From 62a82092687d235ba48c9d0a77c9de56657c77a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 15:57:00 +0100
Subject: Add BIP151, Peer-to-Peer Communication Encryption

---
 bip-0151.mediawiki | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 178 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 bip-0151.mediawiki

(limited to 'bip-0151.mediawiki')

diff --git a/bip-0151.mediawiki b/bip-0151.mediawiki
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d3901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bip-0151.mediawiki
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+<pre>
+  BIP: 151
+  Title: Peer-to-Peer Communication Encryption
+  Author: Jonas Schnelli <dev@jonasschnelli.ch>
+  Status: Draft
+  Type: Standards Track
+  Created: 2016-03-23
+</pre>
+
+== Abstract ==
+
+This BIP describes an alternative way that a peer can encrypt their communication between a selective subset of remote peers.
+
+== Motivation ==
+
+
+The Bitcoin network does not encrypt communication between peers today. This opens up security issues (eg: traffic manipulation by others) and allows for mass surveillance / analysis of bitcoin users. Mostly this is negligible because of the nature of Bitcoins trust model, however for SPV nodes this can have significant privacy impacts [1] and could reduce the censorship-resistance of a peer.
+
+Encrypting peer traffic will make analysis and specific user targeting much more difficult than it currently is. Today it's trivial for a network provider or any other men-in-the-middle to identify a Bitcoin user and its controlled addresses/keys (and link with his Google profile, etc.). Just created and broadcasted transactions will reveal the amount and the payee to the network provider.
+
+This BIP also describes a way that data manipulation (blocking commands by a intercepting TCP/IP node) would be identifiable by the communicating peers.
+
+Analyzing the type of p2p communication would still be possible because of the characteristics (size, sending-interval, etc.) of the encrypted messages.
+
+Encrypting traffic between peers is already possible with VPN, tor, stunnel, curveCP or any other encryption mechanism on a deeper OSI level, however, most mechanism are not practical for SPV or other DHCP/NAT environment and will require significant knowhow in how to setup such a secure channel.
+
+== Specification ==
+
+A peer that supports encryption must accept encryption requests from all peers.
+
+A independent ECDH negotiation for both communication directions is required and therefore a bidirectional communication will use two symmetric cipher keys (one per direction).
+
+Both peers must only send encrypted messages after a successful ECDH negotiation in ''both directions''.
+
+Encryption initialization must happen before sending any other messages to the responding peer (<code>encinit</code> message after a <code>version</code> message must be ignored).
+
+=== Symmetric Encryption Cipher Keys ===
+
+The symmetric encryption cipher keys will be calculated with ECDH by sharing the pubkeys of a ephemeral key. Once the ECDH secret is calculated on each side, the symmetric encryption cipher keys must be calculated with <code>HMAC_SHA512(key=ecdh_secret|cipher-type,msg="encryption key")</code>.
+
+<code>K_1</code> must be the left 32bytes of the <code>HMAC_SHA512</code> hash.
+
+<code>K_2</code> must be the right 32bytes of the <code>HMAC_SHA512</code> hash.
+
+It is important to include the cipher-type into the symmetric cipher key to avoid weak-cipher-attacks.
+
+=== Session ID ===
+
+Both sides must also calculate the 256bit session-id using <code>HMAC_SHA256(key=ecdh_secret,msg="session id")</code>. The session-id can be used for linking the encryption-session to an identity check.
+
+=== The <code>encinit</code> message type ===
+
+To request encrypted communication, the requesting peer generates an EC ephemeral-session-keypair and sends an <code>encinit</code> message to the responding peer and waits for a <code>encack</code> message. The responding node must do the same <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction for the opposite communication direction.
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 33bytes || ephemeral-pubkey || comp.-pubkey || The session pubkey from the requesting peer
+|-
+| 1bytes || symmetric key cipher type  || int8 || symmetric key cipher type to use
+|}
+
+Possible symmetric key ciphers types
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Number !! symmetric key ciphers type
+|-
+| 0 || chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+|}
+
+=== ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suite ===
+
+ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein [2]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
+a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
+
+Poly1305, also by Daniel Bernstein [3], is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
+256 bit secret key.
+
+The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com specified and defined by openssh [4] combines these two primitives into an authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that proposed for TLS by Adam Langley [5], but differs in the layout of data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet lengths.
+
+<code>K_1</code> must be used to only encrypt the payload size of the encrypted message to avoid leaking information by revealing the message size.
+
+<code>K_2</code> must be used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD.
+
+Optimized implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305 are very fast in general, therefore it is very likely that encrypted messages require less CPU cycles per bytes then the current unencrypted p2p message format. A quick analysis by Pieter Wuille of the current ''standard implementations'' has shown that SHA256 requires more CPU cycles per byte then ChaCha20 & Poly1304 [5].
+
+=== The <code>encack</code> message type ===
+
+The responding peer accepts the encryption request by sending a <code>encack</code> message.
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 33bytes || ephemeral-pubkey || comp.-pubkey || The session pubkey from the responding peer
+|}
+
+At this point, the shared secret key for the symmetric key cipher must be calculated by using ECDH (own privkey x remote pub key).
+Private keys will never be transmitted. The shared secret can only be calculated if an attacker knows at least one private key and the remote peer's public key.
+
+* '''The <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction must be done from both sides.'''
+* Each communication direction uses its own secret key for the symmetric cipher.
+* The second <code>encinit</code> request (from the responding peer) must use the same symmetric cipher type.
+* All unencrypted messages before the second <code>encack</code> response (from the responding peer) must be ignored.
+* After a successful <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction, the "encrypted messages structure" must be used. Non-encrypted messages from the requesting peer must lead to a connection termination.
+
+After a successful <code>encinit</code>/<code>encack</code> interaction from both sides, the messages format must use the "encrypted messages structure". Non-encrypted messages from the requesting peer must lead to a connection termination (can be detected by the 4 byte network magic in the unencrypted message structure).
+
+=== Encrypted Messages Structure  ===
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| 4 || length || uint32_t || Length of ciphertext payload in number of bytes
+|-
+| ? || ciphertext payload || ? || One or many ciphertext command & message data
+|-
+| 16 || MAC tag || ? || 128bit MAC-tag
+|}
+
+Encrypted messages do not have the 4byte network magic.
+
+The maximum message length needs to be chosen carefully. The 4 byte length field can lead to a required message buffer of 4 GiB.
+Processing the message before the authentication succeeds must not be done.
+
+The 4byte sha256 checksum is no longer required because the AEAD.
+
+Both peers need to track the message number (int64) of sent messages to the remote peer for building a symmetric cipher IV. Padding might be required (96bit IVs).
+
+The encrypted payload will result decrypted in one or many unencrypted messages:
+
+{|class="wikitable"
+! Field Size !! Description !! Data type !! Comments
+|-
+| ? || command || varlen || ASCII string identifying the packet content, we are using varlen in the encrypted messages.
+|-
+| 4 || length || uint32_t || Length of plaintext payload
+|-
+| ? || payload || ? || The actual data
+|}
+If more data is present, another message must be deserialized. There is no explicit amount-of-messages integer.
+
+
+=== Re-Keying ===
+
+A responding peer can inform the requesting peer over a re-keying with a <code>encack</code> message containing 33byte of zeros to indicate that all encrypted message following after this <code>encack</code> message will be encrypted with ''the next symmetric cipher key''.
+
+The new symmetric cipher key will be calculated by <code>SHA256(SHA256(old_symetric_cipher_key))</code>.
+
+Re-Keying interval is a peer policy with a minimum timespan of 10 seconds.
+
+The Re-Keying must be done after every 1GB of data sent or received (recommended by RFC4253 SSH Transport).
+
+=== Risks ===
+
+The encryption does not include an identity authentication scheme. This BIP does not cover a proposal to avoid MITM attacks during the encryption initialization. 
+
+Identity authentication will be covered in another BIP and will presume communication encryption after this BIP.
+
+== Compatibility ==
+
+This proposal is backward compatible. Non-supporting peers will ignore the <code>encinit</code> messages.
+
+== Reference implementation ==
+
+== References ==
+
+* [1] http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:48205/eth-48205-01.pdf
+* [2] ChaCha20 http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+* [3] Poly1305 http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
+* [4] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/05855bf2ce7d5cd0a6db18bc0b4214ed5ef7516d/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
+* [5] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
+
+== Acknowledgements ==
+* Pieter Wuille and Gregory Maxwell for most of the ideas in this BIP.
+
+== Copyright ==
+This work is placed in the public domain.
+
+
-- 
cgit v1.2.3

