From ef54b486d5333dfc85c56e6b933c81735196a25d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 11:57:38 -0500 Subject: [refactor] Use Reasons directly instead of DoS codes --- src/net_processing.cpp | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp') diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index 99c791daeb..0a78ad47e0 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -959,27 +959,68 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s\n", __func__, state->name, pnode, state->nMisbehavior-howmuch, state->nMisbehavior, message_prefixed); } +/** + * Returns true if the given validation state result may result in a peer + * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted + * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay. + */ static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) { - return (state.GetDoS() > 0); + return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS; } /** * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object - * TODO: net_processing should make the punish decision based on the reason - * a tx/block was invalid, rather than just the nDoS score handed back by validation. * - * @parameter via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should + * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. + * + * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) + * + * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(). */ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { - int nDoS = state.GetDoS(); - if (nDoS > 0 && !via_compact_block) { - LOCK(cs_main); - Misbehaving(nodeid, nDoS, message); - return true; + switch (state.GetReason()) { + case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE: + break; + // The node is providing invalid data: + case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED: + if (!via_compact_block) { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + return true; + } + break; + // Handled elsewhere for now + case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID: + break; + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + } + return true; + // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: + { + // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary) + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message); + } + return true; + case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT: + case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + break; } if (message != "") { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message); @@ -2513,14 +2554,13 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for // nodes hidden behind it. // - // Never relay transactions that we would assign a non-zero DoS - // score for, as we expect peers to do the same with us in that - // case. - if (!state.IsInvalid() || !TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) { + // Never relay transactions that might result in being + // disconnected (or banned). + if (state.IsInvalid() && TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) { + LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); + } else { LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); RelayTransaction(tx, connman); - } else { - LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } } } @@ -2590,21 +2630,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; CValidationState state; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { - if (state.IsInvalid() && received_new_header) { - // In this situation, the block header is known to be invalid. - // If we never created a CBlockIndex entry for it, then the - // header must be bad just by inspection (and is not one that - // looked okay but the block later turned out to be invalid for - // some other reason). - // We should punish compact block peers that give us an invalid - // header (other than a "duplicate-invalid" one, see - // ProcessHeadersMessage), so set via_compact_block to false - // here. - // TODO: when we switch from DoS scores to reasons that - // tx/blocks are invalid, this call should set - // via_compact_block to true, since MaybePunishNode will have - // sufficient information to act correctly. - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); + if (state.IsInvalid()) { + MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); return true; } } -- cgit v1.2.3