diff options
| author | Jonas Schnelli <jonas.schnelli@include7.ch> | 2015-06-01 15:42:34 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jonas Schnelli <jonas.schnelli@include7.ch> | 2015-06-01 15:42:34 +0200 |
| commit | a2241eabfdbdadd2f96c0a538b9901257831b642 (patch) | |
| tree | 060002f56048939282ddde01c8b0055237c329dd /share/certs | |
| parent | 87550eefc1131132e940efcaf296bb399eeb02df (diff) | |
[OSX] revert renaming of Bitcoin-Qt.app
Diffstat (limited to 'share/certs')
| -rw-r--r-- | share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md b/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md index cbd060c268..da299d168f 100644 --- a/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md +++ b/share/certs/PrivateKeyNotes.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ signing requests. For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine. The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is -unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Core.app bundle. +unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle. For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine. The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Threat analysis -- Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys, -allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Core.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid +allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid signature but containing a malicious binary. Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or |