nLockTime which is the last invalid block // time or height. Thus we subtract 1 from the calculated // time or height. // Time-based relative lock-times are measured from the // smallest allowed timestamp of the block containing the // txout being spent, which is the median time past of the // block prior. nMinTime = std::max(nMinTime, nCoinTime + (int64_t)((txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) << CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_GRANULARITY) - 1); } else { nMinHeight = std::max(nMinHeight, nCoinHeight + (int)(txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) - 1); } } return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime); } bool EvaluateSequenceLocks(const CBlockIndex& block, std::pair lockPair) { assert(block.pprev); int64_t nBlockTime = block.pprev->GetMedianTimePast(); if (lockPair.first >= block.nHeight || lockPair.second >= nBlockTime) return false; return true; } bool SequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block) { return EvaluateSequenceLocks(block, CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, flags, prevHeights, block)); } unsigned int GetLegacySigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx) { unsigned int nSigOps = 0; for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { nSigOps += txin.scriptSig.GetSigOpCount(false); } for (const auto& txout : tx.vout) { nSigOps += txout.scriptPubKey.GetSigOpCount(false); } return nSigOps; } unsigned int GetP2SHSigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs) { if (tx.IsCoinBase()) return 0; unsigned int nSigOps = 0; for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) { const Coin& coin = inputs.AccessCoin(tx.vin[i].prevout); assert(!coin.IsSpent()); const CTxOut &prevout = coin.out; if (prevout.scriptPubKey.IsPayToScriptHash()) nSigOps += prevout.scriptPubKey.GetSigOpCount(tx.vin[i].scriptSig); } return nSigOps; } int64_t GetTransactionSigOpCost(const CTransaction& tx, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int flags) { int64_t nSigOps = GetLegacySigOpCount(tx) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR; if (tx.IsCoinBase()) return nSigOps; if (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH) { nSigOps += GetP2SHSigOpCount(tx, inputs) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR; } for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) { const Coin& coin = inputs.AccessCoin(tx.vin[i].prevout); assert(!coin.IsSpent()); const CTxOut &prevout = coin.out; nSigOps += CountWitnessSigOps(tx.vin[i].scriptSig, prevout.scriptPubKey, &tx.vin[i].scriptWitness, flags); } return nSigOps; } bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fCheckDuplicateInputs) { // Basic checks that don't depend on any context if (tx.vin.empty()) return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty"); if (tx.vout.empty()) return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty"); // Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability) if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize"); // Check for negative or overflow output values CAmount nValueOut = 0; for (const auto& txout : tx.vout) { if (txout.nValue < 0) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-negative"); if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge"); nValueOut += txout.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut)) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge"); } // Check for duplicate inputs - note that this check is slow so we skip it in CheckBlock if (fCheckDuplicateInputs) { std::set vInOutPoints; for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate"); } } if (tx.IsCoinBase()) { if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100) return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-length"); } else { for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) if (txin.prevout.IsNull()) return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null"); } return true; } bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, int nSpendHeight) { // This doesn't trigger the DoS code on purpose; if it did, it would make it easier // for an attacker to attempt to split the network. if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx)) { return state.Invalid(false, 0, "", "Inputs unavailable"); } CAmount nValueIn = 0; CAmount nFees = 0; for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i) { const COutPoint &prevout = tx.vin[i].prevout; const Coin& coin = inputs.AccessCoin(prevout); assert(!coin.IsSpent()); // If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) { return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight)); } // Check for negative or overflow input values nValueIn += coin.out.nValue; if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn)) { return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange"); } } if (nValueIn < tx.GetValueOut()) { return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-in-belowout", false, strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(tx.GetValueOut()))); } // Tally transaction fees CAmount nTxFee = nValueIn - tx.GetValueOut(); if (nTxFee < 0) { return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-negative"); } nFees += nTxFee; if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) { return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange"); } return true; }