From cc122a76ef50b1a8607a5c4541f352a705bd112e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steve Lee <moneyball@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2019 12:19:16 -0800
Subject: fixed minor typo

---
 bip-0079.mediawiki | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'bip-0079.mediawiki')

diff --git a/bip-0079.mediawiki b/bip-0079.mediawiki
index 7d0cc57..ca6179e 100644
--- a/bip-0079.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0079.mediawiki
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ This document is licensed under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal license.
 
 One of the most powerful blockchain analysis heuristics has been to assume all inputs of a transaction are controlled by a single party unless otherwise known (such as by the distinctive structure of a traditional coinjoin, or multisig spends that are validated onchain). Combined with other techniques (notably change-output guessing) this has lead to unexpectedly accurate tracking that has exposed bitcoin participants to unacceptable personal, business and financial risks -- undermining bitcoin's utility and fungibility -- and ultimately jeopardizing its ability to function as useful money.
 
-We however can bust these assumption with a sender-receiver coinjoin. To prevent costless spy/DoS attacks, we require the sending party to provide a fully-valid ready-to-propagate transaction to initiate the process, that the receiver can broadcast if the sender never completes the coinjoin thus tying the cost to that of spending a utxo. Most promisingly, bustapay transactions do not have an identifiable structure so any network analysis will be not able to tell if a given transaction is a bustapay transaction or not which erodes the confidence of their entire models, providing positive externalities for the entire bitcoin ecosystem.
+We however can bust these assumptions with a sender-receiver coinjoin. To prevent costless spy/DoS attacks, we require the sending party to provide a fully-valid ready-to-propagate transaction to initiate the process, that the receiver can broadcast if the sender never completes the coinjoin thus tying the cost to that of spending a utxo. Most promisingly, bustapay transactions do not have an identifiable structure so any network analysis will be not able to tell if a given transaction is a bustapay transaction or not which erodes the confidence of their entire models, providing positive externalities for the entire bitcoin ecosystem.
 
 Bustapay transactions also do not grow the receiver's count of unspent transaction outputs, and in fact gives the receiver an opportunity to better manage their utxo set, something normally only done when sending payments. Large utxo sets are often problematic and expensive, and frequently requiring privacy-destroying consolidation.  Besides busting clustering assumptions, bustapay also provides a layer of obfuscation of send amounts.
 
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cgit v1.2.3

