From 997e4f4f0e92ccbc5f5cdf34c265c7e5e41fa4bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James O'Beirne <wild-github@au92.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 09:35:01 -0500
Subject: Update bip-vaults.mediawiki

Co-authored-by: kallewoof <kalle.alm@gmail.com>
---
 bip-vaults.mediawiki | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'bip-vaults.mediawiki')

diff --git a/bip-vaults.mediawiki b/bip-vaults.mediawiki
index 1ac8de9..3f56d01 100644
--- a/bip-vaults.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-vaults.mediawiki
@@ -476,9 +476,9 @@ If the above conditions do not fail, a single true value (<code>0x01</code>) is
 
 In order to prevent possible pinning attacks, recovery transactions must be replaceable.
 
-* When validating an <code>OP_VAULT</code>/<code>OP_UNVAULT</code> input being spent towards a recovery, the script must FAIL (by policy, not consensus) and terminate immediately if neither<ref>'''Why are recovery transactions required to be replaceable?''' In the case of unauthorized recoveries, an attacker may attempt to pin recovery transactions by broadcasting a "rebundled" version with a low fee rate. Vault owners must be able to overcome this with replacement. In the case of authorized recovery, if an attacker steals the recovery authorization key, the attacker may try to pin the recovery transaction during theft. Requiring replaceability ensures that the owner can always raise the fee rate of the recovery transaction, even if they are RBF rule #3 griefed in the process.</ref>
-*# the input is marked as opt-in replaceable by having an nSequence number less than <code>0xffffffff - 1</code>, per [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0125.mediawiki BIP-0125], nor
-*# the version of the recovery transaction has an nVersion equal to 3.
+* When validating an <code>OP_VAULT</code>/<code>OP_UNVAULT</code> input being spent towards a recovery, the script must FAIL (by policy, not consensus) and terminate immediately if both<ref>'''Why are recovery transactions required to be replaceable?''' In the case of unauthorized recoveries, an attacker may attempt to pin recovery transactions by broadcasting a "rebundled" version with a low fee rate. Vault owners must be able to overcome this with replacement. In the case of authorized recovery, if an attacker steals the recovery authorization key, the attacker may try to pin the recovery transaction during theft. Requiring replaceability ensures that the owner can always raise the fee rate of the recovery transaction, even if they are RBF rule #3 griefed in the process.</ref>
+*# the input is not marked as opt-in replaceable by having an nSequence number less than <code>0xffffffff - 1</code>, per [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0125.mediawiki BIP-0125], and
+*# the version of the recovery transaction has an nVersion other than 3.
 
 In order to prevent pinning attacks in the case of unauthorized recovery, the output structure of unauthorized recovery
 transaction is limited.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3

