// Copyright (c) 2012 Pieter Wuille // Copyright (c) 2012-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. #ifndef BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H #define BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /** Default for -checkaddrman */ static constexpr int32_t DEFAULT_ADDRMAN_CONSISTENCY_CHECKS{0}; /** * Extended statistics about a CAddress */ class CAddrInfo : public CAddress { public: //! last try whatsoever by us (memory only) int64_t nLastTry{0}; //! last counted attempt (memory only) int64_t nLastCountAttempt{0}; private: //! where knowledge about this address first came from CNetAddr source; //! last successful connection by us int64_t nLastSuccess{0}; //! connection attempts since last successful attempt int nAttempts{0}; //! reference count in new sets (memory only) int nRefCount{0}; //! in tried set? (memory only) bool fInTried{false}; //! position in vRandom mutable int nRandomPos{-1}; friend class CAddrMan; friend class CAddrManDeterministic; public: SERIALIZE_METHODS(CAddrInfo, obj) { READWRITEAS(CAddress, obj); READWRITE(obj.source, obj.nLastSuccess, obj.nAttempts); } CAddrInfo(const CAddress &addrIn, const CNetAddr &addrSource) : CAddress(addrIn), source(addrSource) { } CAddrInfo() : CAddress(), source() { } //! Calculate in which "tried" bucket this entry belongs int GetTriedBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const std::vector &asmap) const; //! Calculate in which "new" bucket this entry belongs, given a certain source int GetNewBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const CNetAddr& src, const std::vector &asmap) const; //! Calculate in which "new" bucket this entry belongs, using its default source int GetNewBucket(const uint256 &nKey, const std::vector &asmap) const { return GetNewBucket(nKey, source, asmap); } //! Calculate in which position of a bucket to store this entry. int GetBucketPosition(const uint256 &nKey, bool fNew, int nBucket) const; //! Determine whether the statistics about this entry are bad enough so that it can just be deleted bool IsTerrible(int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime()) const; //! Calculate the relative chance this entry should be given when selecting nodes to connect to double GetChance(int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime()) const; }; /** Stochastic address manager * * Design goals: * * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire table to peers.dat. * * Make sure no (localized) attacker can fill the entire table with his nodes/addresses. * * To that end: * * Addresses are organized into buckets that can each store up to 64 entries. * * Addresses to which our node has not successfully connected go into 1024 "new" buckets. * * Based on the address range (/16 for IPv4) of the source of information, or if an asmap is provided, * the AS it belongs to (for IPv4/IPv6), 64 buckets are selected at random. * * The actual bucket is chosen from one of these, based on the range in which the address itself is located. * * The position in the bucket is chosen based on the full address. * * One single address can occur in up to 8 different buckets to increase selection chances for addresses that * are seen frequently. The chance for increasing this multiplicity decreases exponentially. * * When adding a new address to an occupied position of a bucket, it will not replace the existing entry * unless that address is also stored in another bucket or it doesn't meet one of several quality criteria * (see IsTerrible for exact criteria). * * Addresses of nodes that are known to be accessible go into 256 "tried" buckets. * * Each address range selects at random 8 of these buckets. * * The actual bucket is chosen from one of these, based on the full address. * * When adding a new good address to an occupied position of a bucket, a FEELER connection to the * old address is attempted. The old entry is only replaced and moved back to the "new" buckets if this * attempt was unsuccessful. * * Bucket selection is based on cryptographic hashing, using a randomly-generated 256-bit key, which should not * be observable by adversaries. * * Several indexes are kept for high performance. Setting m_consistency_check_ratio with the -checkaddrman * configuration option will introduce (expensive) consistency checks for the entire data structure. */ /** Total number of buckets for tried addresses */ static constexpr int32_t ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2{8}; static constexpr int ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT{1 << ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2}; /** Total number of buckets for new addresses */ static constexpr int32_t ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2{10}; static constexpr int ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT{1 << ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT_LOG2}; /** Maximum allowed number of entries in buckets for new and tried addresses */ static constexpr int32_t ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE_LOG2{6}; static constexpr int ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE{1 << ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE_LOG2}; /** * Stochastical (IP) address manager */ class CAddrMan { public: template void Serialize(Stream& s_) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs); template void Unserialize(Stream& s_) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs); explicit CAddrMan(std::vector asmap, bool deterministic, int32_t consistency_check_ratio); ~CAddrMan() { nKey.SetNull(); } //! Return the number of (unique) addresses in all tables. size_t size() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); // TODO: Cache this in an atomic to avoid this overhead return vRandom.size(); } //! Add addresses to addrman's new table. bool Add(const std::vector &vAddr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty = 0) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); int nAdd = 0; Check(); for (std::vector::const_iterator it = vAddr.begin(); it != vAddr.end(); it++) nAdd += Add_(*it, source, nTimePenalty) ? 1 : 0; Check(); if (nAdd) { LogPrint(BCLog::ADDRMAN, "Added %i addresses from %s: %i tried, %i new\n", nAdd, source.ToString(), nTried, nNew); } return nAdd > 0; } //! Mark an entry as accessible. void Good(const CService &addr, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime()) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); Good_(addr, /* test_before_evict */ true, nTime); Check(); } //! Mark an entry as connection attempted to. void Attempt(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime()) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); Attempt_(addr, fCountFailure, nTime); Check(); } //! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions. void ResolveCollisions() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); ResolveCollisions_(); Check(); } //! Randomly select an address in tried that another address is attempting to evict. CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); const CAddrInfo ret = SelectTriedCollision_(); Check(); return ret; } /** * Choose an address to connect to. */ CAddrInfo Select(bool newOnly = false) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); const CAddrInfo addrRet = Select_(newOnly); Check(); return addrRet; } /** * Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network. * * @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all). * @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all). * @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all). */ std::vector GetAddr(size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional network) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); std::vector vAddr; GetAddr_(vAddr, max_addresses, max_pct, network); Check(); return vAddr; } //! Outer function for Connected_() void Connected(const CService &addr, int64_t nTime = GetAdjustedTime()) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); Connected_(addr, nTime); Check(); } void SetServices(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!cs) { LOCK(cs); Check(); SetServices_(addr, nServices); Check(); } const std::vector& GetAsmap() const { return m_asmap; } private: //! A mutex to protect the inner data structures. mutable Mutex cs; //! Source of random numbers for randomization in inner loops mutable FastRandomContext insecure_rand GUARDED_BY(cs); //! secret key to randomize bucket select with uint256 nKey; //! Serialization versions. enum Format : uint8_t { V0_HISTORICAL = 0, //!< historic format, before commit e6b343d88 V1_DETERMINISTIC = 1, //!< for pre-asmap files V2_ASMAP = 2, //!< for files including asmap version V3_BIP155 = 3, //!< same as V2_ASMAP plus addresses are in BIP155 format }; //! The maximum format this software knows it can unserialize. Also, we always serialize //! in this format. //! The format (first byte in the serialized stream) can be higher than this and //! still this software may be able to unserialize the file - if the second byte //! (see `lowest_compatible` in `Unserialize()`) is less or equal to this. static constexpr Format FILE_FORMAT = Format::V3_BIP155; //! The initial value of a field that is incremented every time an incompatible format //! change is made (such that old software versions would not be able to parse and //! understand the new file format). This is 32 because we overtook the "key size" //! field which was 32 historically. //! @note Don't increment this. Increment `lowest_compatible` in `Serialize()` instead. static constexpr uint8_t INCOMPATIBILITY_BASE = 32; //! last used nId int nIdCount GUARDED_BY(cs){0}; //! table with information about all nIds std::unordered_map mapInfo GUARDED_BY(cs); //! find an nId based on its network address std::unordered_map mapAddr GUARDED_BY(cs); //! randomly-ordered vector of all nIds //! This is mutable because it is unobservable outside the class, so any //! changes to it (even in const methods) are also unobservable. mutable std::vector vRandom GUARDED_BY(cs); // number of "tried" entries int nTried GUARDED_BY(cs){0}; //! list of "tried" buckets int vvTried[ADDRMAN_TRIED_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs); //! number of (unique) "new" entries int nNew GUARDED_BY(cs){0}; //! list of "new" buckets int vvNew[ADDRMAN_NEW_BUCKET_COUNT][ADDRMAN_BUCKET_SIZE] GUARDED_BY(cs); //! last time Good was called (memory only). Initially set to 1 so that "never" is strictly worse. int64_t nLastGood GUARDED_BY(cs){1}; //! Holds addrs inserted into tried table that collide with existing entries. Test-before-evict discipline used to resolve these collisions. std::set m_tried_collisions; /** Perform consistency checks every m_consistency_check_ratio operations (if non-zero). */ const int32_t m_consistency_check_ratio; // Compressed IP->ASN mapping, loaded from a file when a node starts. // Should be always empty if no file was provided. // This mapping is then used for bucketing nodes in Addrman. // // If asmap is provided, nodes will be bucketed by // AS they belong to, in order to make impossible for a node // to connect to several nodes hosted in a single AS. // This is done in response to Erebus attack, but also to generally // diversify the connections every node creates, // especially useful when a large fraction of nodes // operate under a couple of cloud providers. // // If a new asmap was provided, the existing records // would be re-bucketed accordingly. const std::vector m_asmap; //! Find an entry. CAddrInfo* Find(const CNetAddr& addr, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Create a new entry and add it to the internal data structures mapInfo, mapAddr and vRandom. CAddrInfo* Create(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr &addrSource, int *pnId = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Swap two elements in vRandom. void SwapRandom(unsigned int nRandomPos1, unsigned int nRandomPos2) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Move an entry from the "new" table(s) to the "tried" table void MakeTried(CAddrInfo& info, int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Delete an entry. It must not be in tried, and have refcount 0. void Delete(int nId) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Clear a position in a "new" table. This is the only place where entries are actually deleted. void ClearNew(int nUBucket, int nUBucketPos) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Mark an entry "good", possibly moving it from "new" to "tried". void Good_(const CService &addr, bool test_before_evict, int64_t time) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Add an entry to the "new" table. bool Add_(const CAddress &addr, const CNetAddr& source, int64_t nTimePenalty) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Mark an entry as attempted to connect. void Attempt_(const CService &addr, bool fCountFailure, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Select an address to connect to, if newOnly is set to true, only the new table is selected from. CAddrInfo Select_(bool newOnly) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! See if any to-be-evicted tried table entries have been tested and if so resolve the collisions. void ResolveCollisions_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Return a random to-be-evicted tried table address. CAddrInfo SelectTriedCollision_() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Consistency check, taking into account m_consistency_check_ratio. Will std::abort if an inconsistency is detected. void Check() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Perform consistency check, regardless of m_consistency_check_ratio. //! @returns an error code or zero. int ForceCheckAddrman() const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); /** * Return all or many randomly selected addresses, optionally by network. * * @param[out] vAddr Vector of randomly selected addresses from vRandom. * @param[in] max_addresses Maximum number of addresses to return (0 = all). * @param[in] max_pct Maximum percentage of addresses to return (0 = all). * @param[in] network Select only addresses of this network (nullopt = all). */ void GetAddr_(std::vector& vAddr, size_t max_addresses, size_t max_pct, std::optional network) const EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); /** We have successfully connected to this peer. Calling this function * updates the CAddress's nTime, which is used in our IsTerrible() * decisions and gossiped to peers. Callers should be careful that updating * this information doesn't leak topology information to network spies. * * net_processing calls this function when it *disconnects* from a peer to * not leak information about currently connected peers. * * @param[in] addr The address of the peer we were connected to * @param[in] nTime The time that we were last connected to this peer */ void Connected_(const CService& addr, int64_t nTime) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); //! Update an entry's service bits. void SetServices_(const CService &addr, ServiceFlags nServices) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs); friend class CAddrManTest; friend class CAddrManDeterministic; }; #endif // BITCOIN_ADDRMAN_H