From 6e7e5a252376e0be46617434bf5d7f8bd2ce4ecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tim Ruffing <crypto@timruffing.de>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2023 13:50:46 +0100
Subject: BIP341: Use the term "NUMS"

---
 bip-0341.mediawiki | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'bip-0341.mediawiki')

diff --git a/bip-0341.mediawiki b/bip-0341.mediawiki
index 3cb19a2..c3e35b6 100644
--- a/bip-0341.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0341.mediawiki
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ Satisfying any of these conditions is sufficient to spend the output.
 '''Initial steps''' The first step is determining what the internal key and the organization of the rest of the scripts should be. The specifics are likely application dependent, but here are some general guidelines:
 * When deciding between scripts with conditionals (<code>OP_IF</code> etc.) and splitting them up into multiple scripts (each corresponding to one execution path through the original script), it is generally preferable to pick the latter.
 * When a single condition requires signatures with multiple keys, key aggregation techniques like MuSig can be used to combine them into a single key. The details are out of scope for this document, but note that this may complicate the signing procedure.
-* If one or more of the spending conditions consist of just a single key (after aggregation), the most likely one should be made the internal key. If no such condition exists, it may be worthwhile adding one that consists of an aggregation of all keys participating in all scripts combined; effectively adding an "everyone agrees" branch. If that is inacceptable, pick as internal key a point with unknown discrete logarithm. One example of such a point is ''H = lift_x(0x50929b74c1a04954b78b4b6035e97a5e078a5a0f28ec96d547bfee9ace803ac0)'' which is [https://github.com/ElementsProject/secp256k1-zkp/blob/11af7015de624b010424273be3d91f117f172c82/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h#L16 constructed] by taking the hash of the standard uncompressed encoding of the [https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf secp256k1] base point ''G'' as X coordinate. In order to avoid leaking the information that key path spending is not possible it is recommended to pick a fresh integer ''r'' in the range ''0...n-1'' uniformly at random and use ''H + rG'' as internal key. It is possible to prove that this internal key does not have a known discrete logarithm with respect to ''G'' by revealing ''r'' to a verifier who can then reconstruct how the internal key was created.
+* If one or more of the spending conditions consist of just a single key (after aggregation), the most likely one should be made the internal key. If no such condition exists, it may be worthwhile adding one that consists of an aggregation of all keys participating in all scripts combined; effectively adding an "everyone agrees" branch. If that is inacceptable, pick as internal key a "Nothing Up My Sleeve" (NUMS) point, i.e., a point with unknown discrete logarithm. One example of such a point is ''H = lift_x(0x50929b74c1a04954b78b4b6035e97a5e078a5a0f28ec96d547bfee9ace803ac0)'' which is [https://github.com/ElementsProject/secp256k1-zkp/blob/11af7015de624b010424273be3d91f117f172c82/src/modules/rangeproof/main_impl.h#L16 constructed] by taking the hash of the standard uncompressed encoding of the [https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf secp256k1] base point ''G'' as X coordinate. In order to avoid leaking the information that key path spending is not possible it is recommended to pick a fresh integer ''r'' in the range ''0...n-1'' uniformly at random and use ''H + rG'' as internal key. It is possible to prove that this internal key does not have a known discrete logarithm with respect to ''G'' by revealing ''r'' to a verifier who can then reconstruct how the internal key was created.
 * If the spending conditions do not require a script path, the output key should commit to an unspendable script path instead of having no script path. This can be achieved by computing the output key point as ''Q = P + int(hash<sub>TapTweak</sub>(bytes(P)))G''. <ref>'''Why should the output key always have a taproot commitment, even if there is no script path?'''
 If the taproot output key is an aggregate of keys, there is the possibility for a malicious party to add a script path without being noticed by the other parties.
 This allows to bypass the multiparty policy and to steal the coin.
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