From d6e848dc4b07ae2c84796fee73b593b6f8120914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luke Dashjr <luke-jr+git@utopios.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 16:44:21 +0000
Subject: bip-0002: Updates from Q&A with Mustafa Al-Bassam

---
 bip-0002.mediawiki | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'bip-0002.mediawiki')

diff --git a/bip-0002.mediawiki b/bip-0002.mediawiki
index d9a0ede..a667026 100644
--- a/bip-0002.mediawiki
+++ b/bip-0002.mediawiki
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ A process BIP may change status from Draft to Active when it achieves rough cons
 
 See [[bip-0123.mediawiki|BIP 123]] for definitions of the various BIP layers. Activation of this BIP implies activation of BIP 123.
 
-A soft-fork BIP strictly requires a clear miner majority expressed by blockchain voting (eg, using BIP 9). In addition, if the economy seems willing to make a "no confidence" hard-fork (such as a change in proof-of-work algorithm), the soft-fork does not become Final for as long as such a hard-fork has potentially-majority support, or at most three months. Soft-fork BIPs may also set additional requirements for their adoption. Because of the possibility of changes to miner dynamics, especially in light of delegated voting (mining pools), it is highly recommended that a supermajority vote around 95% be required by the BIP itself, unless rationale is given for a lower threshold.
+A soft-fork BIP strictly requires a clear miner majority expressed by blockchain voting (eg, using BIP 9). In addition, if the economy seems willing to make a "no confidence" hard-fork (such as a change in proof-of-work algorithm), the soft-fork does not become Final for as long as such a hard-fork might have majority support, or at most three months. Soft-fork BIPs may also set additional requirements for their adoption. Because of the possibility of changes to miner dynamics, especially in light of delegated voting (mining pools), it is highly recommended that a supermajority vote around 95% be required by the BIP itself, unless rationale is given for a lower threshold.
 
 A hard-fork BIP requires adoption from the entire Bitcoin economy, particularly including those selling desirable goods and services in exchange for bitcoin payments, as well as Bitcoin holders who wish to spend or would spend their bitcoins (including selling for other currencies) differently in the event of such a hard-fork. Adoption must be expressed by de facto usage of the hard-fork in practice (ie, not merely expressing public support, although that is a good step to establish agreement before adoption of the BIP). This economic adoption cannot be established merely by a super-majority, except by literally forcing the minority to accept the hard-fork (whether this is viable or not is outside the scope of this document).
 
@@ -68,6 +68,15 @@ But they're doing something important and have invested a lot in Bitcoin! Should
 
 * This BIP does not aim to address what "should" be the basis of decisions. Such a statement, no matter how perfect in its justification, would be futile without some way to force others to use it. The BIP process does not aim to be a kind of forceful "governance" of Bitcoin, merely to provide a collaborative repository for proposing and providing information on standards, which people may voluntarily adopt or not. It can only hope to achieve accuracy in regard to the "Status" field by striving to reflect the reality of *how things actually are*, rather than *how they should be*.
 
+What if a single merchant wishes to block a hard-fork?
+
+* This BIP addresses only the progression of the BIP Status field, not the deployment of the hard-fork (or any other change) itself.
+* Regardless, one shop cannot operate in a vacuum: if they are indeed alone, they will soon find themselves no longer selling in exchange for bitcoin payments, as nobody else would exist willing to use the previous blockchain to pay them. If they are no longer selling, they cease to meet the criteria herein which enables their veto.
+
+How about a small number of merchants (maybe only two) who sell products to each other?
+
+* In this scenario, it would seem the previous Bitcoin is alive any working, and that the hard-fork has failed. How to resolve such a split is outside the scope of this BIP.
+
 How can economic agreement veto a soft-fork?
 
 * The group of miners is determined by the consensus rules for the dynamic-membership multi-party signature (for Bitcoin, the proof-of-work algorithm), which can be modified with a hard-fork. Thus, if the same conditions required to modify this group are met in opposition to a soft-fork, the miner majority supporting the soft-fork is effectively void because the economy can decide to replace them with another group of would-be miners who do not support the soft-fork.
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cgit v1.2.3

